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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa is well known for the country’s model of racialized territorial government called 
apartheid and the successful transition to constitutional democracy in April 1994. The South 
African Constitution provides a framework for the progressive realization of human rights as a 
measure of transitional justice. The Constitution guarantees land reform to account for histories 
of racialized dispossession. However, critics argue that land remains insecure for millions of 
racialized peoples living in rural areas who remain subject to forms of undemocratic chiefly 
authority. Existing scholarship argues that rural land insecurity is due in part to a failure to 
legislate an appropriate post-colonial and emancipatory version of customary law as a basis for 
collective land rights. A common line of argument is that there are two ways of interpreting 
customary law – as either codified in law, as it was during colonialism, or as ‘living’ customary 
law, referring to an imagined historical evolution of custom in response to a democratic 
transition and changing social and economic conditions. For example, literature often focuses on 
traditional leadership in South Africa and argues that this model of governance, while based on 
cultural rights as protected in the Constitution, relies on ethnic and territorial control reminiscent 
of the Bantustan reserves under apartheid. In this dissertation I demonstrate that a dichotomous 
view of customary law, as either codified or living, is inaccurate in contemporary conditions of 
neoliberalism wherein forms of authority and subjectivity and claims to territorial control are 
characterized by multiple actors engaged in networked and horizontal relationships of power. In 
these conditions, I show, an ethic of transformative constitutionalism paired with forms of 
government characteristic of neoliberalism have opened opportunities for new articulations of 
human rights, custom and property, that contribute to the emergence of ‘living law’ and new 
forms of territorialisation. Moreover, I demonstrate that the transnational indigenous rights 
movement, and the vernacularization of indigenous rights in South Africa, are unsettling colonial 
and post-colonial assumptions about customary law in the contemporary period. The 
characteristics of living law that I identify emerge at the intersection of constitutional law, 
human rights, customary law, and transnational norms on peasant and indigenous rights through 
the activities of state agencies, non-governmental organizations, activist lawyers, and 
corporations who marshal different forms of legitimacy and authority. The dissertation draws 
from the disciplines of sociolegal studies, legal geography, and legal anthropology, and 
contributes to work on the topics of human rights, property, neoliberalism, Indigenous Peoples’ 
rights, customary law, and rural land rights.   
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1 INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY, TERRITORY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAND REFORM 
 
1.1 Introduction  
In March 2015 I attended a two-day training session on land and human rights for paralegals 
working in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa.1 During a presentation on the 
constitutional protection of human rights and security of tenure, the participant  I was sitting 
beside turned to me and said quietly, ‘we don’t have rights here, we have chiefs’. In addition to 
reminding me of the continuing power of chieftaincy in rural South Africa (Ainslie and Kepe 
2016), he evoked two distinct normative worlds, one pertaining to human rights and the other the 
field of customary law. For the participant and others I met during my research fieldwork, the 
authority of human rights belongs to the state legal system, while the authority of customary law 
is held by chiefs or traditional leaders.2 This dichotomous perspective can be traced back to the 
European colonial imposition of a ‘universal’ modern law which in effect created a universalised 
difference – a  customary, savage, and pre-modern ‘other’ (Fitzpatrick 2001) - and to the 
ideological work of colonists who used ‘custom’ as the  marker of this difference and a strategy 
of colonial governance (Mamdani 1996). While this participant’s remark conveyed a perspective 
commonly held by rural people and activists in South Africa, contemporary rights-based 
struggles across the country suggest that this historical distinction is far from stable and might in 
fact, be crumbling. Indeed, the very context that we were in (a workshop on constitutionally 
protected land rights facilitated by members of a research institute and local non-governmental 
organizations) illustrates the fact that human rights, traditional authority, customary law, and 
                                                 
1 The training session was facilitated by the Centre for Law and Society, where I was a visiting researcher. I 
attended the session as an observer and researcher.  
2 ‘Chief’ and ‘Traditional Leader’ are used synonymously throughout this dissertation.  
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property are sites of struggle that simultaneously bear the scars of colonialism and apartheid and 
shape the promise of land reform for the future.    
1.2 Colonialism: Law, territory, and rural subjects 
Apartheid South Africa created territorial jurisdictions by dividing the country between land 
owned by settlers and land merely occupied by the colonized. Land area was marked off and 
divided into reserves, called Bantustans, which were meant to become self-governing and 
independent from the South African settler state. These areas encompassed thirteen percent of 
the country’s land. Outside of such reserves racialized African peoples had no citizenship rights 
nor were they permitted to own land. Within these territorial jurisdictions there were also distinct 
legal geographies constructed through the colonially mandated authority of African chiefs and 
what was recognized as customary law. Custom was codified in colonial and apartheid statutes to 
serve the interests of settler governments seeking to control both land and the movement and 
labour of African subjects.  
Colonial state strategy produced rural African subjects under the authority of traditional 
leaders – a subject position that contrasted with the ‘citizens’ of the state – a form of government 
that operated principally through ‘recognition’ of customary law as cultural difference. A 
dichotomous view that pitted custom against modern law and divided African rural subjects from 
urban citizens was sedimented over centuries of colonization and solidified during half a century 
of apartheid; conditions famously characterized by Mahmoud Mamdani as a bifurcated state 
(Mamdani 1998). While this bifurcated state certainly existed in law and policy, research based 
upon ethnographic fieldwork challenges this dichotomy in the lived reality of African peoples, 
by  demonstrating the fluidity of customary authorities, the nature of the historical allegiance 
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African peoples held for chiefs, and the dynamic and changing practices of customary law in 
South Africa (Crais 2006, White 2015, see also Englund 2012).  
Apartheid, as a legal and political form of rule, ended with the first democratic elections 
in 1994 and the introduction of a constitutional democracy. As I show in this dissertation, the 
legal geographies produced through histories of colonialism and apartheid are being re-
configured through the integrated effects of constitutionalism -- characterized by a commitment 
to the progressive realization of land rights for previously dispossessed peoples --and the forces 
and conditions of neoliberalism. In this conjuncture, contemporary struggles over collective title 
to rural land are defined by new and emergent forms of indigeneity and customary law and the 
entangled territorialities they legitimate.      
1.3 The Constitution, traditional leadership, and collective land rights 
The advent of democracy in 1994 introduced a new government and legal framework to facilitate 
complete structural social and economic transformation of the country. Justiciable 
constitutionalism was the means by which transition to democracy was to be achieved in South 
Africa-- the framework through which seemingly unresolvable conflicts between members of the 
previous apartheid state and the new government could be negotiated (Klug 2000, 18). The 1996 
Final Constitution and the Constitutional Court are the foundation on which the commitment to 
and ethos of progressive change captured in the phrase ‘transformative constitutionalism’ was to 
be realized (Klare 1998). The globally celebrated 1996 Final Constitution entrenched a Bill of 
Rights affirming that human rights are indivisible and justiciable in the country.  
Democratic South Africa adopted a number of distinct measures of transitional justice, 
including land reform – a project enshrined in the Constitution (Section 25). Land reform has 
long been charged with the task of instantiating visions of a new South Africa; it represents a 
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dream of redrawing the map of South Africa through a process dependent on the legalization and 
judicialization of land struggles (James 2007). Land reform consists of three distinct projects, 
land restitution, land redistribution, and land tenure reform, each of which is motivated by an 
attempt to address histories of race-based discrimination and secure tenure for those previously 
dispossessed of land rights under colonialism and apartheid. However, twenty-five years after the 
end of apartheid, land remains insecure for millions of racialized peoples living in rural areas 
whose livelihoods are dependent upon land tenure relations unrecognized by the state. 
Critics explain continued rural land insecurity in South Africa through a set of interlinked 
arguments. First, they argue that a key issue is the persistence of undemocratic chiefly authority. 
Chiefly power, they argue, is based on the contemporary legislative protection of traditional 
territories, governed by traditional leaders and their councils (Claassens 2015). Ironically, 
however, the boundaries of traditional territories mirror the territorial demarcations created 
during apartheid. Thus the spatial distribution and jurisdiction of traditional authorities remains 
entirely unchanged as customary law is codified through legislation in democratic South Africa. 
This form of rural governance is being challenged, however, by Constitutional Court judgements 
that have developed a progressive form of customary law now referred to as ‘living customary 
law’ (Claassens and Budlender 2015).  
Living customary law refers to an interpretation of custom that focuses on its evolving 
and changing character. It is defined as much by what it is as by what it is not: it stands in stark 
contrast to the version of ‘codified’ customary law protected in legislation. As I show throughout 
this dissertation, living customary law is used in three primary ways by different sets of actors. 
First, it is a term used by the Constitutional Court. Second, it is a term adopted by empirical 
researchers as a way to describe rural tenure relations. Third, it is a term used in social 
5 
 
mobilization, activism, and community organizing. These distinctions do not mean that each of 
the three uses of living customary law is completely separate from the others. On the contrary, 
each use of the term by different sets of actors informs its mobilization in other fields. For 
example, it is precisely the emergence of living customary law in the vocabulary of the 
Constitutional Court that gave researchers the incentive to adopt this phrasing. Across all 
contexts in which it is articulated, living customary law is used to affirm a democratic model of 
(living) customary law in contrast to an autocratic and patriarchal interpretation of (codified) 
customary law in a new South Africa that emphasizes norms of participatory deliberation and 
gender equality.  
 As I argue in this dissertation, however, this dichotomous view of customary law - as 
either codified or living - is still inaccurate in contemporary conditions of neoliberalism wherein 
claims to territorial control and forms of authority and subjectivity emerge through the collective 
work of multiple actors engaged in networked and horizontal relationships of power. The 
generative nature of these relationships in South Africa is significantly influenced both by the 
context of transformative constitutionalism and new forms of government characteristic of 
neoliberal governmentality. In these dynamics I identify the emergence of what is best 
understood as ‘living law’. Living law refers to an amalgam of state and non-state law initiated 
by the determination of communities and their advocates to assert renewed land tenure 
arrangements in the post-apartheid era. The range of actors that populate the narrative of this 
dissertation contribute to the emergence of living law as they draw from and leverage customary 
law, constitutionally enshrined human rights standards, Indigenous Peoples’ human rights, 
Aboriginal title, and transnational human rights norms. Living law emerges in conditions 
characteristic of what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls “interlegality”, understood as “legal 
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porosity… multiple networks of legal orders” that community members, their advocates, and 
state institutions and actors “transition and trespass between” in efforts to revitalize customary 
law (Santos 1987, 298). Finally, despite its diverse and transnational influences, living law is 
localized, and in effect has a transformative and constitutive effect on territorial forms of 
authority and power in contemporary South Africa. 
1.4 Property and territorialization in conditions of neoliberalism  
Behind assertions of living customary law there is an unacknowledged assumption: the belief 
that property reform initiated ‘from the ground up’ will automatically reconfigure territorial 
authorities and forms of government. This perspective is in part the product of the land reform 
program which was designed to identify and transfer parcels of property to individual or 
collective owners. Land reform legislation is premised on a socially and legally positivist fantasy 
and a modern liberal conception of property focused on exclusive ownership and hierarchical 
power relations (Smith 2008, 54, van der Walt 2008). These hidden premises were concealed in 
the early political promise of land reform but have surfaced through the long, difficult, and often 
painful process of land reform administration and its outcomes for those who expected to be its 
beneficiaries (James 2007, Nustad 2011, Beyers and Fay 2015). Geographers and political 
ecologists have long identified a constitutive relationship between territory, government and 
property. Their insights suggest that any presumption that land reform consists of a transfer of 
property detached from territorial forms of government and authority needs to be questioned.  
To understand the relationship between territory and property, however, we need to begin 
with land tenure. Land tenure is the most general optic through which to understand relationships 
between people with respect to the land they use or live upon; from tenure we can identify how 
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land becomes a subject of human rights, property, and territory. In the context of South African 
land reform, ‘land tenure’  
. . . refers to a set of rights which a person or group holds in land. It concerns 
who can use which resources, for how long and under what conditions. 
‘Tenure’ is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among 
people as individuals or groups with respect to land and associated natural 
resources (Smith 2008, 36).  
 
‘Tenure reform’, explains Henk Smith, “refers to the amendment or reform of particular types of 
land access and control” (Smith 2008, 36). In democratic South Africa land tenure has become 
an issue of human rights through land reform, which is a human rights-based system. As 
explained in the White Paper on Land Reform:  
In order to deliver security of tenure a rights-based approach has been 
adopted… all tenure reform processes must recognize and accommodate the de 
facto vested rights which exist on the ground. Vested interests would include 
legal rights, as well as interests which have come to exist without formal legal 
recognition (DLA 1997, 84).  
 
The rights at stake in land tenure reform processes are multiple and distinctive to each situated 
example. Rights to land use for agriculture, cattle grazing, fishing, or residency could all be at 
stake in different contexts. As demonstrated in this dissertation, land reform is far from a 
technocratic or bureaucratic exercise that can easily be accomplished through title and the 
transfer of rights; it involves complex social and political negotiations in the specific historical 
conditions from which they arise (see Verdery 2003, James 2007).  
Land becomes an issue of property relations only in specific historical, cultural, and 
political contexts. Property in this dissertation does not refer to a naturalized ‘thing’ or even to 
the proverbial “bundle of rights” but is the result of historically and culturally specific sets of 
understandings, meanings, and relations. Chris Hann, a prominent anthropologist of property, 
argues that “[t]he word ‘property’ is best seen as directing attention to the vast field of cultural as 
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well as social relations, to the symbolic as well as the material context within which things are 
recognized and personal as well as collective identities made” (1998, 5). This approach draws 
attention to both a “cultural sense and power relations” (Hann 1998, 34). As a regime constituted 
by sets of relationships and processes, property is simultaneously a “cultural system, a set of 
social relations, and an organization of power” (Verdery 2003, 19).  
Land reform in South Africa has necessitated that struggles over land be rendered as 
property struggles.3 Political ecologist Scott Prudham argues that property forms are often 
explained according to concrete abstractions, such as exclusive or transferable, communal, state, 
public, etc., but  while such abstraction may be necessary for classification and general 
description, “it is also the case that actual property rights are typically much more complex and 
hybrid in character, and that the more closely we look, sometimes the more complex the situation 
becomes" (2015, 438). My concern is with the processes, subject-positions, and agencies through 
which property rights are struggled over. Property forms are negotiated through institutions that 
both legitimate and guarantee rights, as well as in constitutive claims to authority and/or 
citizenship (Lund 2011, Lund and Peluso 2011). In South African conditions of constitutionalism 
and neoliberalism, it is also often necessary (depending on the characteristics of the case study) 
to consider how property relations are performed, legitimated and stabilized through assemblages 
of state and non-state actors articulating different forms of formal or informal legality. In such 
conditions, property can be product of inscriptions made via material objects and cultural 
practices as well as ideas about boundaries and the interpretation of case law (see Blomley 2013, 
                                                 
3 As anthropologist Paul Nasady explains, there is no natural link between land and property. Through his work with 
Canadian First Nations he argues that starting with the question ‘what is property’ presumes that property, which has 
its origins in western and European capitalism, is a relevant category in all contexts. He argues that an 
anthropological study of property should begin by asking why and under what conditions people struggle over 
property in the first place (Nadasdy, 2002:251). This approach explores how people engage with notions of property 
and interrogates what is at stake in a particular struggle over propertied relationships. 
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Heatherington 2011). In this dissertation, spatialization of property relations is a key concern, 
because property "is an empty formalism unless it is materialized in the world, in part through 
spatial arrangements" (Blomley 2015, 136). Spatialization of property relations are configured 
through processes of territorialization.  
Existing scholarship in geography and political ecology argues that assertions that 
property relations exist outside of the broader relations of power and government in which they 
are constituted misrepresent a more complex political reality. The concept of territory helps us to 
focus upon changing forms of spatialized government. For example, political ecologists Peter 
Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso (1994) argue that territoriality is a useful way to understand how 
states express power over natural resources to regulate people’s rights to access and use these. 
They refer to the ‘internal’ territorialization of state power through multiple state agencies and 
technologies of mapping, for example, as a method of controlling land-based resources and 
people’s access to them. In the context of neoliberalism, however, the imagined spatiality of the 
state as an actor governing vertically is challenged by communities, their advocates, NGOs, and 
private industry, who transform such state territorialities through transnational activities 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002). As anthropologist James Ferguson explains, "[t]he central effect of 
the new forms of transnational governmentality… is not so much to make states weak (or strong) 
as to reconfigure the way that states are able to spatialize their authority and stake claims to 
superior generality and universality" (Ferguson 2006, 112).  
A growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship demonstrates how a multiplicity of 
transnationalized authorities untethered to a single state tend to coalesce in ‘global assemblages’ 
and in effect produce emergent forms of governmentality that traverse scales and territories (e.g.: 
Collier and Ong 2005). Contemporary conditions of neoliberalism have re-configured state 
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power to the extent that the relationship between territorialization and power needs to be 
understood in the context of the nation-state’s fragmentation and the multiplication of actors 
engaged in the production of new forms of government (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 
Prudham and Coleman 2011). Neoliberalism should be understood, then, as a process of 
neoliberalization, which has a variegated character and produces geo-institutional differentiation 
across places, territories, and scales (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 184).  In South Africa, 
neoliberalization processes encompass both the situated and historically sedimented institutional 
landscape of apartheid and the new processes of constitutionalism as well as emergent forms of 
neoliberal governmentality. These are “patterned and patterning processes… continuous path-
dependent collisions between inherited institutional landscapes and emergent, path-(re)shaping 
programmes of regulatory reorganization” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 202, emphasis in 
original).  
Widely dispersed and fragmented laws and actors may be identified in South African 
processes of land reform. Literature on post-apartheid land reform demonstrates that land reform 
legislation has not produced certainty in how to achieve justice for the previously dispossessed, 
but is the subject of intense and ongoing struggle (see, for example, the many volumes dedicated 
to property and  the legal and policy issues relevant to land reform. E.g: Claassens and Cousins 
2008; Cousins and Walker 2015; Hornby et al 2017; James 2007; van der Walt 2009, Klug 
2018).  As recently as early 2019 there were multiple bills – either newly introduced or amended 
- related to land reform making their way through the legislative process (see also Humby et al, 
2014).4 State law and policy, moreover, is overlaid and influenced by international treaties, 
                                                 
4 The Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs lists in their 2018 annual report seven Bills being 
processed: The Regulation of Agricultural Land Bill, 2018; Communal Land Tenure Bill, 2018; Rural Development 
Bill, 2018; Deeds Registries Amendment Bill, 2018; Sectional Titles Amendment Bill, 2018; Land Survey 
Amendment Bill, 2018. These do not include the Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill of 2015 (passed by the 
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international human rights norms, and transnational norms on indigenous and rural peoples’ 
rights. Such conditions, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, provide new opportunities for 
advocates asserting their rights to land but also create further complexity by generating 
competing claims for resources.    
Many researchers working in South Africa demonstrate linkages between processes of 
neoliberalization and new forms of state spatiality; they see these as an outcome of regulatory 
differentiation and contradictions in the policy process. However, much of the existing work 
focuses on social service provision in urban and peri-urban settings (Yates and Harris 2018, 
Narsiah 2013). The particular role of transnational norms, mobilized through actors operating in 
multiple sites and sectors across different scales, and the production of spatial and regulatory 
differentiation in rural areas remains understudied. In South Africa, I show how such 
territorializations are the effect of variegated forms of neoliberal government, whereby 
traditional leaders and NGOs (including human rights and environmental organizations), 
corporate actors (in mining and agriculture), and state agencies actively produce and negotiate 
national and transnational norms in localized struggles for control over rural land. These 
territorializations have direct consequence for how property relations are made legitimate and 
authoritative in conditions of neoliberalism (Prudham and Coleman 2011, Sikor and Lund 2010).  
Neoliberalism goes hand in hand with new forms of transnational solidarity and 
mobilization. Indigenous rights struggles in South Africa have emerged in transnational 
solidarity with NGOs and indigenous activists (Crawhall 2011, Sylvain 2017), as they have 
elsewhere on the continent (Hodgson 2011, Sapignoli 2018). The role of transnational advocacy 
networks in rural struggles for land has received less attention (cf. Edelman and Borras 2016, 73) 
                                                 
National Council of Provinces in January 2019) or the Land Restitution Amendment Bill, which relapsed in 
February 2019. See Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 2018, pg 16-17.  
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but multiple local land activists that I spoke with during my fieldwork had been supported by 
NGOs to travel and meet with other rural peoples engaged in land struggles in Africa as well as 
in Asia and South America. These activities encourage an engagement with transnational norms 
on indigenous and rural land rights that inform most of the land rights struggles I identify 
throughout this dissertation.     
In these conjunctures peoples have sought new forms of recognition for their land and 
histories of dispossession, and in the process they have begun to make their collective 
subjectivities and their attachments to land legible in new ways and to new actors. Political 
scientist James Scott used the trope of ‘making legible’ to refer to the tactics engaged in by the 
‘high modern’ state to identify and intervene in social life for the purposes of governing it (Scott 
1998). In Seeing Like a State Scott analyses the specific tools and technologies developed by 
modern states to simplify and standardize populations, economies, and territories for the purpose 
of governmental intervention. He reviews strategies such as maps, surveys, and programs to 
simplify and standardize names and explains how these state strategies contributed to modern 
forms of state government. Importantly, however, Scott argues that such technologies for making 
them legible were never completely accurate or successful in controlling populations. These 
were as much fictions of state as functions of state. Nonetheless, “[b]acked by state power 
through records, courts, and ultimately coercion, these state fictions transformed the reality they 
presumed to observe, although never so thoroughly as to precisely fit the grid” (Scott 1998, 24). 
Under neoliberal forms of government, technologies and rationalities for making the social 
legible for intervention emerge from a much wider constellation of actors, NGO’s, and social 
reformers (Li 2005).5   
                                                 
5 Tania Li argues that these actors are not motivated by ‘high modernity’ but by a more amorphous ‘will to improve’ 
(Li 2005). However, her concept of the ‘will to improve’ does not adequately account for the dynamics and 
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Law provides an impetus and tool in the creation of new technologies of legibility as land 
reform beneficiaries struggle to secure their land rights through gains in courts. Legal geographer 
Nicholas Blomley writes, “[l]egibility… has a special relationship to law… Law is centrally 
concerned with two acts: inscription - the practice of naming and marking - and reading - that is, 
the determining of  meaning… Law, like other forms of state action, entails particular ways of 
seeing” (2008, 1826).  He directs socio-legal scholars to interrogate the forms of legibility that 
emerge through law; his work invites an analysis of legal and human rights-based struggles and 
the kinds of legibility emergent in the context of transformative constitutionalism.  
The conditions that enable these assertions include community recognition under 
neoliberalism and the opportunities for such collective subjects to identify themselves to a range 
of agents beyond the state (Coombe 2011a, 2011b, 2016). Under conditions of neoliberalism 
‘communities’ have emerged as responsibilized subjects to replace the ‘social’ as the new mode 
through which social life is made legible and targeted for intervention by governance strategies 
(Miller and Rose 2008, 88); an insight elaborated in existing research on community in the 
context of land reform (Beyers and Fay 2015). This requires, however, moving our inquiries 
beyond state-based frames of reference to consider how assertions of custom and cultural 
practices, for example, that may be illegible to the state appeal to a much wider set of authorities 
and normative frameworks (see Coombe and Weiss 2015). In the conjuncture of transnational 
Indigenous Peoples’ struggles, neoliberalism, and constitutionalism we can identify new and 
emerging forms of legitimacy and legibility that are constitutive to land tenure security.   
                                                 
motivations that mobilize living customary law as a rights-based and democratic version of custom, as described in 
this dissertation.  
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1.5 Sociolegal Studies and the politics of human rights and indigeneity  
This dissertation is informed by interpretivist socio-legal scholarship that approaches law as a 
lens and means through which people conceive, interpret, interact with, and make sense of the 
world (Geertz 1973, Coombe 1998, Merry 1990). I examine the constitutive nature of law in 
society (Hunt 1994) and am inspired by early Marxist humanist scholarship that demonstrates 
how law can be oppressive as well as a weapon used by the oppressed to hold accountable those 
in positions of power and transform the conditions in which the marginalized live (Thompson 
1975; Hay et al 1975 [2011]): "law is simultaneously a maker of hegemony and a means of 
resistance" (Lazarus-Black and Hirsch 1994, 9). To this end I draw from more recent scholarship 
on the anthropology of human rights and thereby approach rights and custom as interpretive 
resources in ongoing struggles over land tenure. 
Legal anthropologists who focus on human rights examine local interpretations and 
articulations of human rights norms and the performance of rights claims in transnational 
contexts (e.g. Wilson and Mitchell 2003, Goodale and Merry 2007, Merry 2009). By 
interrogating how international legal instruments are used in diverse, local contexts, 
anthropologists show how human rights are mobilized in the ‘vernacular’ of localized struggle in 
ways unforeseen and unimagined by lawyers and policy-makers who toil over the drafting of UN 
human rights instruments. They explore, for example, how international norms influence local 
identity and subjectivity, and vice versa, particularly in the context of neoliberal globalization 
and the proliferation of NGOs participating in international struggles (Speed 2008).  Moreover, 
scholars who study the translation of human rights into local contexts do not deal simply with 
two normative orders (i.e. ‘human rights’ and the ‘customary’) but rather focus on processes 
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through which multiple normative claims may be asserted and leveraged by diverse actors in any 
given situation (Eckert et al 2012, Englund 2012).  
Legal anthropologists focused on human rights in South Africa have, for example, 
explored the ‘juridification’ of politics through legal struggles (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003), 
the everyday politics of claiming space through squatting in Cape Town (Makhulu 2015), how 
the long-term effects of violence are embodied and translated in litigation (Kesselring 2017), and 
illustrate the limited influence of reconciliatory justice promoted by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in neighbourhoods where ‘traditional’ forms of retributive justice persist (Wilson 
2001). Human rights have been shown to provide an important language through which peoples 
make claims against the state, asserting and re-articulating their citizenship (Von Schnitzler 
2014) and provide a means for marginalized peoples to disrupt governmental orders by re-
asserting themselves into legislative processes and policy-making (Salmeczi 2015).  
The struggles that I identify can be understood through an approach to citizenship 
identified by geographer Bottina von Lieres, who argues that in South Africa emergent political 
subjectivities and struggles for inclusive citizenship  
largely define themselves outside of formal state institutions and through 
highly localized processes of horizontal identification and mobilization. These 
localized non-state spaces of political representation (eg. community groups 
and local associations) have emerged as the only viable political arenas for the 
enactment of citizens’ rights in reaction to an unresponsive state (von Lieres 
2016, 207, see also von Lieres and Robins 2008). 
 
It is by focusing on the construction of collective subjectivities in specific legal and political 
conditions that I study the politics of indigeneity in South Africa. As I show, the transnational 
indigenous rights movement, and the vernacularization of indigenous rights in South Africa, are 
unsettling both colonial and post-colonial assumptions about customary law in the contemporary 
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period. It is through the work of indigeneity that we can begin to identify emergent forms of re-
territorialization. To demonstrate this, I adopt a perspective that interrogates the politics of 
indigeneity, rather than the struggles of so-called indigenous peoples. The politics of indigeneity 
in South Africa, I will show, emerge through diverse practices that are not unique to post-
apartheid indigenous rights. 
An indigenous rights movement is growing in Africa generally as groups across the 
continent identify with international indigenous peoples demanding self-determination and the 
recognition of their distinct cultures (see generally Blaser et al 2010, Coates 2004, Niezen 2003, 
Sissons 2005). The role of NGOs and their work and activism in regional and international 
forums has been key to the mobilization of indigenous rights across the continent (Sylvain 2017, 
Sapignoli 2018). Anthropologist Dorothy Hodgson showed that Maasai peoples in Tanzania, for 
an early example, had a history of engaging with the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII) and working with international NGOs, as well as regional and state-based community 
organizations, as they advocated for their rights as indigenous rather than pastoral or nomadic 
peoples (although a pastoralist subject position is finding new adherents). They negotiate for 
their rights in shifting fields of power that characterize the neoliberal conditions in which they 
live; they have had to strategically position themselves in efforts to gain state recognition of their 
rights to resources (Hodgson 2011). Indigenous rights struggles in South Africa have been waged 
and rights secured through advocacy in international forums such as the UNPFII, the 
International Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (and the subsequent Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), as well as the regional African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the civil society organization Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating 
Committee (Crawhall 2011).  
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Literature on indigenous rights in South Africa largely focuses on the particular struggle 
of the Khoisan, who are identified by the South African state (to a degree) as well as many civil 
society groups, as indigenous due to the particular history of colonialism that they suffered and 
their pastoralist and hunter-gatherer livelihoods. However, wider critical insights may be gleaned 
by examining how indigenous rights norms and vocabularies inform wider fields of activism, 
particularly with respect to rural land rights. To this end, the struggles for indigenous and rural 
land rights in South Africa need to be informed by recent social science literature that makes a 
critical analytic shift from considering ‘indigenous peoples’ to one focused on the ‘politics of 
indigeneity’ defined as:  
. . . the socio-spatial processes and practices whereby Indigenous people and 
places are determined as distinct (ontologically, epistemologically, culturally, 
in sovereignty, etc.) to dominant universals. Historicizing and respatializing 
subjects through the lens of indigeneity seeks to identify and theorize the 
relational, historically--and geographically -- contingent positionality of what 
is (known to be) 'indigenous' (Radcliffe 2017, 221).  
 
This field of research focuses on the "multi-scalar institutional pathways through which 
Indigenous political demands are devised, shared and create a platform for mobilization" 
(Radcliffe 2017, 223). In political ecology, Emily T. Yeh and Joe Brian put a similar emphasis 
upon political processes; rather than asking 'what are indigenous rights?' they draw attention to  
work that indigeneity does, "as a generative site for research and political struggle" (Yeh and 
Brian 2015, 531). Their scholarship is "informed by the circulation of the term rather than any 
fixed definition, its indeterminacy opening a space for self-determination that is often foreclosed 
in academic and political debates where the term's meaning is assumed or left unexplored" (Yeh 
and Brian 2015, 531). Moving from ‘indigenous’ to focusing on ‘indigeneity’ mirrors legal and 
institutional shifts away from identifying ‘indigenous’ peoples and affirms the UN doctrine that 
indigenous peoples define themselves.  
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This approach is useful in the context of South Africa where the applicability of 
indigenous rights is contested. The African Commission Working Group on Indigenous Peoples 
(ACWGIP) argues that a strict definition of indigenous peoples "is neither necessary nor 
desirable" (ACWGIP 2003, in Anaya 2009, 33). They affirm that it is more constructive to focus 
on characteristics of indigenous people’s claims; "the issue is that certain marginalized groups 
are discriminated [against] in particular ways because of their particular culture, mode of 
production and marginalized position within the state" (ACWGIP 2003, in Anaya 2009, 33). 
Rather than focusing on aboriginality the emphasis should be on a peoples’ or communities’ self-
definition as indigenous, as well as on:  
. . . a special attachment to the use of their traditional land …  an experience of 
subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination 
because these peoples have different cultures, ways of life or modes of 
production than the national hegemonic and dominant model (ACWGIP 2003, 
in Anaya 2009, 35).  
 
Thus, even the question of whether or not one group identifies as indigenous is “secondary to the 
more focused inquiry about what concerns the group may be raising in human rights terms and 
whether it helps to address those concerns by reference to the indigenous rubric” (Anaya 2009, 
36). 
Many peoples across the continent of Africa have found that asserting their rights as 
indigenous peoples in strategic litigation has been helpful in gaining legibility and attention from 
the state. In an overview of indigenous rights litigation in Africa prominent law scholar Jeremie 
Gilbert highlights “that the legal category of ‘indigenous peoples’ has allowed communities 
(sometimes divided by colonization) to reassert their rights, using the concept of ‘indigeneity’ as 
a means of deﬁning themselves as peoples entitled to speciﬁc rights” (Gilbert 2017, 284). Similar 
to Dorothy Hodgson’s findings, Gilbert argues that indigeneity is a field of politics wherein 
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peoples use ‘indigenous rights’ in relation to other stakeholders in an attempt to assert rights in 
response to the histories of discrimination they have faced. In these conditions we can think of 
indigenous rights as an emergent discourse of rights assertion.   
 The South African context provides a particularly complex political and legal 
environment to study indigenous rights emergence. For example, anthropologist Richard Lee 
explains that anyone writing about Khoisan peoples today needs to account for centuries of 
“ideologically saturated discourses” that “form an implicit background of unstated assumptions, 
predispositions, and prejudices” (Lee 2003, 85). These discourses are characterized by a range of 
attitudes from historical colonial contempt, a mixture of paternalism and respect, and a 
contemporary uncritical romanticism and admiration (Lee 2003, 86). Lee’s insights have a wider 
applicability in land rights struggles, as the case studies in this dissertation will suggest. 
Traditional leaders, customary communities, indigenous peoples, and their struggles need to be 
understood in relation to the wider historical, political, and legal context in which they are taking 
place. Moreover, none of these struggles can be understood in isolation; rather they need to be 
understood in inter-articulation.    
The theory of articulation I use derives from Marxist cultural theory and refers to a unity 
formed between two different elements that connect within structured relations. One must ask, 
under what conditions do these elements come together? As cultural studies theorist Lawrence 
Grossberg explains, “[a]rticulation links this practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this 
meaning to that reality, this experience to those politics. And these links are themselves 
articulated into larger structures, etc.” (Grossberg 1992, 54). The theory of articulation has 
notably been used to analyse  the shifting structural relations between race, class, and 
nationalism in South Africa (Hall 1980) and more recently to  explore how inflections of popular 
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anger animate reconstructions of race, class, nationalism, gender, and sexuality in South African 
politics (Hart 2007, 98).  
The concept of assemblage, used in combination with articulation, offers a way to 
interrogate how indigenous rights are in some contexts co-constituted through claims voiced in 
terms of to customary law as they are asserted and mobilized in specific struggles over property. 
I understand assemblage 
 as a broad descriptor of different historical relations coming together . . . as an 
ethos oriented to the ‘instability’ of interactions, and the concomitant potential 
for novelty and spatiotemporal difference . . . and as a concept for thinking the 
relations between stability and transformation in the production of the social 
(Anderson et al. 2012, 171–173). 
 
Geographers Anderson et al. (2012) draw from Gilles Deleuze to define assemblage as “both the 
provisional holding together of a group of entities across differences and a continuous process of 
movement and transformation as relations and terms change” (2012: 177 citing Deleuze and 
Parnet 1977).  From this perspective, custom and indigenous rights are not approached as 
ideologies imposed ‘from above’, but rather as emergent in and through relations of power 
between dispersed actors.  
The theory of assemblage perhaps overly accentuates the unwieldy characteristics of 
neoliberalism and risks emphasizing dispersed power and networked relationships at the expense 
of identifying structured forms of power (see Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 201). In the 
context of African land struggles, for example, anthropologist Pauline Peters identifies in 
scholarship on customary law a tendency amongst post-structrualist researchers to seek the 
flexible character of custom and to celebrate people’s agency in negotiations over land. This 
approach has a proclivity to ignore the persistent and structural inequalities characteristic of 
‘traditional’ forms of land governance (Peters 2013). I can avoid these pitfalls, however, by 
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reading processes of articulation within assemblage (Featherstone 2011), which entails 
examining the relations between actors, the means and technologies through which they 
aggregate and mobilize, and the wider social, economic, cultural and legal conditions that enable 
their social and political organizing for justice against perceived inequalities.   
 One of the significant outcomes of the engagement with indigenous rights in the South 
African context are the possibilities it has created for new assertions of culturalized rights - rights 
legitimated through appeals to cultural practices and resources in the context of a global 
proliferation of ‘meaningful difference’ (Coombe 2005, 2017). Moreover, Farida Shaheed, 
United Nations Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, has explained the links between 
human rights and cultural heritage protection, describing specifically the inter-connected 
relationship between the protection of cultural heritage rights (including tangible, intangible, and 
natural heritage), human dignity, identity, and membership in a community and society (Shaheed 
2011). Indigenous peoples have historically referred to cultural rights as means to challenge 
state-based frames of reference and negotiate through and push the boundaries of the existing 
international human rights system. Asserting their cultural rights, for example, was one means by 
which indigenous peoples gained recognition as peoples through the UN without having to 
ascribe to a state personality (Koivurova 2008). In recent years, for example, there has been a 
turn to culturalized rights claims in international forums as indigenous communities assert their 
role as stewards of land and resources in what are now referred to as biocultural rights (Bavikatte 
2014).  
In South Africa, cultural rights are protected in the Constitution and are being re-asserted 
in new ways in social struggles and jurisprudence. In practice, traditional leaders have used 
cultural rights provisions to assert their authority over land and, according to critics, to further 
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entrench traditional territories that mirror apartheid spatializations. Yet, as I show, through 
litigation as well as through social activism, we also witness the use of cultural rights as a means 
to legitimate and make legible collective land tenure relations that have otherwise been neglected 
in land reform law and policy. For example, land tenure is being understood widely as central to 
local identities, encompassing rights to land and minerals, local self-determined governance 
practices, and as expressions of a re-vitalized customary law. Such new territorializations 
challenge apartheid territorialisations and pluralise forms of jurisdiction. In this context the focus 
is not on whether or not authentic indigenous peoples or communities exist, but rather on the 
processes through which they are constituted as collectivities with rights and entitlements to 
land. As legal anthropologist Rosemary Coombe explains,  
Indigenous resurgence and culturalized identities are not merely derivative by-
products of neoliberalism, but may be accomplishments of political articulation 
under conditions of globalizing power, diverse markets, and new forms of 
governmentality that provide distinctive fields of opportunity and instill new 
aspirations (Coombe 2017, 266). 
 
Transnational Indigenous Peoples’ rights and the culturalised assertions of land rights to which 
they have given rise  are transforming territorial governance in South Africa and may have 
implications for indigent rural peoples elsewhere. Under conditions of neoliberalism, territorial 
designations shift or are re-created as new actors and institutions interact with prior forms of 
territory and transform them through new forms of recognition (Hale 2012, Reyes and Kaufman 
2011). I demonstrate that the transnational indigenous rights movement, and the 
vernacularization of rural and indigenous rights in South Africa, are unsettling both long held 
assumptions and new assertions about customary law and its territorialisations..  
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1.6 Methodology 
To identify the diverse relations of power and the territorialized forms of government and 
subjectivity constructed through them in the South African context,  I draw on a wide range of 
sources, interviews, and observations which might be considered my primary research data. I 
developed initial relationships with researchers and advocates in South Africa during an 
internship I completed at the Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town during my Master’s research 
in 2010. This experience led to further collaborations developed during my doctoral research 
through two trips to South Africa as a visiting researcher at the Centre for Law and Society 
(CLS) at the University of Cape Town.6 My work with CLS was motivated by a broader political 
belief in the importance of collaborating with researchers who have a long and intimate history 
with the context and conditions that form the basis of my research. I established a connection 
with an existing research institute with the intention of developing my research questions 
through discussions with South African researchers who have a long history working in rural 
land rights struggles and strong relationships with the communities at the centre of these. The 
first trip lasted 6 weeks (February to April 2015) and the second lasted 3 months (January to 
April 2017). During these trips I was based in the office and made myself available to assist in 
research that was being conducted at the Centre, but most of my time was spent pursuing my 
own doctoral research.  
My secondary research data includes news reports, government policy papers, court 
judgments, submissions to state-organized public consultations on issues related to customary 
law and indigenous rights, and reports and presentations by South African NGOs. I also had 
                                                 
6 In 2016 the Centre for Law and Society that I worked with was re-named the Land and Accountability Research 
Centre, however the Centre was the same – it had the same director and same employees and was in the same 
building. The Centre for Law and Society was moved in name only to the Faculty of Law at the University of Cape 
Town.  
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access to documentation from the High Level Panel on Assessment of Key Legislation and 
Acceleration of Fundamental Change which includes Commissioned Reports, Roundtable 
Reports, Public Hearings Reports and transcripts from every province in the country. I conducted 
8 interviews with lawyers, researchers and activists working in the field to supplement my 
document-based research and clarify my readings of these. I used the qualitative research 
software Nvivo to organize the material, code for trends across sources, and perform 
sophisticated text searches to identify the development of norms or discourse in land rights 
struggles. Nvivo helped to quantify the use of key phrases and terms across material produced by 
different institutions and actors. Importantly, with Nvivo I could track the development of ideas 
over time and develop an understanding of their relationship to the unique social and political 
conditions in South Africa. These findings informed my use of theory to describe ongoing 
movements, developments, and emergences throughout this dissertation.  
The subject matter was approached with an ‘ethnographic imaginary’ (Forsey 2010, in 
Brady & Lippert 2016) to probe the conjuncture of forces present in my case studies (Li 2014, 
Wolford 2010). A conjunctural approach attends to how “multiple forces come together in 
practice to produce particular dynamics and trajectories” (Hart 2004, 97). Such research methods 
follow emerging trends in social science scholarship on assemblage in that it includes multiple 
sources to identify how connections are made and sustained between them (Fox and Alldred, 
2015).  
  The method for this research presented a number of significant challenges, due largely to 
the almost endless amount of resources that I could include in my analysis of assemblages and 
the spatial and temporal scales through which they operate. For example, a change in temporal 
period changes your interpretation of events. New actors are introduced, new technologies are 
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introduced, new opportunities are opened that may have been previously unimagined. Due to the 
huge amount of available data, and my commitment to allowing myself to respond to the 
particular needs and activities of South African activists and researchers, during my dissertation 
fieldwork and writing, I often had a difficult time finding a place to stand in what always seemed 
like a quickly changing political and legal environment. Every topic that I explored in my 
research seemed like the tip of an iceberg. My method often felt like a way to identify micro-
discussions without accounting for any real trends in land reform. Yet in the end, as I look back 
on the core chapters that make up this dissertation, I believe that I have developed a narrative 
that demonstrates some long-term trends in what often feels like a constant onslaught of policy 
proposals, court judgements, and reports of failed land reform.  
By developing and maintaining a view of all the changes going on at once I found myself 
only marginally interested in what a judgement determined, for example, and much more 
interested in tracking the diverse politics and practices  generated through its use and 
interpretation  and the long-term potential and implications it had for  legal change. Courtroom 
outcomes may represent significant victories, I learned, but they are incremental changes that 
will be read and re-read as social movements interpret them. Victories are also spatially and 
temporally defined, but if we can identify the forces, factors, and agencies that  link victories, 
perhaps we will see that it is not in the victories, but in the movements and activities that happen 
between them that we will find successful social change.   
1.7 Chapter overview  
In the next chapter, Chapter Two, I cover the history of colonialism and apartheid in South 
Africa, beginning with the arrival of Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 and 
closing with the end of apartheid in 1994. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate the 
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constitutive relationship between law, power, and space, and to chart the history of colonial state 
formation. I describe the persistence of a racialized division between an assumed Universal 
modern law and a backward, customary other, a distinction made in law and fundamental to 
modern understandings of property (Bhandar 2018).  I illustrate how this colonial mentality was 
expressed through constitutive relationships between colonial governmentalities and forced 
dispossession. The historical overview provided in this chapter raises the following question: can 
the new constitutional democracy facilitate the racialized spatial and territorial reconfiguration of 
the country?  
 In Chapter Three I introduce and describe the post-apartheid constitutional democracy. 
The 1996 Final Constitution (introduced by the African National Congress after the 1993 Interim 
Constitution) is explained in relation to global struggles for human rights. The influence of 
international human rights, I demonstrate, is clearly expressed in the Bill of Rights, which is 
entrenched in the Constitution. I explain the constitutional protection of land tenure rights and 
the constitutional imperative to introduce legislation for the purpose of realizing land reform as a 
measure of transitional justice. After introducing the Property Clause, I explain the link between 
cultural rights and the protection of customary law and traditional leadership, a relationship made 
possible by the protection of cultural rights in the Constitution and reconfigured in a 
transnationalized legal context. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the limits of 
courts in provoking broad-based social and economic transformation, as argued by classic 
literature in socio-legal studies. A socio-legal approach to studying law and social change moves 
beyond legal functionalism to examine the indeterminacy of law and the work of intersecting and 
interconnected rights claims.  
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 Chapter Four illustrates the indeterminacy of law and its effect on social change by 
explaining the origins and outcomes of land reform and by describing the construction of 
collective subjectivities at the conjuncture of law and political economy. I describe two socio-
legal subjectivities that are produced, and their qualities defined, through land reform – 
traditional leaders and communal property associations – and the different collective land tenure 
relationships that are assumed and performed by each. Both traditional leaders and communal 
property associations have been plagued by shortcomings that are most clearly expressed in the 
resistance of rural peoples who challenge the claims of traditional authorities who attempt to 
assert themselves as owners of the rural lands within their demarcated territories. This resistance 
might be understood, I argue, as relationships of belonging derivative of the African philosophy 
of uBuntu, which provides inspiration for new ways of re-imagining property relations.  
 In Chapter Five I explain the significance of the Richtersveld judgement in the 
Constitutional Court. The judgement is widely regarded as the first judgement on the continent 
of Africa to refer to common law Aboriginal title as a basis for proving customary land rights. 
The case is also unique because of its interpretation within a broader movement for the 
recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights in South and Southern Africa. This movement, I show, 
continues to grapple with the definition of the ‘indigenous’ in African contexts and 
disagreements over the applicability of indigenous rights continue to inhibit Khoisan peoples’ 
struggles against dispossession while providing new forms of recognition for rural peoples more 
broadly.   
The Richtersveld judgement created the conditions of emergence for a new legal category 
of living customary law which, as I explain in Chapter Six, has been taken up by a range of 
actors for a variety of different uses. In addition to being used by the Constitutional Court, living 
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customary law is a concept used by empirical researchers and mobilized in social activism. A 
defining characteristic of living customary law in these areas of use is its articulation with 
culturalized rights claims, a significant development that links South African land reform 
activism with transnational discourses and norms and provides an opportunity to re-define land 
tenure relationships in ways that are not recognized in existing legislation. In these conditions, I 
argue, the work of living customary law needs to be understood as one component of the 
emergence of living law, through which we can identify the development of new means for 
understanding and characterizing communal land tenure relationships.    
 In the final Chapter Seven I focus on one struggle over land in the Eastern Cape to 
demonstrate the importance of the opportunities for rural communities opened up by both 
Constitutional Court decisions on living customary law and the political context of neoliberalism 
that contribute to the emergence of living law. The Xolobeni struggle and litigation underscores 
the qualities and effects of living law in two ways. First, by illustrating the potential role of 
transnational norms of indigenous rights, particularly the right to free, prior, and informed 
consent, in the struggles of rural peoples. Second, the struggles of the Xolobeni community 
against multinational mining interests, I argue, are re-configuring territories in conditions of 
living law, and are thus representative of new forms of territorialization in the context of 
neoliberal South African constitutionalism.           
 In the Conclusion I refer to the details to two different and recent court judgements to 
illustrate how the arguments in this dissertation help to interpret ongoing social and legal 
struggles in the country. I summarize each chapter in relation to different details of each 
respective case. I end by reflecting on one of the significant implications of the arguments 
presented here: that a recognition of legal pluralism and an emergent living law in contemporary 
29 
 
South Africa necessitates an engagement with forms of territorial pluralism. These overlapping 
legal geographies, and the social and political processes through which they are constituted, are 
not going to be erased through positivist visions of democratic constitutionalism. I consider how 
literature on “entangled territorialities” (Dussart and Poirier 2017) or territorial pluralism 
(Simeon 2015) might provide a useful means to engage with the ‘overlapping rights’ that have 
too long been identified as a barrier in land reform. This framework suggests that the future of 
land reform must include forms and processes through which old and newly constituted subjects 
can negotiate and deliberate their rights to land and to territorial forms of government.  
1.8 Conclusion: Property in the margins 
In order to fully understand the contours of contemporary struggles for collective land rights, we 
need not only to move from within the institutional baseline of human rights, we also need to 
unsettle a ‘centralist’ modern property paradigm (van der Walt 2009). Andre van der Walt, a 
globally renowned  expert on property law, who was tasked with reconceiving property doctrine 
in post-Apartheid South Africa, explains that a centralist property paradigm privileges and 
naturalizes  vertical and hierarchical sets of relationships. For example, it posits owners against 
non-owners and rests on the hierarchical nature of rights along an axis that moves from no rights, 
to some rights, to more rights. van der Walt argues, instead, that claims to justice can and should 
serve to unravel assumptions about the stability of property: 
Justice often requires that property rules and practices be qualified or amended 
in a certain way, without thereby necessarily undermining or threatening the 
property regime consisting of rules and practices that constitute and uphold a 
particular distribution of property holdings. However, certain justice-driven 
qualifications of and amendments to the property regime are so fundamental 
that they cannot be accommodated within or explained in terms of the current 
doctrine – they require a rethink of the system, a reconsideration of the 
language, the concepts, the rhetoric and the logic in terms of which we explain 
and justify choices for or against individual security and systemic stability in 
the property regime (van der Walt 2009, 15)  
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He uses the example of eviction cases to show that the private property paradigm, while 
imagined to protect the exclusive rights of owners, is often challenged in court when  more 
substantive issues such as economic inequality and historical injustice are debated in reference to 
the human rights norms enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution. These debates often lead to 
upholding the right to housing for poor people, against the exclusive right of property owners.  
In the context of one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world and continued spatial 
segregation (to name but a few of the lasting scars of apartheid) the property struggles that are 
the focus of this dissertation may be considered ‘marginal’ in the sense that they are insignificant 
in the context of such widespread structural racialized inequality. Yet, as I hope will become 
clear by the end of this dissertation, such ‘marginal’ struggles are  significant places of power 
and reform. Returning to van der Walt, marginality in property disputes is not  weakness, rather 
“marginal positions in property can sometimes be quite powerful because of the social and 
political context” (van der Walt 2009, 24) on which they shed light and the inequities they 
reveal. Following van der Walt, I am interested in the conditions in which people are able to 
make claims, affirm property as a right, and the conditions and moments wherein their apparent 
marginality becomes a position of power. This analysis begins in the next chapter with an 
examination of colonialism, apartheid, and the nexus between law and space.   
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2 LAW, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND AGRARIAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN COLONIAL AND APARTHEID HISTORY 
 
2.1 Introduction: Spatializing Law in the Colonial and Apartheid Past 
Contemporary land struggles in South Africa are the outcome of a history of migration, land 
occupation, conflict, and racialized control of subjects and territories and forced dispossession 
dating back over four centuries. Rather than attempting to review this long and complex history 
in full, I focus in this chapter on key moments in colonial expansion and legislative development. 
I read South Africa’s history through literature on colonial land occupation and the development 
of racialized forms of governmentality. Most importantly, I illustrate the deeply spatialized 
character of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa to demonstrate the constitutive 
relationship between law, power and space (Blomley 1994). The analysis accounts both for the 
role of law in perpetuating extreme violence through forced dispossession and its role in 
governing chieftaincy through consent. By highlighting a colonial geography of violence, I 
demonstrate how law served to both legitimate forms of extreme violence – expressed most 
clearly in the forced dispossession of upwards of 3.5 million people during the infamous ‘black 
spot removals’ – and contribute to the emergence of colonial governmentality.  
Three forces and their relationship animate the narrative of this chapter: agricultural 
political economy, colonial governmentality and forced dispossession. The forms of power 
expressed by colonial actors in South Africa and the political rationalities they constituted 
produced spatial expressions of power, which produced legal geographies. It was the spatial 
expression of law that enabled its contradictory character – as both a form of violent oppression 
and as a form of governmentality. Customary law has a key role in this narrative. Custom is 
historically bound up with strategies to both govern and to justify dispossession. Custom 
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emerged at the juncture between dispossession, governmentality, and articulations of race and 
property.  
Colonial governments were principally focused on the control of land; the achievement of 
which depended on the forced dispossession of racial subjects. The explanation of colonial 
violence and dispossession by historian Patrick Wolfe is instructive of the fundamental link 
between land and colonization. He argues that land is central to ongoing processes of colonial 
dispossession, stating concisely: “[t]erritoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible 
element” (2006, 388). Importantly, he understands violence and forced dispossession not as a 
single event – or particular events isolated from a wider logic of government – but rather as a 
structure, constituted by, for example, a logic of elimination, the transformation of native title 
into individual title, and the creation of new forms of native citizenship (ibid). Moreover, the 
logic of colonialism can shift over time, thus narrating the “history involves charting the 
continuities, discontinuities, adjustments, and departures whereby a logic that initially informed 
frontier killing transmutes into different modalities, discourses and institutional formations” 
(Wolfe 2006, 402). Understanding settler colonialism as a structure demands that we then 
consider how it is constitutive of ongoing forms of violence and government. As I demonstrate in 
this chapter, colonial dispossession as a form of violence includes the creation and perpetuation 
of a dichotomized world between the colonised and colonizer wherein the colonized are denied 
land as well as their own humanity (Mamdani 1996; Fanon 1963 [2004]).7  
                                                 
7 Fanon’s work on decolonization can be used to illustrate the pervasiveness of colonial violence to the extent that 
the process of decolonization requires a violent response from the colonized. Only radical violence can overturn the 
colonial situation. He writes, “The colonized subject discovers reality and transforms it through his praxis, his 
deployment of violence and his agenda for liberation” (Fanon, 1963:21). Decolonization, therefore, implies nothing 
less than a total restructuring and reimagining of the colonized world that can be achieved only through a violent and 
continuous revolt against the colonizers. The return of land is essential to the process of decolonization: “For a 
colonized people, the most essential value, because it is the most meaningful, is first and foremost the land: the land, 
which must provide bread and, naturally, dignity” (Fanon 1963, 9).  
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Colonial dispossession, and the specific state practice of forced removals explained 
below, were violent expressions of colonial power, and central to the enactment of law. In these 
conditions, I explain, racialized subjectivities are constituted as the ‘other’ against which the 
colonizers identified themselves. Modern forms of property function as a key modality of 
colonialism to the extent that they are asserted as a universal object against which the colonized 
‘propertyless’ are imagined. Property is one of the founding objects within what Peter Fitzpatrick 
calls the mythology of modern law; it is “the foundation of civilization, the very motor-force of 
the origin and development of society… What is being universalized here is a particular form of 
Occidental property. What is absent there can only be its precursors or savagery” (1992, 50).  
Property laws and racial subjectivities developed in relation to one another in South 
Africa, as they did in much of the British colonized world (Bhandar 2018). It was through the act 
of colonial appropriation that modern property laws emerged (Bhandar 2018, 3); through 
processes of colonial dispossession, property and racial subjectivity were articulated to produce 
what Brenna Bhandar calls ‘racial regimes of ownership’ (ibid). Race in the settler colonial 
context, explains Bhandar, “was and remains subtended by property logics that cast certain 
groups of people, ways of living, producing, and relating to land as having value worthy of legal 
protection and force" (2018, 8-9). Colonialism thus produced specific kinds of inscribing land as 
the property of settlers while racialized peoples were imagined as outside of the ambit of 
property. In South Africa, as explained below, racialized peoples were made landless pariahs on 
their own territories through legal enactments that protected the private property of white settlers. 
Throughout the history of colonization and apartheid liberal property laws evolved in dominant 
centres of colonial settlement, as explained below.   
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The framework of colonial governmentality is useful for conceptualizing the ongoing 
processes of colonialism and its dispossessions. Colonial governmentality draws from the study 
of the rationalities, technologies, and subjects of government as practice (see Inda 2005). It 
explores the “targets of colonial power (the point or points of power’s application; the object or 
objects it aims at; and the means and instrumentalities it deploys in search of these targets, 
points, and objects) and the field of its operation (the zone that it actively constructs for its 
functionality” (Scott 2005, 25). Both the targets of colonial power and the field of its operation 
are diverse in South Africa and defined more by their spatial heterogeneity than their territorial 
homogeneity, as is demonstrated below through descriptions of the different strategies used to 
govern populations in constant flux and movement, and the different subjectivities – chiefs, 
labourers, migrant workers – illustrate. The history of Dutch and British migration and 
settlement further explains the diversity of territorial governance. The rise in colonial 
governmentality, I argue, happened in parallel with a sharp increase in colonial violence, 
expressed most potently through the forced dispossession and the internal incarceration of 
racialized people by the apartheid state. As legal geographer Nicholas Blomley explains, 
violence is constitutive of the relationship between law and property, and plays an important role 
in the creation of space:  
Such violences were not simply a secondary adjunct to the discursive realm 
(for example, the instrument through which ideology was put into practice), 
but were of importance in their own right as a vector of colonial power. Again, 
violence was not only an outcome of law, but its realization. The establishment 
of a Western liberal property regime was both the point of these violences and 
the means by which violent forms of regulation were enacted and reproduced. 
Space, property, and violence were performed simultaneously (Blomley 2003, 
129).8  
                                                 
8 In regards to a western liberal property regime, western here refers to the form of private ownership of property 
characteristic of British imperialism, liberalism refers to an assumption that violence exists outside of law (thus law 
is the organized and modern centre), and thus the violence of dispossession is assumed to be a naturalized fact 
through which the backward other is expelled.  
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What unfolds through the narrative of this chapter is an iterative progression of colonial 
governmentality, whereby political rationalities emerge to focus on a multiplicity of points of 
intervention – from an early focus on land and the control of labour, to the legal and racialized 
regulation of everyday life of the colonized population under apartheid. Significantly, however, 
this is a story of the repeated failures of colonial governmentality. As Nikolas Rose and Peter 
Miller write, “[w]e do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the ‘will to 
govern’, fuelled by the constant registration of ‘failure’, the discrepancy between ambition and 
outcome, and the constant injunction to do better next time” (2010, 288). The failure of colonial 
government leads to the generation of ever more sites of intervention, of control, of attempts to 
conduct the practices and mould the attitudes of African peoples.  
2.2 Early Colonial Occupation: Administration of Chiefdoms and Labour (1795-
1912) 
 
Colonial settlement in South Africa began in the 17th Century. In 1652 Dutch explorers arrived at 
the Cape of Good Hope and established a post for the Dutch East India Company. When the 
Dutch settled in the Cape, they came into contact with two main cultural groupings, the Nama 
(who were referred to as ‘Hottentot’) and the San. The Nama herded cattle, sheep and goats 
while the San were hunter-gatherers who lived further inland from the coast and in much smaller 
groupings than the pastoralist Nama. Dutch settlers began calling the San Bojesman, which is the 
origin for the label bushmen that is still in use by some today. Both groups spoke a language 
distinct from the peoples who spoke Bantu languages (such as the languages spoken by Xhosa or 
Swazi peoples) and is commonly identified by their use of clicks. The names Bushmen and 
Hottentot are both derogatory, and the names Khoi Khoi and San have replaced each respectively 
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(Lee 1979, 29-30).9 It is estimated that when the Dutch arrived in 1652 there were 150,000-
300,000 Khoi Khoi and San living within the whole of Southern Africa from the Zambezi Valley 
to the Cape. The San had occupied this area for an estimated 11,000 years, while some 
anthropologists relate fossils to the San dating 40,000 years (Lee 1976, 5). 
Over the next century settlers came in increasing numbers and impacted the Khoi Khoi 
and San peoples in increasingly violent ways. They brought in slaves from Asia, Madagascar and 
Mozambique and built an ever-expanding settlement. White settlers called trekboers were 
pastoral and semi-migrant farmers who moved from the Cape settlement and into the interior, 
expanding their farmland and taking over territory previously occupied by Khoi Khoi and San 
peoples who, despite initial and short-lived good relations with the first settlers, were being 
pushed off their land and overtaken (Thompson 2014, 46). In addition to occupying their land the 
settlers raided the livestock of the Khoi Khoi pastoralists, who were eventually forced to work on 
the farms of the trekboers in a form of coercive labour tenancy. The San peoples suffered 
degrees of violence not experienced by other groups in South Africa. Anthropologist Richard 
Lee explains:     
The San were subjected to genocidal warfare at the hands of the Dutch settlers, 
the ancestors of the present-day Afrikaaner rulers of South Africa. Decade 
after decade, from the 1690s to the 1830s, the San were hounded by the settlers 
and driven to take refuge deep in the desert or high in the mountains. In the 
eighteenth century the Dutch governor at the Cape regularly sent out vigilante 
unites called commandos, whose task it was to hunt down the San, kill the 
men, and lead the women and children into slavery on white farms. The 
commandos were required to file careful reports on the numbers killed and 
captured, and these reports… grimly document the campaigns of extermination 
(Lee 1979, 32). 
 
                                                 
9 Both names however have been applied to these groupings and whether or not peoples self-identify as KhoiKhoi or 
San is another issue. As Richard Lee explains, in the 1970’s when he was doing his fieldwork there were more than 
a dozen self-identified terms used by different groups of people and none of these terms were San (Lee 1979, 30). 
During my fieldwork, for example, peoples referred to themselves as Khoisan, and others identified as bushmen.   
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In addition to this genocide Khoi and San peoples suffered disproportionately from new diseases, 
particularly smallpox; Bantu peoples did not suffer the same fate.    
The British captured the Cape from the Dutch in 1795. At this time the value of the Cape 
Colony was simply the location of the peninsula in relation to Asia and served an expanding 
global British colonial empire. For the early 1800’s the majority of settlers, Dutch and British, 
remained within the Cape settlement, however, in 1835-40 Voortrekkers (Boer pastoralists) 
unhappy with British colonial administration left the Cape Colony and moved further into the 
interior. By 1840 about six thousand Afrikaner men, women, and children had left the Cape 
looking for land to settle beyond the Cape colony and the control of the British (Thompson 2014, 
88). What is now known as the Afrikaner Great Trek lasted until 1854. 
Despite hostilities between British and the Dutch settlers the British continued to expand, 
with a wave of new arrivals in 1820. The British colony of Natal was established in 1843 and 
five thousand new settlers arrived from Britain and moved to the Natal between the years 1849 
and 1851. African peoples also moved to the Natal in large numbers, and it was in the context of 
quickly changing and expanding settlement that the British introduced measures to ‘control’ the 
African population. To this end the Natal colonial government established reserves (which it 
called locations) for Africans and designated the rest of the colony for white settlement. The 
distribution of land of course was radically unequal. Despite the African population 
outnumbering the setters by upwards of 15 to 1, “[b]y 1864, there were forty-two locations, with 
an area of 2 million acres, and twenty-one mission reserves, with 175,000 acres, out of the total 
colonial area of 12.5 million acres” (Thompson 2014, 97). It is important to note that at least half 
of the African population did not live on reserves, however they did live on what was now 
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‘crown’ land or land owned by white farmers and were forced to pay rent or provide labour for 
settlers.  
Efforts to control territory through Trust tenure marked a significant development in 
property law, particularly in the Natal province. In Natal the British Crown acquired land for the 
purported benefit, settlement, and support of African peoples through the 1864 Proclamation 
which placed specific territories in Natal under the control of a Trust managed by the Lieutenant-
Governor and the Executive Council. The Natal Native Trust was used to hold land for the use of 
identified traditional communities. Importantly, as per the Natal Code and the 1864 
Proclamation, trustees were empowered to collect rent from ‘native squatters or occupiers’ on 
crown lands and remove peoples not deemed acceptable; in effect African people found 
themselves to be squatters on their own land (Xaba 2016).  
Afrikaner farmers continued to live in an area called the highveld and over time 
established the Orange Free State as a republic. Furthermore, they established the Transvaal in 
1870. Both were Boer republics separate from British control. As settlements were founded 
conflicts between the Dutch and British settlers were common. In 1877 the Transvaal republic 
was annexed by the British, triggering an internal rebellion, and in 1880 Boers in Transvaal 
overpowered Britain, leading to the first Anglo-Boer War which lasted from 16 December 1880 
until 23 March 1881. Hostilities between Southern Transvaal chiefdoms and white settlers of the 
Transvaal borderland continued from 1881-1884. The conflict led to migrations of both Bantu 
peoples and settlers, who encountered Khoi Khoi and San peoples and claimed more of their 
territories. 
Governing through the chieftaincy was a colonial strategy introduced in the late 19th 
Century. Colonists learned that Bantu societies had their own systems of governments, wherein 
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chieftaincies were one form of authority. Realizing the material inability of the colonial state to 
impose direct autocratic rule and understanding the conflict that would likely emerge from such 
an imposition, colonists sought instead to develop a model of “define and rule” (Mamdani 2012). 
In other words, a form of government that defined already existing authorities and gave them 
enhanced power to govern over rural populations, thus drawing an existing form of traditional 
government into the fold of colonial strategy. The first administrative attempts to govern the 
power of chiefs can be dated back to 1885 when the Deputy Commissioner introduced policy to 
‘promote peace and order’ and sought to define, as well as restrict, the power of chiefs in relation 
to colonial administration (Schapera 1970).  
In addition to introducing measures of indirect rule the colonial state began imposing 
restrictions on a growing African farming economy. During the late 19th Century and early 20th 
Century white farmers were struggling to gain an advantage over Black African farmers who 
were a competitive force in the agricultural economy. In response to growing pressure from 
Afrikaner farmers, legislators in the Cape began programs of social engineering to undermine the 
ability of potential labourers to become autonomous and self-supporting peasants while at the 
same time retaining labourers who could work on the farms of white land owners. They did so by 
circumscribing their “status so as to transform them from ‘independent’ squatters, lessees, or 
sharers to dependent, wage-earning servants” (Bundy 1979, 134). In 1894 anti-squatter laws 
were introduced in the Glen Grey Act, which allowed only those working in fields to stay on the 
land owned by their employers. Fundamentally the law undermined the position of squatter-
peasants (Bundy 1979, 135). As historian Colin Bundy explains, "[t]he anti-squatting laws and 
practices in the Cape had as their most obvious effects first, the evictions of share-croppers and 
lessees, and secondly, the surrender by thousands of these of their relative independence in the 
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form of their altered status, as they became wage labourers or labour-tenants" (1979, 137). 
Regulating labour functioned concurrently and constitutively with colonial strategies to undercut 
the property relations of Africans and re-defined territory as the property of white settlers. 
In the first decade of the 20th Century the speed and scope of white farming increased 
dramatically, and as an effect land values increased and more market opportunities emerged for 
farmers (Bundy 1979, 115). The changing political economy led to the introduction of new 
legislative pressures on the African peasantry. Further restrictions on access to land were 
imposed, taxes and rents were raised, and various forms of ‘squatting’ were legally defined and 
controlled (Bundy 1979, 240). ‘Squatting’ is a legal term introduced at this time to create a new 
subject position and regulate previously ‘customary’ tenure practices, such as sharecropping and 
tenancy. Restricting the movement of migrant labourers and regulating where they lived went 
hand in hand with the development of new forms of governmentality directed through the 
African chieftaincy and focused on regulation of customary law through practices and 
technologies of reification. By the end of the 19th Century the Administration had deprived chiefs 
of political independence, undermined their judicial authority and required them to perform new 
duties such as collect taxes for the colonial government (Delius 2008, 229).  
Controlling labour did not translate directly into blunt forms of territorial control until the 
early 20th C. In 1905 the South African Native Commission (established in 1903) released a 
report on ‘native affairs’ in which ‘scheduled areas’ for native African settlement were 
introduced by regions defined in geographic terms in a Schedule of the Act (Robertson 1987, 
121). This was the first official report promoting legislated segregation. The South African Act 
was introduced in 1909, which created a colonial order whereby a pseudo-democratic system 
operated for the white minority while an authoritarian order of indirect rule was operated through 
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African ‘chiefs’ – people found to be leaders with authority and legitimacy in rural communities. 
Political scientist Clifton Crais describes the strategic use of chieftaincy for the settler colonial 
government:  
Europeans and especially early colonial officials very often found African 
polities to be exasperating and scarcely intelligible. One thing seemed 
reasonably comprehensible, that is most easily translatable into their own 
political epistemologies: that there were some men of elevated status who wore 
and laid claim to the skins of leopards and lions (2006, 725). 
 
Crais illustrates the unsophisticated colonial logic of government that motivated the development 
of colonial strategy; however, as will become clear below, the methods and legislation 
introduced to sustain this model of colonialism was far from simple.   
In the early 20th Century the idea that African chieftaincies naturally functioned as 
autocratic regimes began to emerge, due in part to the growth and strength of the Zulu kingdom 
dating back to the early 19th C. During the 19th Century the Zulu kingdom in what is now known 
as KwaZulu-Natal emerged as a centralized and authoritarian political system. The Zulu 
kingdom rose in power from 1816-1828 with such force that it contributed to a period of 
migration and upheaval throughout Southern Africa. Under the leadership of Shaka it established 
its dominance. As historian Peter Delius explains, the political system of centralized autocratic 
power that characterized the Zulu kingdom was unique to other chiefly systems in other societies 
(2008, 217). However, the influence of the Zulu kingdom was significant because it became the 
model of chiefship that white officials and legislators recognized and sought to reproduce across 
the country through legislation (Delius 2008, 218). The British effectively dissolved the Zulu 
kingdom in 1879, however its influence as a model of centralized chiefly rule was by then firmly 
established.  
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Colonial policy produced a legal geography of political authority by aligning space with 
chiefly jurisdiction and authority. Early colonists were confronted with dynamic and changing 
African societies with their own systems of government that had developed over time (Delius 
2008, 216). Whereas political boundaries of chiefly authority in pre-colonial South Africa were 
in constant flux and even overlapped, colonialists found this “political landscape unintelligible 
and untenable” and in response colonial policy sought to flatten out and simplify the political 
landscape (Crais 2006, 729). Colonial policy identified and demarcated spaces of chiefly 
political control and delineated positions of authority between chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen. 
By aligning space and authority colonial state government “presented a new conceptual map of 
power that dovetailed with the colonial definition of ‘custom’. It located authority in the body of 
a person who could be fixed within schematic political diagram” (ibid). Importantly, as state 
formation produced a simplified and flattened grid of legibility, “other sources of authority 
entered into the prison house of irrationality, locked into the official discourse of superstition” 
(ibid). In other words, despite the state efforts to bring the chieftaincy into new forms of colonial 
government, ‘customary’ forms of authority and law remained the measure against which the 
universal modern law was enacted (Fitzpatrick 2003).   
Attempts to define space and govern chiefly power (as well as the further strategies to 
control African labour and production, explained in the next section) are examples of colonial 
material processes contributing to the violent re-spatializations of the country, a process legal 
geographer Nicholas Blomley persuasively describes through his analysis of how the frontier, the 
survey, and the grid constituted material expressions of colonial violence (2003). In other words, 
the materiality of colonial violence is expressed through the introduction of technologies of 
identifying and making legible subjects and landscapes for appropriation, occupation, and 
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control (Blomley 2003, 135). As a colonial strategy, territorial government under an elevated 
chieftaincy was secure when the Union of South Africa was created in 1910. When the Union of 
South Africa was established those classified as white or European made up about 20% of the 
total population in South Africa (Bienart and Dubow 1995, 2).    
2.3 Late colonial occupation: The South African Union and the Native Land 
Rights Act  
 
The Union government established an apparatus to create and naturalize a bifurcated state, 
whereby the Union Constitution granted parliamentary democracy to the white minority while 
the black majority where subjugated by authoritarian administrative rule. The Governor General 
was at the apex of authority in the administrative system, wherein African society was presented 
as ‘traditional’ and governed by chiefs in a system of feudal hierarchy (Klug 2010, 8-9). The 
Union produced legislation to restrict the movement of Africans. Under the 1911 Native Labour 
Regulation Act black workers were denied freedom to move or find employment other than that 
tied to white farmers on whose land they lived, without first obtaining the permission of state 
administrators (in the form of a pass) (Southall 1983, 25). These changes emboldened resistance 
to the colonial government; in 1912 the South African Native National Congress (later the 
African National Congress), was formed by a black resistance movement.  
When the Union Government introduced the 1913 Native Land Rights Act chiefs, 
territory and forced dispossession were drawn into a more tightly legislated relationship. As 
Solomon T. Plaatje (the first Secretary General of the African National Congress) famously 
wrote, “[a]waking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African native found himself, 
not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth” (Plaatje 1914, in Crais and McClendon 
2014, 201). The Act introduced ‘scheduled native reserves’, constituting only 7% of the country, 
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for African collective landholding. It was illegal for Africans to own land outside of these 
reserves.  
The 1913 Native Land Rights Act (herein the Land Act) set in motion the slow 
disintegration of African control over land, further impacting where Bantu and Khoisan peoples 
lived and how they profited from their agricultural labour. As in earlier decades, this legislative 
change was motivated in part by the political pressure of poor white farmers who feared that 
African peasants were gaining too strong a foothold in agriculture and wanted not only to 
undermine their competitive ability but also to create a permanent class of labour tenants 
(Chanock 2001, 365). The Land Act represents a growing desire to stifle this competition and 
give white farmers a massive advantage in a quickly growing economy (Bundy 1979, 239). As 
historian Martin Chanock explains, "the debate about tenure (and the Land Act in general) was 
linked to the broader question of what role Africans would have in the market, and how far law 
and policy would be constructed unequally to structure, and to limit, their market participation" 
(Chanock 2001, 386). These legal interventions represented a hardening political rationality that 
targeted on how Africans ought to own and use land and how they ought to participate in the 
agricultural economy. 
The Land Act did not result in the full dispossession of black people but rather produced 
new kinds of dependence upon white farmers. Africans were permitted to remain on land owned 
by white farmers but only if they supplied labour on these farms. Black farmers were no longer 
able to lease land, and as a result farms worked on by black sharecroppers became the leased 
property of poor white farmers (Chanock 2001, 366). In this new context they could work as 
tenant-labourers or herdsmen. In some cases, sharecroppers were permitted to live on land and 
cultivate it outside of reserves if they gave half of their annual crops to white landowners 
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(Southall 1983, 24). Black farmers and sharecroppers were presented with the choice of either 
becoming servants or moving from their homes to find land elsewhere (Bundy 1979, 230), 
creating a system of indirect forced labour:  
[t]he 1913 Land Act sought to arrest the tendency towards a bipolar 
stratification (farmers and workers) and to preserve instead an under-developed 
peasantry: a peasantry whose productive capacity had been so inhibited, whose 
access to land so confined, whose access to markets rendered so unfavourable, 
that its members must have recourse to labour for white employers even at the 
very low wage levels prevailing (Bundy 1979, 242).  
 
Changes in labour and land tenure relations did not occur in all places abruptly, however. 
The Courts rarely enforced the Land Act and even when they did convictions were rare. 
Historians William Beinart and Peter Delius (2014) argue that the Act was “more an example of 
enabling legislation and soft power” (2014, 668). Similarly, Michelle Hay explains that 
"dispossession was cumulative, better understood as a slow loss of rights to land rather than a 
single, momentous experience of forced removal" (Hay 2014, 747). This was due in part to the 
limited resources that many colonial governments had. Historian Sara Berry characterizes the 
quality of colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa as ‘hegemony on a shoestring’ to illustrate the 
scarce resources that colonial governments had at their disposal (Berry 1992). Yet the Land Act 
clearly provided new opportunities for white farmers to benefit from the appropriation of land 
and the exploitation of African labour power and thus facilitated and legitimated further colonial 
territorializations.  
Significantly, the 1913 Land Act set in motion the development of a legal and 
administrative framework demarcating territorial jurisdictions for the governance of land in the 
country. New technologies of government were introduced to define territory and justify 
dispossession. Colonial expansion included violence and legal measures such as annexations, 
surveys, privatization of title, and the creation of new governmental authorities to regulate newly 
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demarcated land parcels (Delius and Beinart 2013, 669). This was the beginning of a new form 
of colonial governmentality, the introduction of which was possible only because of the previous 
century of dispossession and efforts to undermine the growth of an African agricultural class. 
This new form of government, one in which the state developed further strategies to include the 
African chieftaincy in state projects of taxation and the management of migration, went hand in 
hand with the development of new forms of dispossession.  
New roles and responsibilities for chiefs appointed as authorities in the ‘scheduled native 
areas’ were introduced in the early 20th Century. In 1920 the Native Advisory Council was 
established and in 1923 the Urban Areas Act was introduced to regulate African movement and 
settlement in urban areas by stipulating that black people could only be in these areas 
temporarily (the Urban Areas Act was amended in 1930 and 1937 to stop the movement of 
labour tenants to cities (Bundy 1979, 234). In 1927 the Native Administration Act 38 was 
introduced as the first unified nation-wide law that legislated the authority of Chiefs by 
incorporating them into an administrative and legal domain. The Native Administration Act set 
the tone of a new authoritarian and colonial era role for chiefs as authorities over subjects within 
their territories (Delius 2008, 223). Under the 1927 Act the sitting president of the colonial state 
was appointed as the “Supreme Chief of all blacks in the Republic” (Devenish 1987, 27). While 
some African subjects welcomed the ‘restoration’ of chiefly authority, many were deeply critical 
of the lack of democratic principles in the Native Administration Act (Devenish 1987, 29). New 
laws were introduced in quick succession, creating a legal framework of overlapping legislation, 
each focusing on different aspects of chiefly authority, movement of labour migrants, and 
territorial control.    
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There were significant legislative developments in the 1930’s that effectively restrained 
the power of chiefs in relation to white colonial authorities and strengthened their position over 
peoples living within the reserve areas. The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act established the 
South African Native Trust (SANT) which became the trust for all land reserved or set aside for 
the so-called 'Natives', as well as all crown land in scheduled areas (Delius 2008, 227). Under 
trust tenure access to land was distributed to households who had to pay rent or tribal taxes to 
stay on their land. The Native Trust and Land Act also extended the authority of the government 
by granting the Governor General authority to regulate how and under what conditions Bantu 
peoples might occupy or use land in the scheduled reserve areas by implementing the new trust 
system which gave white officials the power to allot, determine the size of, or cancel allotments 
of land to African peoples (Delius 2008, 228). SANT purchased areas of land bordering the 
reserves to slightly expand them to create territories for peoples newly dispossessed by the state 
from elsewhere in the country and forced to live in the reserves. These areas were consolidated 
with the existing reserves, increasing their size from 7% of land area in the country (as defined in 
the 1913 Native Land Act) to 13%. Under the 1936 Act, like the 1913 Land Act, Africans were 
forbidden from owning land outside of scheduled areas. Peoples forced to live in these areas 
were thus put under the authority of existing chiefs whom they did not identify with or recognize 
as legitimate leaders. 
The constitutive relationship between law and political economy at the time is apparent in 
the effects of forced dispossession, and the ways that the threat of dispossession was integrated 
into labour laws. For example, over time more and more people moved (forcibly) to reserves, 
putting pressure on resources within these demarcated territories. As conditions worsened the 
pressure on Chiefs became more intense. An effect of these conditions is that Chiefs became 
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more authoritarian in their effort to retain power, and women and youth in particular began to 
feel their access to land was undermined in this new context (Delius 2008, 226). These 
conditions set the stage for the introduction of legislation reinforcing the power of chiefs, 
described below. Also, in 1936 Labour Tenant Control Boards were created with the power to 
emend or terminate contracts between farmers and labour tenants, drastically reducing security 
of tenure for labourers living on farms (Bundy 1979, 234). The threat of forced dispossession 
was also woven into labour legislation in other ways. For example, the 1932 Native Service 
Contract Act introduced new labour tenancy regulations, stipulating that labour obligations 
applied not only to the father but to the whole household, including children. If anyone in the 
household failed to fulfill their labour obligations to the farmer on whose land they were 
residing, the whole household could be evicted (Chanock 2001, 400). 
The reserves were not defined by an absence of property. They were the focus of 
legislative attempts to ‘recognize’ forms of ‘customary’ land title for peoples who had long lived 
in the areas and for the thousands of displaced peoples who lived in the reserves. After the Union 
government formed in 1910 the South African Native Affairs Commission considered two 
different models for ‘recognizing’ property rights within the reserves, a model of individual title 
(as was practiced in the Cape) and a trust model (as was practiced in Natal). The Union 
originally decided to focus on realizing individual title by surveying land into individual plots. 
However, the colonial state decided that surveying land took too much time and resources and 
moved to legislate a uniform trust model of ownership in the 1936 Land Act (Robertson 1987, 
126). It is difficult to understate the significance of this shift as it marks a move from the 
widescale institutionalization of individual titles for peoples in scheduled areas (reserves) to the 
normalization of trust land under the authority of a chieftaincy. It marks a shift from developing 
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colonial technologies of government that identified individual plots of land as the property of 
African people to focusing instead on governing the authority of chiefs and determining the 
nature of property relations through them.  
2.4 Apartheid 
Apartheid was a particularly extreme model of colonial racialized government and represents the 
further formation of what legal geographer Sandy Kedar calls an ‘ethnocratic settler state’ 
(Kedar 2006). Ethnocratic settler states, explains Kedar, refers to a context wherein “[e]thnicity, 
rather than citizenship, constitutes the main criterion for distributing power and resources” 
(Kedar 2006, 403). Furthermore, “[t]he project of territorial expansion and domination is 
presented as something ‘taken for granted’ or as an ultimate ‘truth’ upon which society is built” 
(Kedar 2006, 404). There is an enduring role of law in perpetuating colonial violence in this 
context. Moreover, the establishment of new land regimes in ethnocratic settler states is a key 
form of government. Land regimes in ethnocratic settler states are 
constructed on a violent dispossession of natives. The violent acquisition is 
then translated into legal arrangements that represent the ethnocratic power 
structures and at the same time obscure the dispossession. This legal-cultural 
order reduces the need for direct force and legitimizes the unequal ordering of 
space and society (Kedar 2006, 437-438).  
 
Apartheid in South Africa represents a distinctly powerful illustration of the establishment and 
maintenance of an ethnocratic settler state. It is distinct however for the extent to which ‘tribal’ 
subjects were folded into colonial government and allotted powers to make decisions over 
ethnically defined subjects within demarcated territories; moreover, they were made the authors 
and authorities of custom.  
In 1948 the Nationalist Party was elected with a platform to establish a system of 
racialized segregation called apartheid. Apartheid ideology was based on the purported 
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‘recognition’ of a 'mosaic of culturally distinct peoples', including White (Boer and Britain), and 
Black i.e. Bantu (Xhosa, Zulu, North and South Sotho, Tswana, Swazi, Shangaan, Venda, and 
Ndebele). According to some apartheid ideologists, separate development was the only way to 
recognize this diversity (Southall 1983). The Nationalist Party set out to entrench racial 
differentiation. The earlier forms of segregation were amplified by making African subjects the 
‘citizens’ of ‘self-governing’ bantustans, the administrative and ideological edifice of which 
were built upon the introduction of ‘scheduled areas’ and the 1913 Land Act (Gordon 1989, 52).  
Chiefs were increasingly allotted more authority under apartheid (Delius 2008, 229). In 
1951 the Bantu Authorities Act was passed to clearly identify the jurisdiction of Chiefs in the 
new apartheid state. It stipulated that the Governor General may "with due regard to native law 
and custom and after consultation with every tribe and community concerned, establish… a 
Bantu tribal authority" (section 2(1)(a)). The Bantu Authorities Act established a hierarchy of 
authorities that included local, regional, and area jurisdictional authorities. The legislation was, 
in part, founded on the idea that it was ‘restoring’ the power of Chiefs, and used Bantu 
customary law as a legitimating source for “bolstered tribalism and tribal authority” (Gordon 
1989, 52). The idea that there was an ‘authentic’ custom to be ‘restored’ and ‘protected’ 
legitimated colonial strategy. In this period a regime of colonial governmentality begins to take a 
more complete form in which colonial power operated  
in such a way as to produce not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies 
as governing-effects on colonial conduct. For what was at stake in the 
governmental redefinition and reordering of the colonial world was… to 
design institutions such that, following only their self-interest, natives would 
do what they ought (Scott 2005, 43-44).  
 
In these conditions, chiefs were given specific roles to carry out the work of the colonial state, 
assuming the legitimacy of the ‘tradition’ that legitimated their ‘customary’ authority.    
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Chiefs took on wide responsibilities as agents of the state. For example, Bantu authorities 
were given the power to set up courts to deal with disputes, impose tribal levies (taxes on peoples 
within their jurisdiction), and participated in the administration of the influx control program - 
designed to limit Black movement into urban areas - by granting passes to those subject to their 
control. The discretion to withhold passes - which they exercised with little oversight - granted 
them incredible power over populations within their jurisdictions (Delius 2008, 230). Thus, 
chiefs were involved not only in the governance of traditional courts and land matters, they were 
also key in the governance of movement of Africans. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act also gave 
chiefs unprecedented powers to control land within their territories, although the ownership of 
land remained with the state.  
Under apartheid Chiefly power was justified as maintaining local custom in the context 
of domination by a foreign power. Chiefship was privileged as a singular, traditional institution, 
rooted in local histories that legitimated it as a model of rural rule: "Conferred the power to 
enforce their notion of custom as law, chiefs were assured of backup support from colonial 
institutions… in the event they encountered opposition or defiance" from their subjects 
(Mamdani 1996, 122). The authority of chiefs went hand in hand with the increasing role of 
‘custom’; custom was used as the ultimate legitimating discourse to confirm the jurisdiction of 
chiefly power.  
This intensified emphasis on bringing chieftaincy more centrally into the government of 
colonized territories came at the same time that forced dispossession became much more 
widespread, systematic, and violent. In 1958 Hendrik Verwoerd (previously minister of Native 
Affairs) was elected Prime Minister of the Nationalist Party. During his tenure, which lasted until 
1966, he introduced a new brand of segregation: Bantustans. Bantustans, he argued, were less 
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about racially exclusive apartheid policies and more an example of political decentralization and 
internal decolonization to encourage a form of ‘separate development’. They institutionalized a 
new level of colonial violence. 
Under the leadership of Verwoerd, a new system of local and regional government was 
introduced under which Chiefs were again mobilized as key actors in the apartheid state. The 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was introduced in 1959. This Act elevated local 
administrative authorities to semi-autonomous governments and transferred costs – such as 
welfare and unemployment costs – from white areas to ‘homelands’ (the Act transformed the 
‘native’ reserves into self-governing homelands). It provided a framework for separate economic 
development and homeland ‘modernization’. According to this plan, “black residents… were to 
be domiciled in the ethnic homeland of their supposed ‘origin’ where they were to possess 
‘citizenship’. These territories would be guided towards independence by the white South 
African government” (Evans 2012, 119). These ideas “paved the way for nominal Bantustan 
independence, granted first to the Transkei in 1976” (Beinart and Dubow 1995, 16). Legal 
researcher Aninka Claassens explains, "[t]he bantustan policy went together with the denial of 
South African citizenship and political rights for black people. Once they were consigned to one 
or other ‘homeland’, people were to be governed by chiefs according to ‘timeless custom’" 
(Claassens 2014, 764). Custom thus served as a legitimating rhetoric in the Bantustan policy. 
The ‘protection’ of custom maintained a semblance of recognition of ‘traditional’ governance. 
Robust legislation determining the power and authority of chieftaincy contributed to an illusion 
of legitimate rule.  
The apartheid state went through its own transformations at this time. For example, a 
long struggle between key political and legal actors over models of parliamentary sovereignty 
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and legislative supremacy (effectively between a model of sovereignty vested in the people of 
the Republic, and the sovereignty of legislature to strike down laws that were not compatible 
with the Constitution).10 The eventual achievement of parliamentary sovereignty was 
fundamental to the success of segregation. The 1961 Republican Constitution secured this form 
of government. Section 59(1) of the Republic Constitution stated, “Parliament shall be the 
sovereign legislative authority in and over the Republic, and shall have full power to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of the Republic"; thus "the will of a racially exclusive 
parliament was to be paramount" (Klug 2010, 12). Appointing parliament as the legislative 
authority allowed for the autocratic introduction of legislation without checks and balances on 
their power or their effects.   
This period saw the forced relocation of millions to the Bantustans. In the 1960’s the state 
labeled black homesteads and communities living outside of the reserves as ‘black spots’ on 
‘white’ land. Under the Group Areas Act (1960) the state forced people out of black urban 
neighbourhoods, such as Sophiatown in Johannesburg and District Six in Cape Town. Between 
1960 and 1983 an estimated 3.5 million people were forcibly dispossessed to live on South 
African Development Trust (SADT) land created as resettlement areas adjacent to and on the 
boarders of Bantustans (Platzky and Walker 1985).11 The population of the reserves grew from 
4.2 million in 1960 (39% of all Africans) to over eleven million in 1980 (52.7 %) (Beinart and 
Dubow 1995, 16).  
The Bantustan system was premised on enforcing racialized divisions between white, 
black, Asian and coloured. It relied on a form of colonial governmentality that created multiple 
                                                 
10 See Klugg 2010, 11-12, for a review of key moments and court judgements at the turn of the 20th C. This struggle 
can be dated back to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. 
11 The South African Native Trust (SANT) discussed above was converted into the South African Development 
Trust (SADT), an institution key to carrying out forced removals of peoples living outside of reserves. 
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racial distinctions. It also promoted divisions within African society by invoking ‘tribalism’ and 
promoting the entrenchment of ethnic identities such as Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi or Tswana (Beinart 
and Dubow 1995, 17). “Segregation was, however, more than a panoply of restrictive legislation: 
it refers as well to a composite ideology and set of practices seeking to legitimize social 
difference and economic inequality in every aspect of life” (Beinart and Dubow 1995, 4). 
Segregation, for example, depended on forced compliance with a model of ‘traditional 
leadership’. The people resettled in Bantustans were put under the leadership of the traditional 
authorities who were already established in the reserves, even though those dispossessed had no 
history with these particular leaders or the traditions over which they might preside. The 
promotion of self-government was for a short time ‘successful’ according to its own measures. 
Ten ethnic bantustans were identified as self-governing areas and between 1976 and 1981, four 
of these were granted independent status by South Africa (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, 
Ciskei). These states, however, were never recognized on the international stage (Evans 2012, 
119).  
Govan Mbeki (father of South Africa’s second president, Thabo Mbeki) describes the 
context of these forced dispossessions and the role of chieftaincy in an article titled “The 
Peasant’s Revolt’. He focuses specifically on how democracy was undermined:  
The people of the Transkei had no say in the drafting of their constitution. The 
elections held in 1963 took place under a state of emergency: which imposed a 
ban on all meetings of more than ten persons, laid down severe penalties for 
statements disrespectful to chiefs, and permitted the indefinite detention, 
without warrant or trial, of political opponents (Mbeki 1964, in Crais and 
McClendon 2014, 331).  
 
He describes the illegitimate role of the Chieftaincy:  
the Transkei scheme, rooted in tribalism and the sway of the Chiefs, is 
corrupting itself from within… Conservatism is the lifeblood of the 
chieftainship system, and change threatens the positions of power that the 
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Chiefs and the government enjoy. Chiefs and government therefore, have 
common aims: to resist movements advocating multi-racialism and modern 
social development (Mbeki 1964, in Crais and McClendon 2014, 332).  
 
Mbeki explains that these apartheid initiatives never went smoothly; they often faced violent 
resistance. The Transkei, for example, erupted into revolt in 1960. The apartheid state declared a 
state of emergency and didn’t repeal it for nearly a decade. 
Under apartheid racialized groups were defined in very particular ways with implications 
for different aspects of life. The Population Registration Act (1950) as well as the Group Areas 
Act (1950) stipulated that people be classified by racial group. These classifications regulated 
where they could live and work, as well as controlled movement and settlement, the right to 
choose the nature of one’s work, education, use of public spaces, social security, and taxation, 
among other things (Cornell 1960 in Bowker and Star 1999, 196-198). Racial classification 
divided people into four groups: Europeans, Asiatics, persons of mixed race or coloured, and 
“natives”, referring to Bantu peoples (ibid). Khoi San peoples were included in the ‘coloured’ 
category. The issue was, as Bowker and Star (1999) explain, that certainty in race identification 
was elusive in many cases, particularly in the instance of people who did not appear to be of the 
racial group to which they were assigned, lived with those of another race, or spoke a different 
language than those of their assigned group. This uncertainty meant that laws were constantly 
being amended or new ones introduced to respond to new challenges; by 1985 racial law in 
South Africa filled over 3,000 pages (Bowker and Star 1999, 201). Rights and entitlements in all 
dimensions of life were legislated and determined by racial categories and classifications.       
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2.5 Understanding ‘customary law’ as dispossession and governmentality: Legal 
Anthropology and Legal Geography 
 
How do we understand the emergence and role of customary law through this long history of 
colonization, apartheid, land dispossession, and colonial governmentality? Central to a theory of 
customary law is an understanding of how custom constitutes colonial legal geographies through 
legal techniques of governmentality and dispossession. Understanding colonialism in Africa as 
instituting a new legal geography is not a new idea, yet the particular manifestations of legal 
geography and the processes and practices through which it has been, and continues to be, 
created demands further interrogation.  
Customary law and its relationship to colonialism has long been the subject and object of 
anthropologists and socio-legal researchers and in effect has been the product of research. For 
example, during apartheid the Nationalist Party funded research by anthropologists to record and 
register ‘customary law’. The customary law represented in the work of these anthropologists 
and used to inform legislation and policy at the time was "almost unknowable" by the subjects to 
whom it applied because "recorded law exists… in a language spoken only by the rulers" 
(Gordon 1989, 55). Custom, argues anthropologist Robert Gordon (1989), has historically been a 
tool of the powerful to impose rule on African populations; black students, for example, had no 
interest in doing research that might reinforce this strategy. There was a “further sense of 
embarrassment” for anthropologists working in South Africa during the 1980’s, explains 
anthropologist Adam Kuper, because ethnographic research could be used to reinforce the idea 
that traditions and tribal identities and institutions were viable political structures that should be 
respected by the apartheid state (Kuper 1987, 1).   
Much can be learned from how ‘custom’ has been recorded and understood through the 
historical works of key anthropologists. Isaac Schapera famously recorded customary ‘rules’ in 
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his ethnography on African chieftaincy and negotiations between chiefs and colonial authorities 
(Schapera 1938). Max Gluckman studied disputes in his work on the relationship between 
conflict and cohesion in African societies (Gluckman 1955). John Comaroff and Simon Roberts 
move beyond a rule-focused study to examine dispute processes in two Tswana chiefdoms,12 
showing that rules in Tswana society were not strict, but were better understood as a “loosely 
constructed repertoire rather than an internally consistent code” (1981, 18). They examined the 
relationship between rules, processes, and the determination of social action, arguing that a “rule-
centred approach” to studying customary law “does violence to our ethnographic data” (ibid.). 
"The Tswana conceive of their political community as a hierarchy of progressively more 
inclusive coresidential and administrative groupings: household, local agnatic segments (or, in 
some places, family groups), wards, and sections" (Comaroff and Roberts 1981, 26). However, 
this work falls prey to a critique that anthropologist Sara Berry makes of colonial strategies more 
generally: "[w]hatever conclusions officials reached about the content of customary laws or the 
boundaries of traditional societies were either challenged by Africans offering a different version 
of tradition, or outpaced by changing social and economic practices" (Berry 1992, 338). 
There is an inherent dualism between ‘customary’ and ‘colonial’ law produced in the 
above accounts. Anthropologist and legal pluralist Richard Wilson critiques Comaroff and 
Roberts (as well as Schapera (1938)) by arguing that these studies adopt an intellectual paradigm 
that does not challenge an imaginary of a dualistic colonial and apartheid legal system and 
ignores how state law influenced and transformed local adjudicative institutions. This 
perspective derives from an “entrenched analytical frame which reproduced assumptions of 
                                                 
12 The Twsana cheifdoms that are the subject of their research refer specifically to the Kgatla and Barolong Boo 
Ratshidi, each living on different sides of the border between South Africa and Botswana. Kgatla is in central-east 
Botswana, while the Barolong has territory on both sides of the border between the countries (see Comaroff and 
Roberts 1981, 21-23).  
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isolation and autonomy” (Wilson 2001, 219). Furthermore, he argues that it is implausible that 
the Tswana did not understand or feel the effects of colonialism, considering that ‘Tswana’ was a 
category forced upon them in the former ‘homeland’ of Bophuthatswana and was run by a 
corrupt leader named Lucas Mangope (ibid). Wilson reminds us of the risk of understanding 
custom as the domain of a ‘local’ community, unimpacted by colonial strategies. 
Anthropologist Sally Falk Moore develops a more fluid and dialogic understanding of 
customary law in her study of Chagga law and custom in Kilimanjaro. Her research illustrates 
the changing character of Chagga customary law and places it in local, national, and international 
context, explaining that “[p]re-colonial Chagga customary law was a system of political 
institutions, social domains, systems of ideas that are both material and mystical (Moore 1986, 
50). Congruent with the perspective of Comaroff and Roberts, who argue that no such thing as an 
institutionally bounded and functionalist thing as a “Tswana legal system” exists (1981, 20), 
Moore explains that it is inaccurate to assume that there are hard-fast laws ‘externally’ applied 
into a ‘local’ context:  
Rule statements there were, and are, but they are not intelligible out of social 
context. More appropriate to an understanding of the way things worked is a 
focus on the asymmetrical relations between groups and individuals, on the 
nature of transactions between individuals, and conceptions of the 
micropolitics of the significant groups. Chagga “law” was situated in ongoing 
arenas of action (Moore 1986, 90-91).  
 
Moore brilliantly illustrates the importance of the processes at stake and the scales at which 
customary law is negotiated. 
These classic texts in legal anthropology explain the different scales at which customary 
law operates. However, they lack a critical engagement with spatiality beyond the ethnographic 
sites they are working within. Nigerian historian Mahmood Mamdani develops a now famous 
description of British colonial Africa that focuses explicitly (and perhaps excessively, as his 
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critics, below, point out)  on the geography of colonialism. Mamdani (1996) famously explains 
that British colonial strategy in Africa focused on the creation of a bifurcated polity. His analysis 
introduces a crude geography of colonialism between the rural and the urban. This refers to a 
form of state governance that constructed two forms of government: civil government and Native 
Authority. Government worked in relation to two forms of subjects: citizens who lived by civil 
law and rural peoples who were subject to customary law and chiefly authority. His theory of 
‘decentralized despotism’ expressed through traditional leadership, brought together two forms 
of colonial power, direct rule and indirect rule (Mamdani 1996, 18). He argues that the colonial 
state was a “double-sided affair. Its’ one side, the state that governed a racially defined citizenry, 
was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its’ other side, the state that 
ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven 
justice” (Mamdani 1996, 19). This system created a bifurcated state. This “Janus-faced, 
bifurcated” state, “contained a duality, two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. 
Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and 
culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power claimed to enforce tradition” 
(Mamdani 2012, 18).  
It is important to note that Mamdani attempts to acknowledge the agency of African 
peoples, but he still gives way to a determinative understanding of the colonial state. His 
argument is not that custom was defined from ‘above’ or ‘invented’ as a colonial construct 
completely unreflective of local norms and practices. Rather, custom “was a site of struggle. 
Custom was often the outcome of a contest between various forces, not just those in power or its 
on-the-scene agents”, however “the terms of the contest, its institutional framework, were 
heavily skewed in favor of state-appointed customary authorities. It was… a game in which the 
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dice were loaded” (Mamdani 1996, 22). The chieftaincy, according to Mamdani, is empowered 
only by the state: “it is nothing more than an extension of the state’s authority” (Williams 2010, 
13). The counter-point to this perspective is that chieftaincy is also legitimated at the local level 
through the people: “Mamdani did not consider the limits of the central state’s control at the 
local level, or the possibility that traditional leaders needed to respond to community opinions in 
order to maintain legitimacy” (Williams 2010, 14). Anthropologist Hylton White illustrates 
through ethnographic fieldwork in South Africa that while Mamdani argues that “colonial 
histories witnessed the reduction of multiple sources of authority into the singular power of 
chiefship”, this claim is disputed by the fact that contemporary “life in the former homelands is 
very much governed by an array of parallel and competing authorities, including, very notably, 
authorities that can more or less be construed as having religious or spiritual mandates.” (2015, 
1006). Mamdani’s attempt to consider African agency, therefore, is much too sparse to save him 
from these critiques. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in chapters four and five, the 
dichotomous understanding of ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’ or a comprehension of custom as 
derivative of identified centers of power is particularly unsuitable for discerning contemporary 
articulations of customary law and indigeneity in conditions of neoliberalism.  
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have described the evolution of a system of colonial governmentality, and the 
multiple forms of forced dispossession incrementally enabled through emerging logics of 
colonial control. Law played an important and unique role in colonialism and apartheid to the 
extent that it was used to create and define subjects and attach these subjects to territorial 
designations. Law was used as a tool for violent forced dispossession as well as a means to 
‘recognize’ custom and the authority of chiefs, thus creating a unique legal geography in the 
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country. Thus the history of land control and spatialized racial dispossession and governance 
must inform contemporary struggles over customary law in land reform, as explained in the 
remaining chapters.  
Studies of customary law would do well to heed the advice from Fredrick Cooper who, 
writing about writing colonial histories, argues:  
we must analyze the culture of politics and the politics of culture by constantly 
shifting the scale of analysis from the most spatially specific (the politics of the 
clan or the village) to the most spatially diffuse (transatlantic racial politics) 
and examine the originality and power of political thought by what it 
appropriated and transformed from its entire range of influences and 
connections (Cooper 1994, 1539).  
 
Customary law was itself an arena of struggle, one connected to the wider political struggles 
constituted by diverse subjectivities, the possibilities and constraints that they operated within, 
and the aspirations to which they worked towards (Cooper 2002). It is an arena of struggle that 
continues to be waged, as I demonstrate in the remainder of this dissertation. The complexity and 
variability of colonial efforts in South Africa must be read alongside the bluntness of violence 
experienced by colonized African peoples, the colonial spaces and subjectivities that were 
produced, and the role of law in the production of geographies of government, movement and 
dispossession. 
The struggle over customary law must now be positioned within the larger legal 
transition from apartheid to democracy in the early 1990’s. This transition brought into dispute 
the ‘naturalness’ of law’s role in protecting colonial-era private property and demanded that 
custom is recognized not as the outside against a universal modern property system but also as a 
form of democratic and rights-based tenure system. In other words, the democratic transition 
brought about a shift from a racially-skewed recognition of proprietary norms to the promise of 
rights regimes that recognize equal citizenship. Can the unequal ordering of space and society, 
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constituted as it was through a historical regime of colonial governmentality, be overturned via 
state endorsed and organized legal processes and authorities? What are the opportunities for 
traditional leadership as an authority in rural government and assertions of customary law? 
Anthropologist David Scott explains the continued importance of the forms of politics and 
relationships of power introduced through colonial histories of governmentality:  
The crucial point here is not whether natives were included or excluded so 
much as the introduction of a new game of politics that the colonized would 
(eventually) be obliged to play if they were to be counted as political. And one 
of the things the new game of politics came to depend upon was the 
construction of a legally instituted space where legally defined subjects could 
exercise rights, however limited they were (Scott 2005, 39).  
 
The transition from apartheid to democracy entailed the production of new legal spaces as well 
as new legal subjects, the character and emancipatory potential of which I consider in the next 
chapter.  
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3 LAW AS REVOLUTION: TRANSFORMATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LOCALIZED STRUGGLE  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The violence of the apartheid state was made clear to the international community by the 
Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the Soweto student uprising in 1976, provoking international 
condemnation and further internal instability. International solidarity movements, boycotts of 
South African products, and widespread criticism helped frame apartheid South Africa as a 
global pariah. It took both peaceful and militant resistance, as well as periods of civil war 
(sparked primarily by a series of uprisings in the 1980s), to end the brutal apartheid regime. 
Those who endured the struggle clung to hope for a better future. The human cost of the 
resistance should not be understated:  
The price of its triumph was paid in blood and broken childhoods. The 
conviction that all of this suffering would be redeemed was affirmed at every 
surging funeral and in the sweat, beer, and tears that drew people into each 
others’ arms at the end of every back-street jazz concert. Every teenage 
struggle poet promised that the blood would water the tree of freedom (Desai 
2002, 10).  
 
Democracy triumphantly replaced apartheid with the first open and free democratic 
elections in 1994 and the introduction of the Final Constitution in 1996. The new democracy and 
a commitment to a constitutional order was the outcome of intense struggle where competing 
sides argued over the principles on which the new democratic order would be founded. In the 
end a model of constitutional supremacy, wherein human rights are enshrined, was adopted to 
guide the government and the country towards the progressive realization of justice by 
fundamental structural transformation. These debates were not unique to South Africa. The turn 
to constitutionalism in South Africa was part of a global trend of countries adopting new 
constitutional frameworks, a trend coined the ‘new constitutionalism’ (Hirschl 2007). Emerging 
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research on apex courts in the Global South13 and into the more general role of the judiciary in 
upholding social and economic rights (Gauri and Brinks 2008, Dixon and Roux 2018) has found 
a critical, but limited, role of courts in social transformation. Nonetheless, the particularities of 
the South African Constitutional framework inspired a strong belief in the promise of law as a 
means of transformation that continues to be distinctive in design and context.   
 In this chapter I explain the uniqueness of the South African Constitution in the global 
context and outline some of the conditions that have contributed to the model that it embodies. I 
introduce and explain the constitutional framework, particularly as it relates to property and 
cultural rights, and illustrate it as generative of a field of rights-based struggle. I place this 
argument in conversation with literature on transformative constitutionalism and conclude by 
explaining the insights that can be gained by approaching constitutionalism through the politics 
of interpretation, and more specifically by understanding human rights struggles as they are 
articulated in the vernacular of local struggles and how these new articulations are brought back 
into law through a constitutive relationship between law and social struggle.  
3.2 The origins of constitutionalism in South Africa 
Political negotiations for a new state began in 1990 between the Nationalist Party (NP) and the 
African National Congress (ANC). Discussions were focused on the need to address the 
historical legacies of colonialism and apartheid, and to respond to the specific demands for land 
reform. The very real threat of descending into civil war made it imperative that the negotiations 
focus on maintaining social stability, a tall order set against the demand for radical social, 
economic, and legal transformations. Therein is the crux of the challenge: the necessity to 
maintain political, legal, economic, and social stability while facilitating a regime change which 
                                                 
13 See Maldonado (2013) for critical engagements with apex courts in Colombia, India, and South Africa. 
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included an overhaul of the government and a demand to radically re-distribute resources. 
During the transition negotiators addressed this challenge, in part, by moving from (legislative) 
parliamentary sovereignty (the apartheid model) to (judicial) constitutional supremacy. Within 
this model the two main strategies adopted to achieve material redistribution of resources were 
affirmative action programs, called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and land reform 
(both arguably administrative matters that would inevitably require judicial oversight). Of these, 
land reform was the most contentious. As Klug argues, “[i]t was only with the acceptance of the 
principle of restitution of lands that had been lost due to racially discriminatory law, by all sides 
in the negotiations, that it became possible to accept that there could be both legal continuity and 
some redress for the legacies of apartheid” (2010, 17). The question of how the constitutional 
framework could support land reform was a driving influence in the negotiations leading to the 
transition, and the success or failure of land reform would later become one of the primary 
indicators in criticisms of the transformative effect of the Constitution. In the context of the 
transitional negotiations the first democratic elections were held on April 27th, 1994, with the 
ANC winning by a landslide and Nelson Mandela elected the first black president in South 
Africa. 
3.3 The Final Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Constitutional Court 
The Constitution emerged out of intense struggle and negotiations between the NP and the ANC. 
Each respective party wanted control over the process. The NP did everything it could to 
determine the rules under which the transition would take place and advocated to have the 
existing parliament at the time, controlled by their own party, pass the new Constitution. The 
ANC and its allies in the liberation movement on the other hand demanded that the Constitution 
represent a “compact of the people” and thus the constitution-making process be democratic and 
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inclusive of the emerging ‘new’ South Africa (Ackerman 2004, 636). As a compromise, the NP 
and ANC negotiators agreed in November 1993 to a three-part compromise. The agreement 
included first, a two-stage constitution-making and transition process involving an interim 
Constitution, second, an agreement on 34 Constitutional Principles, and third, a Constitutional 
Court to act as an arbitrator (ibid). The interim Constitution acted as a holding measure while the 
coalition government drafted a new Constitution.    
The interim Constitution provided a transitional government that would govern on a 
coalition basis for the first democratic elections. It also included an interim legislature 
responsible as a Constitutional Assembly to draft and adopt the text of the new Constitution. In 
1996 the legislature introduced the Final Constitution, ushering in what constitutional legal 
scholar Bruce Ackermann calls a “substantive constitutional revolution” (2006, 643). He 
explains that the Constitution “establishes an objective normative value system that, as an 
underlying constitutional value for all areas of the law, acts as a guiding principle and stimulus 
for the legislature, as well as for the executive and the judiciary" (Ackermann 2006, 646).  
The Final Constitution entrenches human rights to facilitate and guide social, economic, 
and legal transformation. To this extent the Bill of Rights is embedded in the Constitution in the 
form of the second chapter, coming only after the Founding Provisions; its placement in the text 
unwaveringly affirms a commitment to human rights in the post-apartheid state. Section 7(1) 
declares “This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the 
rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom”. The Bill of Rights represents an ongoing commitment to transformation, as 
opposed to a temporary ‘transformation’, an ideal that “envisions a society that will always be 
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open to change and contestation, a society that will always be defined by transformation” (Langa 
2006, 354). 
The Bill of Rights represents a new standard for the global human rights movement 
because it can be used to hold the state, and in some cases private parties, to account for 
violations of human rights. It does not posit that all South Africans have rights, rather the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights envisions rights as something to be progressively realized 
through the ongoing work of state and civil society (Klug 2010, 4). The Bill of Rights binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary, all organs of the state, and natural or juristic persons.  
In the Bill of Rights, political, civil, socio-economic and cultural rights are indivisible 
and enforceable: "these rights are fully justiciable and thus the courts are required to review the 
practices of government, and in some cases private parties, to ensure that these rights are being 
protected" (Klug 2010, 4). In this way the transition represents a shift from a “culture of 
authority” under apartheid to a “culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of 
power is expected to be justified” (Mureinik 1994, 10, quoted in Langa 2006, 353). The Bill of 
Rights puts negative restraints on state interference with liberty. It imposes affirmative duties on 
the state to address poverty, promote social welfare, and support people’s expression of their 
constitutional rights and self-realization as equal citizens in a democratic state (Klare 1998, 154). 
The Final Constitution and the Bill of Rights play an important role in social transformation and 
poverty reduction; they provide a legal and institutional framework to monitor the state’s 
progressive realization of its constitutional obligations to the poor (Rosa 2011, 545).  
The Constitutional Court has a specific role in facilitating transition in the post-apartheid 
state. The role of the Constitutional Court is, most generally, to make the Constitution serve the 
needs of the transition and to build the county on the basis of human rights. It has been called an 
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‘activist court’, wherein judges are expected to “work with the idea of the Constitution being a 
living tree that sheltered and promoted an emancipatory vision of democratic rights” (Sachs 
2016, 162). James Fowkes (2016), senior researcher at the Institute for International and 
Comparative Law in Africa, argues that ‘making the Constitution work’ through the 
Constitutional Court requires three different processes. First, the adjudication of cases. Second, a 
role in making decisions about how the legal system works and how decisions are made and by 
whom: "The power to decide who decides, with respect to a new system or mechanism, is often a 
matter of deciding how the machine should work in the first place" (Fowkes 2016, 31). Finally, it 
requires bringing the present society into line with the one envisioned by the Constitution: "This 
is a question of implementation, of making effective", thus encompassing a “full reach of the 
duty to make the real-world work as the Constitution envisions" (Fowkes 2016, 31). Fowkes’ 
explanation underscores that the Court is not simply the sum of the judgements that come out of 
it, but actually a key institution in both regulating the state as well as promoting the purposive 
and positive fulfillment of human rights.  
3.4 The Property Clause 
Land Reform is embedded in the Constitution in the form of Section 25, known as the Property 
Clause, strategically positioned within the Bill of Rights. Sections 5-7 of the Property Clause 
provide the framework for the broader land reform program and are worth including here in full: 
25(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis.  
25(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress. 
25(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
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provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress. 
 
These three provisions provide the framework and impetus for splitting the land reform program 
into three different areas, land restitution, land redistribution, and tenure reform. Each area has 
its own focus as well as specific procedural qualities, as explained below. The land reform 
program was expected to both facilitate the realization of land rights in line with the Bill of 
Rights as well as respond to the complexity that is a result of past dispossessions and the ongoing 
legacy of spatial inequality.14  
Land restitution is a rights-based program designed to return land to people who were 
previously dispossessed of it due to racially motivated laws and policies by identifying and 
transferring specific parcels of land from which applicants were dispossessed. Land 
redistribution is designed to redistribute land to the black majority. It is application based and is 
based on the demonstrated need of beneficiaries. Tenure reform focuses on advancing tenure 
security for people living in communal areas or on private land, such as farm workers, for 
example. A Land Claims Court was established to adjudicate land restitution cases and the 
Department of Land Affairs (now the Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs) was 
created to oversee and report on the progress of land reform. While these three approaches to 
land reform are directed by the Constitution, the struggle for land rights in contemporary South 
Africa draw on a much wider ambit of rights, including cultural rights, and within this framing, 
the recognition of customary law as an expression of culture.     
                                                 
14 The design, administration and politics of land reform is explained in much more detail in chapter four. 
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3.5 Culture and Custom in the Constitution 
South Africa is a nation of incredible diversity, and the recognition of legal pluralism, as well as 
religious and cultural practices reflects the commitment to equality across recognized 
‘difference’. The democratic Constitution promotes a vision of a new South Africa that “belongs 
to all who live in it, united in our diversity”, as written in the Preamble. In Section 15(3) the 
Constitution obliges parliament to enact legislation that recognizes tradition, as well as cultural 
and religious systems of both personal and family law. Cultural rights are the focus of Section 30 
and Section 31. Section 30 on Language and Culture outlines: “Everyone has the right to use the 
language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights 
may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights”.  Section 31 
determines that peoples belonging to a cultural, religious and linguistic community will not be 
denied the right to enjoy their culture, practice their religion or use their language and to 
participate in creating and maintaining cultural, religious and linguistic groups (31(1)a; b)   
‘Customary law’ is recognized and protected in the Constitution as an expression of 
cultural rights. Section 39(3) on the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, stipulates “The Bill of 
Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or 
conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent 
with the Bill”. A further reading reveals that the ‘custom’ of the Constitution relates primarily to 
the domain of traditional leaders. Section 211(1), on the status of Traditional Leaders, states: 
“The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are 
recognized, subject to the Constitution”. Moreover, “The Courts must apply customary law when 
that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law” (211(3)). The important point about these provisions is that in the Constitution 
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customary law is paired directly with traditional authorities; there is an implicit connection made 
between culture, customary law, and traditional authorities in the Constitution, the significance 
of which is examined in the next chapter.   
  Cultural rights in the South African Constitution need to be understood in the context of a 
long history of resisting ‘minority’ rights, which have referred generally to racial distinctions. In 
an effort to erase the divisions of apartheid the new democratic model represented a clear and 
intentional move toward a united South Africa. In this context the racially divisive nature of 
colonialism and Apartheid contributed to an ideological orientation away from the idea of 
‘minority’ rights. This thinking can be traced back to early discussions within the ANC. On April 
6, 1959, R.M Sobukwe, the founding leader of the Pan African Congress, a group proposing an 
ideology of Africanism (focused on the unity of all Africans, including the establishment of a 
United States of Africa), stated powerfully in his opening address:  
To use the term “multi-racialism” implies that there are such basic insuperable 
differences between the various national groups that the best course is to keep 
them permanently distinctive in a kind of democratic apartheid. That to us is 
racialism multiplied, which probably is what the term truly connotes… We 
guarantee no minority rights, because we think in terms of individuals, not 
groups (Sobukwe 1959, in Crais and McClendon 2014, 344).  
 
As Crais and McClendon note, this is generally the position adopted by the ANC during the anti-
apartheid struggle as it opened itself to white membership and advocated for a non-racial South 
Africa (2014, 339).  
The actual distinctions between ‘minority’ rights and ‘cultural’ rights remain an area of 
conflict and contestation, whereby ‘cultural’ rights are sometimes assumed to represent a move 
back to old divisions. Retired Constitutional Court Judge Albie Sachs argues that Oliver Tambo, 
president of the ANC from 1967-1991, had a vision of unity that significantly influenced the 
Constitution. His vision dismissed ideas of racial groups living ‘side by side’ and focused instead 
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on securing “the fundamental rights of all, black and white, in a united, non-racial South Africa” 
(Sachs 2016, 11). Tambo refused to “introduce constitutionalised markers of identity, culture and 
historical provenance into the very formal structures of government itself. Instead, people would 
have their fundamental rights secured, not because they belonged to a majority or a minority, but 
because they were human beings” (ibid). This perspective provided the impetus for excluding 
any reference to ‘minority rights’ in the constitution and focusing instead on the rights of 
cultural, linguistic, and religious communities. The Bill of Rights, argues Sachs, “acknowledges 
and embraces multiculturalism. But it does so without allowing group rights to become the 
foundation of the governing structures of our new constitutional order. That was foundational. 
From a political point of view, our institutions simply had to be non-racial” (2016, 13). As he 
further explains, “Once the issue of directly constitutionalising group rights in our institutions 
had been taken off the agenda, then issues of how to respect and balance out different 
community, traditional and cultural interests could come to the fore” (2016, 14-15). Yet, as 
critical scholarship on the re-emergence and re-articulation of ‘tradition’ by chiefs in South 
Africa demonstrates, such distinctions and their place in the new South Africa, continue to 
constitute a significant site of struggle.15  
The Constitution responds to diversity by focusing on culture, religion, and language. 
Section 31 of the Constitution stipulates that “Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or 
linguistic community may not be denied the right… to enjoy their culture, practice their religion 
and use their language; and… to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society”. Rather than elaborating on these rights in the 
Constitution, their progressive realization is the focus of a ‘Chapter 9’ institution. Chapter 9 
                                                 
15 For example, for two different perspectives on this contemporary emergency of chieftaincy see Claassens 2015 
and Comaroff and Comaroff 2018. This literature is further engaged with in chapter four.     
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institutions are ‘State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy’. They include the 
Public Protector, the Auditor-General, the Electoral Commission, the South African Human 
Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, and the Commission for the 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights 
Commission). These institutions are subject only to the Constitution and the law and are thus 
independent of government. The CRL Rights Commission is mandated to support cultural rights.  
Contemporary politics of minority rights in South Africa affirm the fears and sentiment 
of anti-apartheid activists and drafters of the Constitution. An internet search of ‘minority rights 
in South Africa’ brings up lively debates about the need for such rights in South Africa, however 
these debates are not dominated by historically marginalized groups but rather by Afrikaner 
nationalists. Hyperbolic claims of an ongoing ‘white genocide’ in South Africa are linked with 
the assertion of international rights protecting minorities. Afrikanerbond, whose membership 
criteria includes being Afrikaner and 18 years old or older, is at the forefront of this trend. Pieter 
Vorster, chairperson of Afrikanerbond, argued in a speech at a conference on minority rights in 
Cape Town, 21 November 2013: 
We need the political will to endorse internationally recognised minority rights 
in South Africa. This can be done in the form of a charter on the rights of 
minorities as an addendum to the Constitution… The involvement of civil 
society at this stage is very limited. It is for this reason that the Afrikanerbond, 
as an organisation within civil society, is becoming increasingly involved in 
minority groups and the promotion and protection of the rights of such groups 
in this country. Our programmes and initiatives will henceforth focus on the 
plights of all South African minority groups (Vorster 2013).  
 
These actors are clearly asserting the model of ‘group rights’ that the drafters of the Final 
Constitution, discussed above, strategically moved away from. Certainly, the history of legislated 
distinction under apartheid has left a dark cloud over contemporary struggles over cultural rights, 
identity, and distinction in the ‘united’ South Africa.    
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3.6 Understanding the Constitution and Social Change: Transformative 
Constitutionalism and the Interpretation of Rights in Localized Struggle 
 
Property struggles in the context of land reform are emergent through the Constitutional 
framework but they are far from determined by it. Studying human rights struggles in the context 
of constitutionalism, and specifically land reform, demands empirical analysis of the translation 
of law and human rights in local contexts. There is a wide body of literature on constitutionalism 
that can inform how we understand the dynamic relationship between the Constitution, human 
rights, and property rights as they are mobilized in particular social, political and economic 
contexts. There are four aspects of constitutionalism in practice that can be identified in the 
literature. First, the role of legal culture in South Africa; second, the practice of adjudication; 
third, social movements and their interaction with the courts; and finally, the politics of 
interpretation in law and litigation.     
First, a conservative legal culture in South Africa has been identified as a barrier to 
transformation through a model of constitutional supremacy. Karl E. Klare, in a now famous 
article published in 1998, explains that a deeply entrenched ‘liberal’ legal culture in South Africa 
could undermine what he calls ‘transformative constitutionalism’:  
By transformative constitutionalism I mean a long-term project of 
constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in 
isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political 
developments) to transforming a country's political and social institutions and 
power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. 
Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-
scale social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law 
(Klare 1998, 150). 
 
What is required to realize this vision, according to Klare, is an intentional break from the classic 
liberal legal culture that has long been prevalent in South African courts. He argues for a move to 
what he calls a ‘postliberal’ legal culture that understands the South African Constitution as 
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“social, redistributive, caring, positive, at least partly horizontal, participatory, multicultural, and 
self-conscious about its historical setting and transformative role and mission” (1998, 154).  
A problem with this approach, according to Theunis Roux (2009), is that Klare’s critique 
of legal culture and prescription of what is required to facilitate transformation is too narrow and 
largely uncontested (no judge or lawyer would disagree that the Constitution must be used to 
facilitate change) and therefore insignificant. Klare’s focus on ‘post-liberal’ interpretations of the 
Constitution suggest that all judges must share the same ideological perspective of 
transformation in order to realize the potential of the Constitution. Roux thinks that this puts too 
much emphasis on the political views of judges and argues on the contrary that it is the actual 
text and ethos of the Constitution that by design directs judges to make decisions towards the 
transformation of South African economy and society. In other words, whether a judge is 
conservative or progressive, and how their interpretive method corresponds with that view, does 
not determine the effect of transformation under the Constitution. Academics, legal professionals 
and judges can all contribute to the development of the constitutional democracy, from any 
critical perspective, "provided only that they respect the fundamental tenets of non-violent, 
democratic, law-driven social change" (Roux 2009, 285). Roux does not deny the existence of a 
conservative legal culture, but he does not think that transformation hinges precisely on changing 
it; the Constitution does that work by design.  
A second theme in the literature is that the actual practices of adjudication are identified 
as significant barriers to the promise of constitutionalism. In an international context, Ron 
Hirschl argues that constitutionalism represents a form of ‘jurisdocracy’ whereby the power and 
authority of elected officials is fundamentally usurped by Judges, creating conditions that 
undermine democracy and restricts the political nimbleness needed to respond to constantly 
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shifting economic and social conditions, particularly in ‘developing’ nations (Hirschl 2007). 
There are institutional barriers to transformation in the practices of adjudication. This argument 
resonates in South Africa, where the institutional structure charged with fulfilling the promise of 
constitutionalism represented much of the ‘old’ legal structure of apartheid to the extent that the 
Interim Constitution and the Final Constitution left the judicial structures and judicial officers of 
the apartheid state intact (Ackermann 2006, 638). Moreover, while the Constitution “contains the 
hopes and aspirations of the majority of South Africans”, the turn to the rule of law as the 
primary vehicle for transformation “means that the processes for fulfilling these dreams will be 
shaped by the encrusted processes and encumbered resources that make up the South African 
legal tradition" (Klug 2010, 21). This institutional structure, arguably, maintains a liberal dilution 
of the radical spirit of resistance that motivated the transition to democracy. For example, Sanele 
argues that transformative constitutionalism is inextricably wedded to liberal democratic 
constitutionalism making it “ill-suited for achieving the social, economic and political vision it 
proclaims" (Senele 2011, 486).  
The legal system encounters significant hurdles in facilitating transformation by design. 
Adjudication promotes change through countless incremental victories, thus by design the legal 
system may be ill-equipped to promote transformation. It is commonly understood that 
transformation requires significant redistribution of wealth and resources, however, “the 
incremental judicial process of interstitial development may well be too slow and protracted 
because it is driven by the logic of doctrinal development and not by the need for change" (van 
der Walt 2006, 9). Moreover, Constitutional Court judges have been critiqued for deciding 
judgments in light of the institutional capacity of the state to implement judgments; the Court 
walks a fine line to preserve its own integrity by engaging with complex social and economic 
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policy issues and producing judgements that are considerate of the limits of the state (Brand 
2013, 420). Jackie Dugard (2013) finds an entrenched elitism in the courts. For example, Judges 
frequently ‘trivialize’ poverty by failing to engage with the structural history of inequality, 
serving only those with the resources and ability to engage with the courts in a meaningful way, 
i.e. by hiring representation or knowing how to navigate a complex legal system (Dugard 2013).  
Some criticize the idea that the courts are a site of democracy and inclusion whereby it is 
in constant dialogue with the state and civil society as they work collectively towards the 
progressive realization of human rights. This is the third strand of critique I identify. While many 
of the early anti-apartheid negotiators who advocated for a form of Constitutional supremacy 
envisioned a Court accessible to all citizens of the country, research has found that South 
Africans face barriers in unaccommodating courts. Researcher Tshepo Madlingozi reviews 
contemporary social movements’ engagement with the Courts and finds that  
the Court has arguably failed in its mission to facilitate ‘constitutional 
dialogue’, making it inaccessible, unaccountable and ultimately alien to poor 
people. Its practice is characterised by thinly‐reasoned judgments, a failure to 
translate and make its judgments widely accessible, and a willingness to 
engage more with academics, NGOs and English‐medium media than with 
social movements, trade unions, poor people’s organisations and African‐
language media (Maslingozi 2013, 553).   
 
Pete and du Plessis (2014) similarly find that many of the progressive judgements coming out of 
the Constitutional Court are rarely implemented because the court has not forced other 
institutional actors to fulfill its judgements. An effect of an impotent court is that the material 
outcomes that are realized after considerable resources and time are devoted by advocates to 
litigation are very difficult to quantify. In this regard, they argue that democratic 
constitutionalism as well as liberal rights discourse has:  
served to pacify grassroots opposition to the gross economic inequalities which 
continue to bedevil the country. While the enemy of the impoverished masses 
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was clearly in sight during the apartheid period in South Africa, with the 
dawning of the new era of constitutional democracy and all the talk of rights 
and transformation, the poor and the marginalized may be finding it more 
difficult to identify clear targets for their anger and frustration (Pete and du 
Plessis 2014, 197).  
 
This critique has large purchase among activist writers and researchers. For example, Julian 
Brown, in his book ‘insurgent citizenship’, argues that the “[c]ourtroom more often than not is a 
space of disempowerment” (2015, 146) in South African struggles. However, he admits, the 
courts, when engaged with by public interest litigators, “open up new possibilities for politics” 
(Brown 2015, 147). Brown oddly falls into the trap of understanding law to be all that happens in 
the courtroom rather than looking to the co-constitutive relationship between law and politics. In 
a direct challenge to this narrow view of law in the courts, scholarship in socio-legal studies and 
legal anthropology suggest that law informs people’s consciousness and influences how they 
understand their subjectivities and entitlements in their ‘everyday life’.16  
The fourth and final area of scholarship on constitutionalism focuses on the politics of 
interpretation. This critique relies on a vision of the constitution as a dialectical product of “the 
ever evolving liberal constitutionalist ideal in international political culture and local traditions of 
political struggle” (Roux 2013, 50, see also Klug 2000). Constitutionalism as a dialectical 
product refers to the fundamental role of public participation in its constitutive development 
(Roux 2013, 50). The generative opportunity created by the Constitution is illustrated by Klug in 
his work on the emerging role of Chapter 9 institutions in promoting good government and 
accountability – roles that they were not originally designed to fulfill but have adapted to occupy 
in response to growing corruption and state capture (Klug 2018b). Albertyn takes a similar 
                                                 
16 Within the field of socio-legal studies, works on legal consciousness are perhaps the most indicative of a scholarly 
trend away from studying law in courts to studying law in everyday life. For example, see Ewick and Silbey (1998). 
Studies of law and culture in legal anthropology also represent key transitional moments in law and society 
scholarship. See Coombe (1998), Merry (2000), Rosen (2006).  
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approach to interpreting the Constitutional text. She argues that a transformative interpretation 
“is one that enables a deep respect for cultural identity and diversity and consequent recognition 
of positive cultural norms and practices, while also addressing crosscutting, intragroup 
inequalities” (Albertyn 2013, 164). Her approach examines struggles for transformation within a 
broader cultural context, emergent from the history of struggle, political transition, and ethnic 
diversity of the country, wherein human rights “are contested, flexible, and permeable, capable 
of varying meanings and of being responsive to socioeconomic changes” (Albertyn 2013, 165).   
The range of sources available to the courts in adjudicating cases contribute to the 
ongoing development of human rights norms in South Africa. For example, Section 39 of the 
Constitution directs courts to uphold the values of democracy, human dignity, equality and 
freedom, and to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. These 
imperatives create a “formal and permanent link between the rights enshrined as a product for 
the local struggle for democracy in South Africa and the constant evolution of rights in the 
international environment" (Klug 2010, 46). As Klug powerfully emphasises:  
The diversity of legitimate sources provides wide scope for an interpretive 
practice that must recognize that the Constitution is a living tree whose 
meaning and application will grow as South African society moves away from 
its multiple legacies of colonialism, apartheid, deprivation and violence (Klug 
2010, 83).  
 
The question of legal interpretation is an important area of critical scholarship on transformative 
constitutionalism, as the work cited above illustrates. However, these studies are so far 
concerned with interpretation within the courts, i.e. the role of legal culture and how judges 
interpret constitutional provisions in their judgements. The question of legal interpretation in a 
wider field of action is often overlooked in the literature on transformative constitutionalism. 
Analysis of the politics of interpretation needs to move outside of the courtroom and into social 
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and political struggles on the ground, around particular rights-based assertions. In his critique of 
Klare’s focus on a ‘liberal legal culture’, van der Walt argues that law “is not an extraneous and 
autonomous framework within which judges can be restricted; it is an intellectual and cultural 
artifact that judges themselves create through their interpretation of legislation and the common-
law tradition” (2006, 11). Moreover, understanding law and politics as co-constitutive areas of 
struggle demands that legal researchers “search for and highlight opportunities for and real 
instances of dissent and disharmony and emphasise the effect it had on the development of law in 
its social and political context" (van der Walt 2006, 46). Law and rights are focal points to both 
mount resistance and legitimate appeals; they exist in a constellation of discourses and practices 
that provide means to make legible social struggles and collective claims to redress.  
 Human rights struggles in the context of South African constitutionalism also exist within 
a transnational field of activism wherein a global culture of human rights is emergent through 
UN agencies, transnational NGOs, and human rights advocates and doctrinally based in treaties, 
declarations, and human rights law. Socio-legal researcher Heinz Klug describes the relationship 
between the national and international struggles against apartheid in South Africa and the 
importance of the transnational human rights machinery and activism in this national struggle. 
He argues that the international campaign against apartheid in South Africa marks a key point in 
the “transformation of human rights from the state-based system of international legal norms to 
what might more accurately be thought of as a normative and institutional system of 
transnational human rights” (Klug 2005, 88).17 If the conditions of transnationalizing human 
                                                 
17 Klugg describes the role of the UN General Assembly in condemning apartheid, beginning in 1952, by asserting 
its jurisdiction to advocate for human rights within particular states. Klugg explains: “This was not merely the 
construction of a normative framework but rather a globalizing process that only came to prominence through the 
struggles of national and international social movements, from the civil rights movement in the United States to the 
mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and the international anti-apartheid movement itself. Despite the old 
formal doctrine that states are the sole or primary subjects of international law, by the end of the twentieth century 
the reality of a constant renegotiation of state sovereignty was well established, providing a smorgasbord of 
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rights played an important role in the struggle against apartheid, argues Klug, the final 
Constitution in South Africa set a ‘high water mark’ in the global movement for human rights 
(Klug 2010). As demonstrated in the remaining chapters, human rights struggles in South Africa 
are mobilized through references to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, as well as numerous soft-law instruments, such as the Food and Agricultural 
Organization’s Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure. Regional 
institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights also play a role in 
legitimating human rights claims.  
3.7 Conclusion: Approaching struggles over land as property in post-apartheid 
South Africa  
 
The relationship between constitutional law and social, economic and political transformation is 
unwieldy and unpredictable. Transformative constitutionalism lends itself to pronouncing visions 
of equality and glorifying the role of law in fulfilling calls for economic and social justice. Yet 
the effort to create an institutional framework that both sustains stability while being flexible 
enough to respond to changing social, economic and political contexts remains a significant 
challenge. In this context, how do we measure, or understand conceptually and theoretically, the 
relationship between the constitution and social change?   
How constitutional provisions and judgements from the Constitutional Court are 
mobilized in a wider field of action remains out of the purview of existing literature on South 
                                                 
subjects—international organizations, nongovernment organizations, transnational corporations and movements, as 
well as individuals—and a fragmentation of jurisdiction in which the nation-state provides the locus for constant 
renegotiation, realignment, and reassignment of jurisdictional powers” (Klugg 2005, 91). 
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African constitutionalism. As explained above, researchers concentrate on the specific work of 
the court by studying issues such as legal culture, adjudication,  the interaction of social 
movements with the courts, and legal interpretation. If we are to take a different approach and 
understand the work of the Constitution and Constitutional Court in processes of human rights 
articulation, and the unique forms of vernacularization of Constitutionally upheld human rights 
norms in local contexts, then we can begin to understand the work of transformative 
constitutionalism as practice and process. We can also begin to recognize how mobilization on 
the ground feeds back into changes in Constitutional law, thus impacting the ethos and process of 
transformative constitutionalism from the ground up.   
The approach that I take to the relationship between law and social change in the 
remainder of this dissertation draws from a history of critical socio-legal scholarship. American 
critical legal scholars have long argued the question of whether courts can produce change 
through progressive human-rights based jurisprudence is an empirical one. In his famous and 
landmark book “The Hollow Hope: Can courts bring about social change?”, Gerald Rosenberg 
(1993) argues that, counter to the hopes and assumptions of progressive lawyers and activists 
focusing on the courts as a means to achieve social justice, longitudinal empirical evidence 
demonstrates that landmark civil rights cases in the United States, such as Brown v. Board of 
Education, have failed to generate social reform. The failure of courts to spur social reform is 
due largely to a number of structural constrains, argues Rosenberg, such as a lack of political will 
to enforce widespread institutional change and lack of implementation powers. Yet there is a 
deeper problem embedded within this critique: it relies on a functionalist perspective of the 
relationship between two distinct spheres of ‘law’ and ‘society’ wherein law evolves to respond 
to the perceived needs of society, an approach (or habit of thought) that reifies history and 
83 
 
assumes either that divergences of the predicted outcome are due to a dysfunction of the system 
or that a specific outcome is the natural result of a carefully laid plan (Gordon 1984, 70-71). In 
his seminal paper Critical Legal Histories, legal historian Robert Gordon argues that critical 
legal scholarship can overcome functionalist accounts of legal history by collapsing the law and 
society distinction, examining how law is constitutive of consciousness, and by arguing that the 
indeterminacy of law is itself grounded in a legal system founded on contradictions. He explains, 
“if it turns out to be true that law is founded upon contradictions, it cannot also be true that any 
particular legal form is required by, or a condition of, any particular set of social practices” 
(1984, 116).  
A focus on the indeterminacy of law and legal change is foundational to a critical legal 
perspective. As Gordon explains, indeterminacy does not assume that regularities in social 
outcomes are “necessary consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules. The rule-
system could also have generated a different set of stabilizing conventions leading to exactly the 
opposite results and may, upon a shift in the direction of political winds, switch to those 
opposing conventions at any time” (Gordon 1984, 125). Leaving legal functionalism behind and 
turning instead to focus on indeterminacy in the political and social relations that are constitutive 
of law, involves approaching law as something that is produced and re-produced in the everyday 
practice of struggle and understanding law as a central locus of power through which new forms 
of territorial inscriptions and governmental relations are articulated.  
In the remaining chapters of this dissertation I examine the mobilization of rights through 
the work of actors, state and non-state institutions, and social movements. Contemporary 
struggles over property, I demonstrate, are not determined by the property clause. Rather, 
struggles over property are fundamentally struggles over authority, over territory, over who can 
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make legitimate claims to land; they are struggles that draw on a wide range of intersecting and 
inter-connected rights claims, including cultural rights, indigenous peoples human rights, 
transnational norms on rural people’s land rights, and rights to the autonomy of communities as 
self-determined decision-makers. As I show in the next chapter, it is precisely the politics and 
processes of neoliberal governmentality that have opened up new spaces for the realization of 
transformative constitutionalism.  
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4 CONSTITUTIONALISM, LAND AND NEOLIBERALISM: 
GOVERNING AUTHORITY AND COLLECTIVE 
SUBJECTIVITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a jarring disjuncture between the promise of transformative constitutionalism and the 
realities of South Africa’s political economy of inequality (Brand 2013, Dugard 2013). Critics 
widely argue that beginning in 1994 the apartheid state transformed into a democratic state 
steeped in neoliberal economic policies which effectively reproduced racial and class-based 
inequalities (Bond 2000, Desai 2002, Saul 2014). In the years directly following the transition to 
democracy the ANC “imposed its own structural adjustment program” realized through tax cuts 
for the rich, the elimination of tariffs protecting unionized South African workers from the 
impact of low-cost products produced in global sweat shops, and the abandonment of exchange 
controls (Desai 2002, 10). As journalist Desai describes, “by every measure (life expectancy, 
morbidity, access to food, water, etc.) the living conditions of the poor rapidly worsened” (Desai 
2002, 10) after 1994. Political scientist Patrick Bond explains the influence of a neoliberal global 
economy in the country: “South Africa has undergone an elite transition from racial to class 
apartheid. This transition was mediated by the institutions of imperialism and their elegant local 
collaborators who regularly occupied economic ministries and endorsed the Washington 
Consensus, giving it local, continental and global legitimacy” (2016, 5). The absence of a 
constitutional avenue to regulate or dictate what kind of economic decisions could be made, 
leaving neoliberal economic policy outside the realm of human rights litigation, was arguably a 
fundamental flaw of constitutional supremacy in South Africa (Baxi 2013).  
Land reform has certainly been configured in part by the forces of neoliberalism, as I 
describe below. However, a brief note on land in South Africa is needed. As I described in 
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Chapter Two, the imposition of colonial forms of property was one way that the colonists created 
and defined a sense of universality, in law and property, against the colonized other (Fitzpatrick 
2003, Bhandar 2018). It was the control of land and labour that motivated colonial expansion and 
justified forced dispossession and racialized government through apartheid. Rural land is often 
the focus of agrarian political economists who understand land for its productive value within a 
small-scale farming or large-scale capitalist economy (see Bernstein 2006, 2013). But land is 
about much more than production. In contemporary South Africa, land is an emotive issue for 
both those previously dispossessed, who consider land rights to be deeply intertwined with 
citizenship and identity, as well as white South Africans who claim that their farmland is part of 
their heritage (see Kepe et al 2010). As geographer Thembela Kepe and his collaborating authors 
explain, “people’s relations with land form the basis of their membership in communities, ethnic 
groups and nations. Land is not only a productive resource and economic asset; it also denotes a 
political entity” (Kepe et al 2010, 150).  
Land has also been found to be an important resource for the distribution of goods within 
and between communities and families (rather than just a resource for production) (Fay 2015). 
James Ferguson (2013) argues that agricultural political economists should move beyond the 
well-worn perspective of land as a productive resource and consider additionally how land is an 
important site of non-agricultural distributive activities that enable people to, for example, 
produce and access food. This requires that researchers adopt a distributive perspective to attend 
to “the specific institutions and cultural forms through which processes of distribution take place, 
and not to suppose that these specificities simply follow mechanically or automatically from a 
given system of production” (Ferguson 2013, 170). Pauline Peters identifies the deep social, 
culture and historical significance of land across the continent:  
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Many studies in different parts of Africa show how people identify with certain 
areas – not just as sources of livelihood but as home, as a place where they 
belong, where their ancestors are buried, or where they have historical 
memories of having arrived and settled, or of having struggled mightily to 
obtain and keep. Many people also express liking, even love, of certain rural 
places and rural practices (Peters, 2013: 556). 
  
A wide range of sources consistently and affirmatively illustrate the cultural significance 
of land (as is illustrated throughout this chapter). In a report on land conflicts in relation to 
extractive industry, for example, the South African Human Rights Commission explains that 
land is much more than a source of economic production; it “reflects a more deeply entrenched 
cultural affiliation that grounds social relations in particular localities” (SAHRC 2018, 12). A 
participant in Eastern Cape hearings explains “Land is of deep significance to African people: 
key to identity and cultural expression” (2016). However, in law and policy the cultural 
significance of land in South Africa is often referred to only in very general terms, for example 
as an expression of ‘African’ cultural identity.  
The diverse historical and cultural values attached to land are not included in the Property 
Clause of the Final Constitution, despite its recognition of diverse forms of tenure relations. 
Moreover, regardless of the historical, social, political and cultural meanings of land, the South 
African land reform program sought to implement a ‘classical’ conception of property following 
four principles (Atuahene 2010, 784). First, an owner must, through their individual efforts, 
acquire valid legal title to become the sole owner with clearly defined and consolidated rights. 
Second, the owner possess control over the use and transfer of her property to the extent that it 
does not cause harm to anyone else. Third, the state has a responsibility to protect the property 
rights of the owner (while the responsibilities of the owner towards third parties is under 
emphasized). Fourth, the state or other third parties bear the burden of justifying any actions that 
weaken the owner’s control of their property (Atuahene 2010, 783-784). In land restitution we 
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can identify the influence of the classical conception, argues Atuahene, wherein the government 
gives current owners facing expropriation for land restitution market value of the land being 
transferred, whereas in cases where land claimants have opted for financial compensation (rather 
than land restored) the financial amount determined does not reflect market value but is rather 
‘symbolic’. This reflects the fact that the state “is working within a conceptual framework that 
assumes current owners acquire valid legal title through their individual effort to become 
exclusive, deserving owners” all the while ignoring the rights of the owners unjustly 
dispossessed and overlooking the duties that present owners might have towards dispossessed 
peoples making valid ownership claims (Atuahene 2010, 785).  
It should come as no surprise that the nature of property rights was hotly debated during 
the transition to drafting of the new constitution and the transition to democracy. The property 
clause in the Final Constitution was the result of a long and intense period of negotiation through 
which powerful actors – including the South African Law Commission, the South African 
Agricultural Union, and the Democratic Alliance – demanded the continued protection of private 
property while members of the African National Congress, as well as other activist 
organizations, asserted the need for a robust legislative agenda to facilitate structural property 
reform and redistribution (Klug 2018, 14-18). Arguably, the property clause reflects the work 
and activism of land claiming communities and activists and allows for radical transformation, 
however it is a lack of political will, as well as Constitutional interpretations influenced by the 
recent history of land expropriation witnessed in neighbouring Zimbabwe, that have undermined 
the transformative potential of property reform (Klug 2018, 18). In these conditions we need to 
pay close attention to how peoples narrate their property rights in changing social and economic 
conditions. As anthropologist Carol Rose argues, property relations are stabilized as people 
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persuade others to recognize their distinct and exclusive rights; property is thus an act of 
communication, the success of which depends on producing and maintaining cooperation among 
peoples and institutions (Rose 1994). Of particular importance, therefore, is not the distinct 
model of property introduced, but rather the social, economic, political and legal contexts 
through which institutions and actors make claims to legitimacy over particular propertied 
relations, and the kinds of subjectivities that are created in the process (Sikor and Lund 2009). 
It is a key contention of this chapter that conditions of neoliberalism have impacted how 
land is struggled over in contemporary South Africa; at stake is how values over land have been 
articulated, and how certain actors have been able to legitimate their claims to land as collective 
property over others. While many understand neoliberalism as a political economic ideology, this 
is arguably a limited view of a process of governmental regulatory restructuring (Larner 2003). 
Recent literature develops a conception of neoliberalism that accounts for discursive conditions 
of fragmented and not always coherent policies, ideologies, and practices that take form through 
an assemblage of uneven processes of neoliberalisation (Peck and Theodore 2012, Brenner, Peck 
and Theodore 2010), an approach that I demonstrate is useful for examining the networks of 
actors and authorities coalescing through struggles over property. These conditions require that 
the “particular form, contradictions and adaptations of neoliberalism in South Africa” be 
examined through empirical analysis (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013, 509). For example, as 
illustrated in this chapter, we witness the diverse ways that the political issues of land reform 
contribute to the production of new subjects and their proprietary relationships. New political 
rationalities are born through the work of non-state actors (such as non-governmental 
organizations who take on the responsibility to intervene in struggles over rural peoples rural 
property arrangements) and land claimants (who take on the responsibility to manage land 
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collectively), a relationship that demands particular forms of conduct from previously 
dispossessed land claimants in the democratic era. Land reform is illustrated as a site of 
“regulated freedom” (Rose and Miller 2010, 272) wherein specific technologies are used to make 
subjects legible and targets of interventions for the purpose of shaping both behavior and 
management (Berry et al. 1998). Moreover, the conceptual framework of neoliberal 
governmentality is used here to investigate “the reformulation of identities, not simply as the 
outcome of rhetoric or political manipulation, but rather as an integral part of the process of [the] 
restructuring" of social and economic life (Larner 2003, 19). New subjectivities are understood 
as the outcome of processes and practices of land reform and the political economic context in 
which they are applied.  
Conditions of neoliberalism involve the responsiblization of subjects and new 
opportunities for making possessive claims to culture and custom (Coombe 2017). In conditions 
where governmental rationalities are dispersed between state and non-state actors who are 
advocating for specific conceptions of customary land holdings and the democratization of land 
governance through land-holding entities called ‘communal property associations’ (CPA), 
traditional leaders have new found resources to assert their legitimacy over land, even in cases 
where their claims are not supported by the Constitutional Court and ambiguously recognized in 
legislation. This reality speaks to the strength of the political rationalities of collective property 
that have sedimented in the country. On one hand there is an understanding of ‘collective 
property’ as the appropriate model of landholding for land claimants organized as 
‘communities’, and on the other hand there are traditional leaders, who – through diverse means 
illustrated below - assert their own form of ‘collective property’ by nature of the fact that they 
mobilize their claims to culture and custom as a means to legitimate their roles as trustees for 
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rural peoples. Collective subjectivities are also the constitutive outcome of the work of 
transnational actors and the norms that are brought to bear through international activities.  
In this chapter I demonstrate how collective subjectivities are constructed as legitimate 
property claimants and holders at the conjuncture of law, policy, and political economies of land 
reform and resource extraction. The constitutional framework, the unique ethos of transformative 
constitutionalism, and the model of land reform described in the last chapter, are generative of 
new subjectivities in conditions of neoliberalism. Newly capacitated citizens, often organized as 
collectivities, assume the responsibility to not only advocate for themselves but also to manage 
the means to realize their rights in a transitional state. Yet the opportunities offered through 
conditions of governmentality, and through legal vehicles of collective land holding, are far from 
uniform. As I show, despite evidence that communal land holdings can appropriately be 
understood as an expression of cultural practice in the form of customary law, CPAs have not 
provided a vehicle that provides room for its members to assert claims to custom and culture as a 
way of legitimating their property title. The chapter provides a novel intervention into 
contemporary debates about communal landholding in South Africa by conceptually 
distinguishing CPAs and Traditional Leaders as constitutive of distinct collective subjectivities.   
 The chapter is organized as follows. In the first part I explain the land reform program 
and the Constitutional framework and provide a brief overview of how existing literature 
explains the role of neoliberalism as economic policy in land reform. In the second section I 
describe the CPA model in law, policy and practice. In the third section I explain the institutional 
role of traditional leaders in democratic South Africa and explain some of the conditions that 
have contributed to their emerging power in the country. In the fourth section I illustrate areas of 
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rights-based struggle and assertion as emerging at the “limits of governmentality” (Coombe 
2007).   
4.2 Political Economy of Land Reform 
The persistence of a form of neoliberal political economic ‘apartheid’ in present-day South 
Africa is an established argument in existing literature (Clarno 2017). Researchers in the field of 
agrarian political economy examine the effect of neoliberal ideology and economic policy on 
land reform (Aliber and Cousins 2013, Hall 2015, Kepe and Hall 2016). The focus of this wide 
body of scholarship is not confined to restitution, reform or redistribution per se, but rather the 
literature examines the economic and social context in which land is used as a means of 
production and a site of important social and economic redistribution. In order to understand the 
conditions through which legal struggles for land rights are being waged it is important to 
summarize some of the key points of this literature.   
The land reform program in South Africa has not accomplished its objectives of 
providing land through restitution for those physically displaced under apartheid, redistributing 
land to the black majority to make land more equitably owned across racial lines, or reforming 
tenure in the former communal areas of South Africa.18 Emerging political and social discontent 
clearly indicates widespread dissatisfaction with land reform. Conditions in which most black 
South Africans live are dire, as is particularly the case for peoples living without formal tenure, 
due in part to the failure to introduce tenure reform legislation. Those living with insecure tenure 
include 17 million in communal areas, 2 million on commercial farms, 3.3 million in informal 
                                                 
18 In their 2016/2017 annual report, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform reports “The 
Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights is also contributing towards redressing the skewed ownership 
patterns caused by colonial-apartheid dispossession. The Commission has managed to settle 790 212 of the claims 
lodged by 31 December 1998, which translates to a total of 3.38million hectares; benefitting 408 231 households. 
The Commission is currently processing 6 989 outstanding land claims”. It is important to note that the vast majority 
of these claims have been settled by financial compensation rather than the transfer of land.  
93 
 
settlements, 1.9 million in backyard shacks, 5 million in RDP houses without title deeds, and 1.5 
million in state-built housing (known as RDP houses in reference to the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme) houses with inaccurate title deeds (Cousins 2016, 9-10). Moreover, 
large scale land acquisitions threaten people without ‘legally legitimate’ claims to land (or the 
resources to resist dispossession) in the context of what has been termed ‘land grabbing’ in the 
region of Southern Africa (Alden-Wily 2011, Hall et al 2015). 
  Land redistribution is found to be a site of ‘deepening’ neoliberalism to the extent that it 
has historically moved further into a model that demands either contributions from the targeted 
beneficiaries or demands their participation in the agricultural economy. It has also created new 
forms of inequality to the extent that people connected to business or politicians access a 
majority of the benefits. Policy moved away from state-assisted land purchase for redistribution 
in the mid 1990’s, often realized through the form of small grants to households to buy land, to 
an approach wherein potential beneficiaries would ‘apply’ to the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform for land reform grants and would have to demonstrate how they 
would contribute, either in cash or in kind, to the subsidized land (Hebinck 2013, 16). Under 
president Mbeki the government focused on supporting medium to large scale farms and 
provided purchase subsidies to people who were already engaging in commercial production and 
a resource base to expand their business. In 2011 President Zuma introduced the ‘willing buyer, 
willing seller’ model whereby the state would buy land from ‘willing sellers’ at market value for 
redistribution. However, this redistributed land remained as state leasehold and did not transfer 
title to create new land owners. In other words, state leasehold introduced a new form of state 
landlordism and does not support the production of a new class of smallholders (Hall and Kepe 
2016, 123, Hall 2015). Wage labourers remain tenants on farmland owned by the state, while 
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those who receive the most significant material benefit are black business owners (often well-
connected to politicians) who gain a stake in farming operations (Hall and Kepe 2016). To date, 
land reform has not, in practice, promoted the agency and autonomous decision-making of the 
people who were meant to benefit from land redistribution.   
 Geographers Ruth Hall and Thembela Kepe studied land redistribution in one district of 
the Eastern Cape Province called the Baartman District. Their investigation included examining 
11 projects falling under the state leasehold model called the State Land Lease and Disposal 
Policy (SLLDP), wherein the state black farming households obtain 30-year leases on the 
precondition that they secure a ‘strategic partner’ – i.e. an agri-business company – with whom 
they establish a joint venture agreement. The authors find that in the majority of cases the targets 
of land reform gained little while the strategic partners gained the majority of resources:  
Although government policy emphasises the need for tenure security, and aims 
to achieve this through the provision of long-term leases, we found that 
beneficiaries did not have leases in any of our case study projects. The only 
two valid leases among the sample were concluded between government and 
strategic partners (i.e., agribusiness companies), not the ostensible 
‘beneficiaries’. The inability of beneficiaries to pay rent to the state has led 
officials to institute a practice of issuing ‘caretakership’ agreements (mostly 
lapsed) in order to absolve beneficiaries of a need to pay for their land. Under 
such agreements, rather than being rights-holders, they are given a duty to look 
after state property for a limited period, normally three months, with the state 
being able to give them 30 days’ notice to vacate the property. In one case, a 
family was granted permission to occupy a state farm (without a lease), and 
asked by the DRDLR [Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs] to 
deliver an informal eviction notice to those already occupying it… Situations 
in which people either have no documented rights, or have caretakerships or 
expired leases produce high degrees of uncertainty, leading people to avoid 
investment in land use, production or maintenance of infrastructure. This 
means that ‘beneficiaries’ have little or no tenure security” (Kepe and Hall 
2017, 123-124).  
 
The above example provides insight into one of the areas of land reform, but the actual 
practices of implementing land reform policy are incredibly varied across the country. Paul 
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Hebinck explains that the state has “multiple layers which act according to their own 
interpretations of the state’s reform discourse, which often turn out to be contrasting 
interpretations of state policies, directives and objectives. Next to the state there are many other 
coordinating mechanisms and practices that shape the dynamics and outcomes of land and 
agrarian reforms” (Hebinck 2013, 18). In this fragmented landscape of policy and 
implementation land reform beneficiaries often become disenchanted with a complex and slow 
process and strategically manipulate the process in order to try to make it work for them, “often 
leading to a particular entanglement of practices and new resource use patterns” (Hebinck 2013, 
17).  
Under these conditions, two forms of legal subjects, variously supported in law and 
policy, have emerged: collective property holders and traditional leaders. In her work on the 
emergence of culturalized property claims in conditions of neoliberal governmentality, legal 
anthropologist Rosemary Coombe argues for a critical engagement with collective property that 
acknowledges “the political economies of community construction in order to understand 
ownership as a process through which property-holders are constituted as social actors and 
political agents" (Coombe 2011a, 106, see also Coombe 2017). Importantly, through processes 
of collective identification we can identify new kinds of spatialized and territorialized claims. 
However, these interact with colonial legal geographies in contradictory ways; as I show, 
narratives of post-colonial ‘emancipation’ or ‘re-entrenched’ colonial authorities are not 
generalizable in contemporary South Africa. In the remainder of this chapter I demonstrate not 
only the political economies via which collective subjectivities emerge but also illustrate the 
disparate and uneven opportunities offered to property claimants in contemporary conditions of 
neoliberalisation and its spatial configuration. Many of the struggles that I highlight are 
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ambiguous and contradictory, and demand nuanced judgements about how they echo colonial 
forms and subjectivities and how they might be reforming them (du Toit and Neves 2014). 
4.3 Legislating ‘Community’ as Collective Property Owners 
Under conditions of neoliberalism there has been a shift from focusing on the ‘social’ to 
targeting the ‘community’ as a subject of governance (Bennett 2000). This is particularly true in 
the context of ‘development’ where, in some cases, a focus on the ‘collective’ or ‘communal’ 
landholding subject is ubiquitous, unchallenged, and supported through transnational 
governmental assemblages focused on the global South (Li 2016). The ‘community’ in South 
Africa has long been an imagined beneficiary of land reform, despite scholarship that challenges 
the fallacy of homogeneous property-owning communities (Kepe 1999, James 2007, Beyers 
2009).  
A policy trend focusing on collective subjects as both the subjects and agents of land 
reform can be identified across a range of sources, including the National Development Plan 
2030. ‘Community’ and its stemmed words are used 556 times in the 480-page document, while 
‘individual’ was used 132 times and ‘household’ 172 times. ‘Community’ refers to a national 
community, as well as the subject of ‘community-based programs and community development 
programs. While it is important not to generalize from quantitative results, the numbers do 
represent a level of uncritical comfort with the concept of ‘community’ in the national 
development plan.  
A concern about the role of communities in rural development is also pronounced in land 
reform policy. In the Green Paper on Land Reform, published by the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), it states: “The need to instill national identity, shared 
citizenship and autonomy-fostering service delivery are the primary reasons why the State must 
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continue to invest in the transformation of land relations” (DRDLR 2011, 3). Moreover, the 2015 
Communal Tenure Policy (CTP) notes that it’s effective implementation “requires the 
mobilisation and organization of rural people into functional groups to effectively take charge of 
their own development, especially in identifying the most pressing needs of the community and 
perceived optimal ways to address these” (DRDLA 2013, 12); and further notes that one of the 
core objectives of the Comprehensive Rural Development Plan includes the “self-reliance of 
rural communities” (DRDLR 2013, 12). Finally, the CTP refers back to the value and 
requirement of participation in the Constitutional democracy: “in order for rural transformation 
to occur in communal areas, we need a capable state supported by an active citizenry as South 
Africa’s democracy is not only representative but participatory in nature” (DRDLR 2013, 23). A 
focus on citizen participation (a key to transformative constitutionalism as discussed in Chapter 
Three) as well as a clear focus on making the subjects of land reform autonomous communities 
for the purpose of realizing service delivery needs, is unambiguously asserted.    
In line with these broader policy objectives, peoples seeking redress through land reform 
often need to create a collective landholding entity. Community subjects are defined both in the 
land restitution program, which allows claims to be filed as either individual or collective claims 
to land, and in the context of land reform where tenure rights have historically been imagined to 
be held and managed collectively. In the Restitution Act, for example, 'community' "means any 
group of persons whose rights in land are derived from shared rules determining access to land 
held in common by such group, and includes part of any such group" (Restitution Act 1994). 
Communal Property Associations (CPA) were legislated as holders of private property under the 
Communal Property Associations Act of 1996, written to "enable communities to form juristic 
persons, to be known as communal property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage 
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property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a written constitution; and 
to provide for matters connected therewith." (CPA Act 1996). The Act defines a 'community' as a 
group of persons who have shared rules of land use and occupation, and who have defined their 
rules through a democratically-written CPA constitution, to be approved by the Minister of Land 
Affairs. During the process of land restitution claimants would apply to register their CPA, 
which requires that they convince the Director-General of Land Affairs that they are a 
‘community’ that has been disadvantaged and that it is in the public interest to approve their 
application (CPA Act 2). An application for registration for a provisional CPA must include a list 
of names, principles for the identification of other peoples who may be added at a later date, 
procedures for resolving disputes, and a democratically elected interim committee to represent 
the association (CPA Act Section 5). A number of imperatives define these legal entities, 
including the constitution of a board, the collective writing of a constitution, and frequent 
meetings of the board to discuss issues in the management of the collective land.  
  Constituting collective land-owning subjects has been very difficult in practice. This is 
due in part to the incredible social complexity inherited by the post-apartheid state. In the White 
Paper on Land Reform, published in 1997, this complexity is clearly acknowledged. The authors 
of the report argue that the issue of defining legitimate owners constituted as legal communities 
is a bewildering task due to the long history of forced removals:  
Often people were forcibly removed and ‘resettled’ on land to which others 
had prior rights. People evicted from white farms were ordered by magistrates 
to go and settle in black freehold areas. Thus it is commonplace that there are 
overlapping and competing tenure rights to the same land. One group may 
claim ownership because they have traditionally owned the land for 
generations, another because Pretoria awarded the land to them and gave them 
documents to this effect. In other situations, there are people who were 
accepted within tenure systems as ‘refugees’ 60 years ago who now claim 
independent rights to stay there, while the ‘host’ owners want to use the land 
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for the agricultural purposes to which they have always aspired (DLA 1997, 
56).  
 
It is on this contested landscape that dispossessed peoples have had to demonstrate their 
collective solidarities with others whom they would hold land collectively. Thus, they are not 
only responsible (in land restitution for example) for demonstrating their previous occupation of 
a particular area of land, but they also need to present themselves as collective land-holding 
subjects.  
Unfortunately, due to issues such as lack of ongoing support and lack of resources, many 
CPAs failed to operate as intended (Cousins and Hornby 2000, Pienaar 2000). Their failure has 
been attributed to a number of factors. For example, while CPA constitutions are meant to be 
organically and democratically written by members, Klug (2006) finds little evidence to suggest 
that ‘communities’ organized as CPAs “actively participated in constituting or defining 
themselves in very specific ways during the constitution-drafting process” (2006, 134). 
Moreover, some argue that the CPA model was far too bureaucratic and demanded far too many 
resources to be successful in the long term (Kingwill et al. 2017). Others argue, however, that 
there is no necessarily inherent flaw in the design and implementation of CPAs, but rather the 
problem is a lack of government support in their creation and ongoing functioning (Weinberg 
2015).  
There are significant reasons to have reservations about the assumed cohesiveness of 
property-owning communities. Thembela Kepe argues that defining the boundaries of 'local 
communities' for the purpose of land reform is highly problematic. The definition of 
'communities' in rural areas is "both complex and ambiguous" (Kepe 1999, 418). Kepe identifies 
three basic characteristics of community - as a spatial unit, an economic unit, and as a unit of 
kinship, social and cultural relations - to demonstrate the ways that a 'community' is often 
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actually one of many different understandings of community relations super-imposed on one 
another, with each layer emphasized by different kinds of government interventions. He 
highlights that simplistic and ambiguous understandings of community are not merely theoretical 
issues, but misunderstandings that can cause conflict if not dealt with properly by state agents 
working in land reform:  
In the gap between policy and implementation, the meaning of 'community' as 
used or implied by policy makers may easily get confused and blurred by local 
realities. Unfortunately, the uncertainty around the meaning of 'community' is 
not only a problem for outsiders, but also for local people engaged in struggles 
in terms of social and territorial groupings. These local conflicts and 
uncertainties complicate the work of the implementers of policy (Kepe 1999, 
430).  
 
The valorization of collective property in South Africa is informed by what anthropologist Knut 
Nustad argues is a dichotomy in liberal thinking about property in the country wherein 
“possessive individualism” is approached as regressive and “communal property systems” are 
imagined to be the most progressive form of property holding for racialized groups (Nustad 
2011, 24). Further, he identifies a shift in thinking from approaching "property as a social 
relation to property as specific plots of land, and from people with a multitude of histories and 
experiences to people as members of a 'community'" (Nustad 2011, 24).  
This shift is indicative of a trend identified by anthropologist Deborah James: the rights-
based assertions of collective property in South Africa have routinely run into barriers when 
future-oriented rights language is translated into the ‘hard ground’ of property (James 2007). 
James argues that the land reform program is constituted by two discourses of land reform: one 
focusing on rights and the other on property. The rights approach echoes the rights talk of the 
1980s and seeks to legally secure land for citizens. It appeals to the past in its claims for 
ownership as reparation for past wrongs. The property approach is more forward looking and 
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seeks to affirm material and concrete access to land for the purposes of economic development 
(James, 2007: 43). James asks in response to these approaches: “[d]o the subsequent ideological 
contestations over the respective merits of restoring citizenship ‘rights’ or securing economically 
viable ‘property’ affect how different categories of the heterogeneous landless are viewed – and 
their landlessness addressed – by land reform? (James, 2007: 50). In other words, how has this 
identified tension between rights and property affected the policy prescriptions and constitutions 
of collective land holding institutions?  
'Communities' are imagined as responsible subjects of land restitution through processes 
of 'strategic essentialism' in litigation (see Spivak 1987, Huizenga 2014). While this may be a 
necessary political strategy in order to access resources, it also creates problems. Attorney 
Wilmien Wilcomb states: “Lawyers are often forced to ‘strategically essentialize’ communities 
for the purposes of litigation. That means that lawyers must speak about ‘the community’ as an 
entity with a single view all the while knowing that that is not the case" (2013, 21). She further 
elaborates that the role of lawyers working with communities is to "learn with and learn from the 
tensions", and to "unashamedly inject meaning into these legal concepts before the more 
powerful forces do so – and re-appropriate those terms already conquered” (ibid). Strategic 
essentialism is not only a question of whether or not ‘communities’ exist, but rather it raises 
more specific questions about what ideological constructs, or what values, might make assertions 
of strategic essentialism successful and it what contexts? Such more nuanced analysis also 
demands empirical examination of the kinds of conflicts that might emerge within a claimant 
community despite observed collective solidarity.    
Anthropologists Chris Beyers and Derick Fay explain, for example, the conflicts that tend 
to emerge ‘after restitution’. One of the legacies of the CPA model is that it has directed 
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problems and conflicts inwards, within and between members who often turn to litigation to deal 
with disagreements around membership, decision-making powers, and property entitlements. 
The nature of these conflicts takes on a particularly neoliberal characteristic, as explained by 
Beyers and Fay:  
Across the South African restitution landscape, we see fracturing of claimant 
communities… Members of claimant groups are now using the law, not to 
challenge the state or demand delivery, but to make claims and levy accusation 
on one another through challenges to the new legal entities created through 
restitution (2015, 439). 
 
One effect of this streaming of grievances inwards to members of CPAs, is lengthy and resource-
heavy litigation, wherein the state stands back as an apparent ‘neutral’ actor in what is otherwise 
a ‘local’ conflict between land claimants (Beyers and Fay 2015). The entity as a responsibilized 
subject becomes the target of its own members through litigation.  
 In land reform policy and legislation, we witness a rapid and often uncritically 
acknowledged shift from land rights to land administration as assumed rights claimants are 
expected to take on the responsibility of adhering to a strict set of administrative (and legally 
defined) roles in the management of their own land. In other words, in order to free themselves 
from being neo-colonial rural subjects of chiefs they must conform to a set of rules that are 
democratically mandated in a constitutional democracy. For example, the CPA model does not 
account for the diverse meanings of land, the kinds of relationships that people actually have 
with the land, for example by recognizing the layered rights between households, kin groups, 
communities, and traditional territories, and the temporal or spatial character of these rights 
(Kepe 1999, Kepe et al 2010). Members of CPAs are assumed to conform to a political 
rationality that demands their own participation in managing this legal entity, however the degree 
to which they can participate is highly circumscribed by administrative rules. Moreover, the CPA 
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model of collective ownership is not easily amendable or transferable to wider sets of claims and 
issues, such as claims to culture and custom as a means to legitimate forms of landholding. It is 
telling, for example, that the only reference to ‘culture’ in the CPA Act is in reference to 
prohibitive grounds of discrimination within on the principle of equality of membership 
(members must not be discriminated against on the basis of culture)(Section 9(1)(b)(i)).  
In conditions of legal pluralism, accentuated by fragmented and variegated neoliberal 
government restructuring, traditional leaders have begun to re-assert their own legitimacy 
through a variety of means (discussed below), in order to trump the property rights of CPAs. 
These assertions may also be supported through state agents. As Kingwill et al. explain, “policy 
makers, since at least 2009, have seen CPAs as being in competition with traditional councils for 
authority over land” (Kingwill et al 2017, 63). Further, the authors list among the emerging 
problems with CPAs: “A marked upsurge in contestation between the authority of traditional 
councils and the governing bodies of CPAs over control of land access and rights” (ibid, see also 
Weinberg 2015). Ironically, despite the number of issues that have plagued the CPA model and 
administration, it is CPAs that have provided one of the legal forms that peoples use to assert 
their own property and autonomy against the assumed authority of traditional leaders. It is to the 
particular power of traditional leaders in contemporary conditions that I now turn.  
4.4 Traditional Leadership 
The role of traditional leaders is unique in South Africa compared to most of the continent in that 
the country has taken specific measures to officially recognize chieftaincy at local and national 
levels of government (Berry 2018, 92). Traditional leadership relies upon the existence of an 
imagined traditional community that is the subject of their authority. Moreover, under current 
legislation, they have effective property rights which they hold on ‘behalf’ of a larger collective. 
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Thus the ‘traditional leader’ is itself a legal subject position that perpetuates a political rationality 
of communal property-holding within horizontal relations of power characteristic of 
governmentality.   
During the early transition to democracy, traditional leaders who had benefitted from 
enhanced authority under colonial rule began to fear that a democratic system would undermine 
their rural authority. A 'traditional leadership lobby' formed to advocate for the continuation of 
customary authority in the new democratic dispensation. In 1987 the Congress of Traditional 
Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) was formed to lobby for their representation in the 
new state government, and in 1997 the National House of Traditional Leaders was established to 
guarantee their inclusion in the new South Africa and establish state budgets for their 
remuneration.  
Significantly, in 2003 the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
(TLGFA) was passed. Although it did not outline the statutory powers and authorities of 
traditional leaders, it provided a framework by specifying, “that the national or provincial 
governments may enact laws providing a role for traditional councils and leaders on a wide range 
of issues, including land administration, welfare, the administration of justice, safety and 
security, economic development, and the management of natural resources” (Claassens 2015, 75-
76). Legislation introduced since the Framework Act, such as the (now overturned) Communal 
Land Rights Act (CLARA), and the Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill (TKLB), further 
endorsed the authority of traditional leaders who, in turn, have articulated a particular version of 
customary law to justify their own proprietary powers. The post-apartheid State, in collaboration 
with traditional leaders, chose the most expedient way of making customary law: by defining 
'traditional' leadership as the historical authors of customary law in a fashion congruent with 
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African colonial history (Chanock 2005, 343). Moreover, to identify the peoples living under the 
government of traditional leadership, existing legislation attaches their authority to state-
identified ‘traditional territories’ that essentially mirror territorial jurisdictions created through 
Bantustan legislation, recreating the relations of power that characterized the legal geography of 
colonialism and apartheid identified in Chapter Two. State recognition has thereby also offered 
chiefs new opportunities to claim property, as described below.  
The powers granted to traditional authorities, and the coercive measures used to protect 
them, have left many commentators bewildered (Thamm 2015, Mbembe 2014). In recent years, 
for example, traditional leaders have increasingly partnered with mining companies without 
consulting impacted peoples (Claassens and Boyle 2015). Aninka Claassens (2014) argues that 
this amounts to the “double dispossession of the rural poor”, suggesting that rural peoples were 
first dispossessed of rights under apartheid rule and are again being dispossessed by traditional 
leaders. Research shows that chiefs have resorted to coercion to suppress dissent and maintain 
their power as they continue to collect rents from extractive industries (Mnwana and Capps 
2015). 
In some instances, community members have attempted to stand up to the authority of 
chiefs to assert their land rights, and the legitimacy of CPAs, as autonomous from traditional 
leadership. Conflicts between CPAs and traditional leaders have received the attention of the 
Department of Land Affairs, which in 2015 announced that CPAs would be ‘discouraged’ while 
the authority of traditional leaders would trump the rights of newly constituted CPAs (Weinberg 
2015). This official announcement contrasts with legislation drafted during the transition to 
democracy. For example, in the early years of democracy in South Africa there was an attempt to 
sever any legal link between collective land-holding entities and traditional leadership. The 
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Restitution Act, for example, defines ‘communities’ without any reference to traditional 
leadership or traditional territories. As one NGO explains, “[t]his indicates that at that early 
stage, the legislature did not understand communities as necessarily represented by traditional 
leaders” (Spatial Inequality Report 2016). In public forums many participants decry the idea that 
traditional leaders determine the identity of community and control their landholding (TKLB 
Public Consultations, 2 February 2016). Moreover, transcripts and reports from public hearings 
for this research found that participants often complained that traditional leaders have become 
too powerful in democratic South Africa and that their leadership and control over property and 
territory mirrors Bantustan law and policy introduced during apartheid.    
 Conflicts have emerged between the legitimacy of chiefs and rural peoples as they 
struggle to determine the nature of their political allegiances and property forms. These conflicts 
were brought to the fore by activists in a legal arena by the 2003 Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLARA). CLARA was introduced in 2003 to fulfill a constitutional imperative to introduce 
legislation to secure tenure in rural areas, and the former bantustans (now communal areas) in 
particular. Lawyer Henk Smith describes that at the core of the Act legislates traditional councils 
or “modified tribal authority structures to administer the land and represent the ‘community’ as 
owner. Its legal effect is to transform and recast customary law and traditional councils” (Smith 
2008, 39). These characteristics continue to be contested today. 
CLARA faced significant opposition and was eventually found to be unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court on 11 May 2010. Unfortunately, the Court overturned the legislation on 
procedural grounds, therefore the substantive arguments submitted and evidence amassed for the 
courts were never heard. Four communities sought an order declaring all the provisions of 
CLARA unconstitutional or invalid. The substantive challenge was based on the following 
107 
 
grounds: it undermines the security of tenure on land communities use and occupy, it undermines 
customary law-based systems of land administration because it introduces a form of land 
administration under traditional councils, women’s rights were not adequately secured as the 
land rights envisioned in the Act relied on historical forms of ownership that excluded women, 
and finally, if read together with the TLGFA, CLARA creates a new sphere of government in 
traditional leaders (Pepeteka 2010, see also Cousins and Claassens 2008). Land rights-activist 
and researcher Rosalie Kingwill explains the further limits of the act, arguing CLARA "made no 
attempt to recognize property in terms of familial or kinship relationships, nor did it allow for 
decentralized relationships of authority to tie in with the layered levels of local authority, 
building up from families and clans" (Kingwill 2013, 170). Unfortunately, by basing the 
judgement on procedural grounds, the Court avoided having to deal with any of the substantive 
issues before it.  
Despite the legislative vacuum created when CLARA was struck down, no new 
legislation securing tenure in communal areas has been introduced to date. Rather, an interim 
measure, the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (1996), is re-introduced annually. 
The most recent Communal Land Tenure Policy (2012) stipulates that all land in communal areas 
will be owned and managed by traditional councils, which are headed by traditional leaders. 
Finally, the TLGFA is on track to be replaced by the TKLB, however many of the concerning 
aspects of the TLGFA remain in the new version (Custom Contested, 2018).19  
The efforts of traditional leaders to expand their authority over land as well as in 
government more broadly in Africa and in post-apartheid South Africa is now the topic of a wide 
and burgeoning body of work (Oomen 2005, Comaroff and Comaroff 2011, 2018). Some argue 
                                                 
19 Also see the website founded by a collectivity of land researchers and activists in late 2018: 
https://stopthebantustanbills.org/ 
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that post-apartheid chieftaincy represents a resurgence or revival of past traditional forms of 
government (Claassens 2015, Ntsebeza 2008). This view is a 'half truth', argue Comaroff and 
Comaroff (2018), as Chiefly assertions of power today have only partially to do with a re-
assertion of the past, and as much to do with drawing on contemporary conditions of global 
neoliberalism, including new avenues to establish themselves as brokers between extractive 
industry, development agencies, and international partners seeking to connect with 'local' 
communities. In other words, the legitimacy of chieftaincy derives from many sources that are 
untraditional (Comaroff and Comaroff 2018, 14). The authors emphasize the huge diversity of 
ways that chiefs assert their authority and aggregate resources to buttress their claims to 
leadership and trusteeship. They also identify what they believe are interconnected conditions 
that enable the re-articulation of traditional authority: 
 (1) the relative capacity of rulers to mobilize the customary as a fungible 
political resource in order to control flows of wealth and tangible assets, 
territory, and people; (2) the devolution of the functions of the state and, with 
it, the dispersal of resources, especially where it is accompanied by an active 
corporate and NGO presence; and (3) the sedimentation of "local" 
communities of engagement around an indigenous authority, positioned to 
claim recognition and rights - material, social, spiritual, territorial - by virtue of 
inalienable cultural difference (Comaroff and Comaroff 2018, 19). 
 
Certainly, these are conditions in South Africa that facilitate and allow for the power of 
chieftaincy. However, the idea that local communities of engagement are ‘sedimented’ is a clear 
point of contention – countless cases in South Africa demonstrate that local communities are 
often at odds with, and in conflict with, traditional leaders who are meant to ‘represent’ them 
(See Mnwana and Capps 2015, Claassens and Boyle 2015, Mnwana 2016). One such case, where 
the authority of the traditional leader as protected in the TLGFA came into direct conflict with a 
CPA, involved the Bakgatla ba Kgefela.  
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4.4.1 Culture and conflict in Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela 
 
‘Culture’ is a particular site of struggle between rural peoples and traditional leaders. As some 
critics argue, this interpretation of communal property as being under the sole trusteeship of 
chiefly authority can “violate the cultural meanings attached to and connections with the land” 
(Mnwana et al 2016, 13). However, in an extensive government report on the status of traditional 
leaders in post-apartheid South Africa (the Status Quo Reports on Traditional Leadership, which 
span 6 volumes and were informed by consultations with traditional leaders across the country), 
traditional leaders argue the opposite – that CPAs undermine the essential role of traditional 
leaders in sustaining the spiritual and cultural link between people and the land: 
The link between traditional leadership and land is irrevocably irreversible. 
The land and soil is identified as the spiritual home of the ancestors who 
maintain an interest in the welfare of the living. A traditional leader plays an 
important role in the propitiation of the ancestors as he is also the religious 
leader of his community. In short, communal ancestors are domicile in the land 
(soil) over which the traditional leader, by virtue of the religiosity inherent in 
him, wields tremendous authority. The CPA's on the other hand seem to be 
bent on wrenching the land away from traditional leaders. The powers of 
holding the land in trust for their communities are being eroded. Similarly, the 
institution of traditional leadership is being put under siege. The traditional 
leaders point out that the establishment of CPA's seems to be a ploy to abolish 
the institution by removing its very foundations, namely the land (soil) (Status 
Quo Report 1996, Volume 6, Section 26.2.3).20     
 
                                                 
20 Additional and revealing quotations include: “The traditional system of land administration is cheap simple and 
effective without any bulky administrative support network. It is also a hands-on control method of which the 
community forms an integral part. A change in the system will bring about new administrative and financial 
demands that cannot always be met in practice. Where individual property rights have been introduced the 
administrative system tended to collapse after the first generation of owners has passed away. Community Property 
Associations will undermine the authority of traditional leaders and will destroy traditional systems. In rural areas 
this will create a vacuum that will such rural communities into a crevasse of landlessness and poverty as land falls 
into the hands of a few wealthy individuals” (Status Quo Reports 1996, Volume 6, 26.6.6). It is telling that the 
traditional leaders identified some of the issues with CPA’s identified above, including the administrative burden.   
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Through the Status Quo Reports traditional leaders clearly articulate their disapproval of CPAs.21 
This disapproval is followed by a description of the role of traditional authorities in relationship 
to land: “In traditional communities land does not belong to a single individual. Land is the 
property of the whole community and the traditional leaders acts as the "trustee" who must 
protect and manage this land to the benefit of the community” (Status Quo Report Volume 6, 
26.6.1). While these conflicts were identified 20 years ago, contemporary conditions have 
impacted the power dynamics of fields in which they take place.    
'Traditional communities' are made legible as collective property-owning subjects in a 
transnational field whereby claims to culture and heritage are acknowledged and celebrated by, 
amongst others, extractive industries. In the context of the an international consensus that 
extractive industry must respect human rights, as endorsed in the UN Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework (2008) and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(2011), for example, heritage conservation has received attention as an important factor in 
human rights and in achieving social legitimacy. A commissioned report22 by Stephen Turner 
(2012) called World Heritage Sites and the extractive industry is one example of a purported 
concern with protecting heritage within the transnational extractive industry. In South Africa, 
argues Susan Cook (2018), we are witnessing the rise of ‘traditional-industrial’ complex through 
the work of chiefs and mining companies, particularly in the platinum belt, where traditional 
leaders offer mining companies access to land and minerals as well as legitimate their ‘social 
licence to operate’.23 
                                                 
21 Coding developed through my analysis of these reports include ‘Traditional Leadership erosion, challenges’, 
‘Conflict with CPAs’, ‘US vs Them mentality [ie. Traditional leaders vs CPAs]’, ‘Traditional leaders as custodians 
of land, culture’.   
22 The report was commissioned by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, in conjunction with the 
World Heritage Centre, the International Council on Mining and Minerals, and Royal Dutch Shell. 
23 Lynn Meskell (2012) argues in her book The Nature of Heritage that biological and natural heritage have taken 
precedence over cultural heritage in South Africa, a trend that is linked back to colonists concern for the 
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Ongoing struggles for the legitimacy to represent the ‘community’ and to determine how 
'community property' is governed in the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela (Bakgatla) traditional territory 
provide an illustration of how cultural heritage is being re-asserted in the context of extractive 
projects. The Bakgatla traditional territory is located in the North West province on an area 
which is home to the world’s largest platinum reserves – referred to as the ‘platinum belt’ - 
making it the potential beneficiary of an unimaginable amount of wealth. While the Bakgatla are 
often referred to as a ‘community’, this is a misnomer as the use of the term tends to suggest a 
small, organic group of persons, while in reality upwards of 350,000 people live under the 
governance of the Bakgatla traditional council, led by Kgosi Nyalala Pilane, thus illustrating the 
homogenizing tendency of this contested term.  
The role and importance of an international audience to the traditional leader and his 
traditional council is clearly illustrated in a news interview with Pilane. In the interview Pilane 
clearly directs his message to international investors in the extractive industry by saying that the 
territory over which he claims legitimate authority as a traditional leader was open for business 
(SABS News August 2015). Moreover, the Bakgatla traditional council produces promotional 
materials boasting a ‘master plan’ for the development of the territory as well as a ‘cultural 
centre’. In a ‘Corporate Brochure’ published to attract investors to the area it is explained: 
The newly developed Moruleng Cultural Precinct is also expected to become a 
hub for cultural activities and will integrate the development of other heritage 
sites throughout BBK’s 32 villages. A brand new digital archive and library 
will be developed at the current Bakgatla Primary School. Here the community 
and visitors will explore Bakgatla’s proud heritage and also discover the tribe’s 
historical story. The breadth and depth of the project is unusual for a traditional 
community and may serve as a model for others (BBK Corporate Brochure). 
 
                                                 
conservation and preservation of South Africa’s unique biological diversity. Conservation, she argues, is historically 
and routinely used as a justification for the dispossession of racialized peoples. While she offers a compelling 
argument, for the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the conditions that have allowed for the emergence of 
traditional leaders as custodians of cultural heritage.  
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Major mining ventures also focus investments in ‘community development’ on cultural 
institutions and activities. For example, Anglo American - one of the main mining companies in 
the region - chose to focus its funding on the Department of Art and Culture in the Bakgatla 
traditional territory, an investment it boasts in its 2015 annual report (Anglo American 2015, 38). 
These examples illustrate how custom and cultural rights are articulated as means to legitimate 
assertions of collective property over resources in this new conjuncture.   
  Claims to heritage are not neutral articulations of a shared sense of past or identity. As 
Derek Peterson and his collaborating authors (2015) demonstrate in the book The Politics of 
Heritage in Africa, the promotion of cultural heritage across Africa has historically been the 
work of elites who leverage culture to promote their own interests.24 Peterson argues that in the 
contemporary moment, across Africa chiefs and kings are finding new opportunities for 
commodifying heritage practices: [t]he local and authentic can now be sold, purchased, and 
consumed in a range of media: as medicine, as food, as literature, as art” (Peterson 2015, 18). 
Moreover, he argues, “[t]he practice of heritage has allowed certain entrepreneurs to trademark 
culture, claim it as their exclusive property, naturalize behavioral norms, and sideline minorities, 
dissidents, and other non-conformists” (Peterson 2015, 19). The statement, however, is not 
universally applicable. For example, not all peoples living within the Bagkatla territory disavow 
the new representations of heritage in the cultural centre. However, these assertions of cultural 
specificity, specifically to the audience of diverse actors – including South African consumers of 
news and extractive industry actors – have served to delegitimate the protests of communities 
against their political representation by leaders whose colonial titles gave them a head start and 
                                                 
24 Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria are the focus of contributing authors in the book, however the authors 
argue that their work points to a broader trend in the contentious politics of heritage in Africa. Examples include the 
entrepreneurial efforts of kings who assert themselves as “the arbiters of custom and the managers of tradition” 
(Peterson 2015, 26) by partnering with museums abroad to promote their kingdoms.  
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advantage in defending community custom for their own ends. It is in these conflicts that the 
power differentials in defining heritage are most apparent.   
The promotional material produced by the Bakgatla traditional council, including the 
website, detailed development plans, the cultural centre and its celebration, demonstrates how 
the authority of the traditional leader over his territory is legitimated. Here we get no indication 
of the pressing poverty and social unrest that characterizes the traditional area. Rather, we learn 
about Pilane’s ‘commitment’ to his community. This work is more than just a smokescreen, it is 
an emergent field of governmentality wherein claims to collective identity and custom as a basis 
of social identification are constructed; it is an articulation through which possessive claims to 
cultural distinction are used to attract investments in the area and as a consequence gain a share 
in mining profits.   
Conflicts have emerged between Pilane and a CPA in the Bagkatla territory. He argues 
that his authority trumps that of CPAs which have been registered as land holders through the 
land restitution program. He has been embroiled in court battles as he tries to argue that no one 
in his area has the right to congregate for meetings without his prior consent. These claims 
however were overturned in a landmark Constitutional Court decision that recognized that CPAs 
are property owners whose land ownership cannot be taken over by a traditional leader 
(Bagkatla-ba-Kgafela 2015). In this example, the CPA has provided an important institutional 
and legal body through which to challenge Pilane.   
 This example demonstrates the political economy through which a distinctive 'cultural' 
community is made legible to a transnational audience and how it comes up against 
'communities' legislated through the CPA model. The perception that the Bagkatla people are a 
cohesive group benefitting from mineral wealth is actively promoted through grandiose public 
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acts of building a cultural centre and developing a 'Master Plan' replete with discourses and 
imagery of community participation and community representation. The acts by the Bakgatla 
traditional council are supported by South African legislative proposals that strengthen the 
position of traditional leaders and draw from the legitimacy provided by a renewed focus on 
celebrating cultural heritage. The collective, culturalized subjectivity that is emergent through 
the work outlined above is tied directly to a regime of transnational law25 and transnational 
extractive industry regulation. This is accomplished through the participation of the traditional 
council in a transnational discourse of heritage and cultural rights as they act as intermediaries 
between mining companies seeking a ‘social licence to operate’ and valuable extractive 
resources (Cook 2018; see Chapter Seven for further explanation). Traditional leadership also 
attaches and contributes to a transnational discourse on heritage and cultural protection to 
legitimate their role in relation to extractive industry.  
  Just as chiefs have been able to strategically mobilize themselves and their 'cultural 
capital' in order to gain the recognition and collaboration of a variety of actors in conditions of 
neoliberal globalization, so too, have chiefs drawn the steady and focused gaze of researchers, 
who have invariably ignored the agency of peoples in this ‘renewal’ of traditional authority. The 
strategic efforts of those framed in the literature as the 'subjects' of chiefs, and the ways that they 
are asserting their own agendas, visions and hopes for the future in the context of the resources - 
material and 'cultural' - that are available to them, are largely unaccounted for in literature on the 
                                                 
25 ‘Transnational law’ is distinct from ‘international law’. The dominant view of international law defines it simply 
as law that exists between nations; the rules and obligations that govern international legal subjects, which are 
almost exclusively nation states (Currie 2008). I depart from this positivist view and account for the interplay of 
laws, standards, and law-like norms in a dynamic network of international legal pluralism (Berman 2012). My use of 
the concept of transnational law is particularly influenced by the contributions of legal anthropologists and socio-
legal researchers who recognize the increasing transnational traffic of legal norms through common law and soft law 
instruments under neoliberalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, Szablowski 2007, von Benda-Beckmann et al. 
2009). 
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‘complex’ re-emergence of traditional authorities. Comaroff and Comaroff (2018) and their 
collaborating authors, for example, sustain a perception that chiefs unilaterally control the levers 
to take advantage of rural peoples to amass wealth for themselves. Indeed, there is no real 
engagement with the question of how to understand those who operate within the realm of 
community governance other than as subjects to chiefly authority.  
What vocabulary or terminology might be more appropriate today to account for the 
proprietary relationships assumed to apply to colonial-era ‘chiefs’ and ‘subjects’? How do we 
understand rural agency in conditions of neoliberal and transnational forms of governmentality 
without assuming the vertical imposition of power (Ferguson and Gupta 2002)? I turn to public 
consultations as a site where peoples are articulating critiques of both CPAs and traditional 
leadership and in the process challenging assumptions about ‘community’ as a subject of 
government. Public consultations provide a venue through which peoples contest not only the 
illegitimacy of the CPAs, but also contest the authority of traditional leaders to act as trustees on 
their behalf. Public consultations offer a place to identify the articulation of subjectivities and 
their properties at the ‘limits of governmentality’ (Coombe 2007).   
4.5 The Performative Enactment of Constitutionalism: Public Consultations and 
the Limits of Governmentality  
 
Public consultations are a vitally important part of the legislative process in South Africa. The 
Constitutional Court has determined that it is imperative to conduct appropriate consultations to 
develop and amend land reform legislation. For example, in July 2016 the Land Restitution 
Amendment Act was declared invalid by the Constitutional Court because it was found that 
Parliament did not adequately consult impacted parties.  According to one researcher in the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs, this decision - which incurred incredible 
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costs for the government - sent a strong signal to government authorities that when drafting and 
introducing new legislation appropriate public consultations were mandatory (Interview #3). 
Many argue that transformative constitutionalism signals a commitment to democratic 
and participatory decision-making. It overlaps with a theory of a democratic developmental state, 
for example, that “emphasises the collaborative role of all players in society and the 
empowerment of the poor in the development project. Participation and empowerment are 
central means and ends in our transformative Constitution" (Rosa 2011, 543). Similarly, law 
professor Sandra Liebenberg argues that the jurisprudence on social rights is successful to the 
extent that it serves to “enhance the participatory capabilities of those living in poverty and 
expose the socially constructed nature of poverty and inequality. At its best it should… facilitate 
the inclusion of marginalised voices in the debate on what is required to achieve such a society" 
(Liebenberg 2006, 36). Justice Langa further underscores the importance of dialogue of 
participation as protected by the Constitution. He suggests that the new Constitutional order 
promotes “a way of looking at the world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation 
are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and 
rejected and in which change is unpredictable but the idea of change is constant " (Langa 2006, 
354). These Constitutional directions, arguably, create spaces and venues where people might 
contest the political rationalities and forms of governmentality that emerge in land reform.  
A striking feature of the discourse that emerges from public consultations is the 
persistence of verbal articulations of ‘belonging’.26 Belonging in these forums represents a 
particular articulation of the African philosophy of uBuntu. The essence of uBuntu, explains 
                                                 
26 This section focuses specifically on transcripts from public consultations organized for the ‘High Level Panel on 
the Assessment of Key Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change’, a panel organized and authorized 
by Parliament to develop a report on the stated titles ambitions. 
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historian and professor of human rights Bonny Ibhawoh, “is captured in the famous phrase 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through other people). The humanness of the 
person who has ubuntu comes from knowing that the fate of each person is inextricably 
intertwined with his or her relationship with others” (2016, 243). Philosopher Magobo Moore 
explains two aspects of uBuntu: 
In one sense ubuntu is a philosophical concept forming the basis of 
relationships, especially ethical behaviour. In another sense, it is a traditional 
politico-ideological concept referring to socio-political action. As a moral or 
ethical concept, it is a point of view according to which moral practices are 
founded exclusively on consideration and enhancement of human well-being: a 
preoccupation with ‘human’” (More 2006, 149 in Cornell and Muvangua 2012, 
6).  
 
The philosophy of uBuntu infuses assertions of land as a site of social relationships where chiefs 
function only as mediators, not as owners. For example, in public hearings participants claimed 
that “the land belongs to the people” and “we belong to the land” (Eastern Cape Public Hearings, 
2017).27 These statements often specifically address chiefs. In Gauteng, a participant asserted  
such lands belong to the people. The chief is one of the people. He holds the 
land in trust for the people. The chiefs’ keep order, allocate and provide access. 
They are not owners of the land”. In Limpopo a participant states “The land 
belongs to the people, hence in our custom, we allocate a plot and volunteer to 
plough on that plot and the plot belongs to the royal house, because a king is 
like a child to us, we feed him and he must not be greedy now (Gauteng Public 
Hearings, 2017). 
  
Moreover, dissatisfaction with the CPA model is expressed: CPAs are “the biggest mistake 
government could have made. Put six people in charge and they are doing it as if it belongs to 
them [due to the legalistic nature of CPAs]. The land belongs to the people” (Western Cape). 
Such pronouncements of ‘belonging’ could easily be dismissed as general statements about land 
                                                 
27 The transcripts I analyzed were translated to English from a range of Bantu languages (the hearings here held 
across the country) by a group of graduate students and researchers. Moreover, they are ‘verbatim’ translations, as a 
result the grammar is often poor. I kept the original grammar to retain the authenticity of the statements.   
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lost. But the persistence of assertions and pronouncements of ‘belonging’ demands deeper 
reflection.  
Indeed, understandings of property relationships as forms of belonging are described in 
ethnographic literature. Sociologist Ben Cousins develops a widely cited perspective of how to 
recognize communal land rights that might by understood as congruent with the politics of 
belonging. Cousins argues that an approach to tenure relations is needed that emphasizes 
“making socially legitimate occupation and use rights, as they are currently held and practised, 
the point of departure for both their recognition in law and for the design of institutional 
frameworks for mediating competing claims and administering land” (2007, 282). He elaborates 
a focus on what he calls ‘social tenures’, whereby social relations and identities inform the 
recognition of tenure rights. These systems are processual systems rather that dominated by well-
defined rules, and they have a great deal of flexibility. Cousins explains: 
Land and resource rights are directly embedded in a range of social 
relationships and units, including households and kinship networks; the 
relevant social identities are often multiple, overlapping and therefore ‘nested’ 
or layered in character (e.g. individual rights within households, households 
within kinship networks, kinship networks within wider ‘communities’)… 
They are thus both ‘communal’ and ‘individual’ in character (Cousins 2007, 
293).   
 
An example of such layered rights is found in the rich empirical research conducted by 
researcher and small-scale fishing rights activist Jackie Sunde who describes resource use in the 
Dwese-Cwabe community: “Rights to access and use resources in this system are layered and 
relational; they are vested in each individual, nested within the context of each household, itself 
nested within largely clan-based clusters of homesteads, further nested within the neighbourhood 
as a whole” (Sunde 2014, 213). She further explains that the relational sets of rights that 
characterize her field site are representative of the philosophy of Ubuntu, a philosophy that 
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“shapes their [the Dwesa-Cwebe community] sense of self in relation to others, as well as their 
understandings of rights and obligations. This is given expression in their culture through, 
amongst other processes, their ethic of sharing resources with others in need” (Sunde 2014, 212). 
Thus we can identify a link between expressions of belonging and the inter-connected 
relationships that exist within this community over and through their shared resources; in other 
words, we can identify forms of relationships that are not captured by the legislated and 
administrative CPAs.  
An understanding of landholding as relational use rights mediated through a philosophy 
of uBuntu relates directly to a concept developed by anthropologist Blair Rutherford. What is 
useful about his approach is that he does not assume that there is a form of relationality that 
exists outside of the struggles for rights and access to resources; rather he develops a conception 
that considers how modes of belonging are constituted through peoples’ engagements with the 
institutions, discourses, and resources available to them. His research site is on farms in 
Zimbabwe but is applicable in the South African context. Through his research he develops the 
concept of ‘mode of belonging’, which refers to the “routinized discourses, social practices and 
institutional arrangements through which people make claims for resources and rights, the ways 
through which they become ‘incorporated' in particular places" (Rutherford 2008, 79). The 
concept of ‘modes of belonging’ may also capture something of social life at the limits of 
governmentality – where people resist the generalized political rationalities of ‘collective’ 
property animating the CPA model and traditional leadership. Modes of belonging, Rutherford 
explains, “are not reducible to these wider forms of governmentality and hegemony. Rather, 
modes of belonging emerge from, energize and are entangled with ‘social projects', which are 
organized aims and efforts of action” (Rutherford 2008, 80). Finally, he explains:  
120 
 
By examining practices and conflicts through the lens of modes of belonging 
and their particular cultural politics of recognition, one can avoid assuming 
that legal categories and social identities actually operate on the ground as they 
do on paper, or presuming that some actions are caused by improper 
consciousness on the part of some social actors. Rather, through this heuristic 
tool one can attend to the varied forms of dependencies and interdependencies 
and their associated cultural styles, through which power operates in specific 
localities during particular political economic conjunctures. It is unclear what 
routinized territorialized modes of belonging will emerge from the current land 
conflicts, but what is clear is that anyone who will be struggling for the ‘rights' 
of farm workers will have to operate through, if not against, them (Rutherford 
2008, 95).  
 
It is through linking uBuntu, nested forms of land tenure relations, and modes of belonging, that 
we can identify aspects of collective relations constitutive of land tenure use rights unrepresented 
in existing legislation. These emergent property relations include a sense of stewardship over the 
land and for the collective relations that define the cultural and social life through which the 
meanings of land are expressed. An ethic of care in the social relations that define property 
relations are identified by numerous authors, however they are expressed in different language. 
Derick Fay, for example, demonstrates the importance of ‘holding land for your children’ (Fay 
2015) while James Ferguson describes the importance of land as a place of social distribution 
(Ferguson 2013). Such relations over lands can be identified as expressions of stewardship for 
the resource of land but also for the maintenance of important social ties; it is through these 
expressions that we can identify an emergence of property relations akin to what lawyer and 
environmental activist Sanjay Kabir Bavikatte calls biocultural rights (Bavikatte 2014).    
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I described the general conditions and issues at stake in contemporary struggles 
over collective property in South Africa. I focused on the legislative development of two 
subjectivities that are central to the land reform program, communal property associations and 
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traditional leaders, and the indeterminate ways that they have emerged in conditions of 
neoliberalism.  
CPAs, despite their role as a primary legal vehicle in land reform, have not contributed to 
a sedimentation of new political rationalities that appear to reflect the natures of social 
relationships that characterized communal property. CPAs remain a legal, administrative body 
that is designed to impose procedural conditions on land holding without clarifying the specific 
substantive rights of members, including the layered rights of individuals, households, kin 
groups and wider communities, and without allowing space for the articulation for a variety of 
values that people might attach to land. Traditional leadership, on the other hand, has effectively 
mobilized to bolster their authority and make new claims to legitimacy in conditions of 
neoliberal governmentality wherein assertions of custom and cultural specificity are valorized by 
a range of actors, including, perhaps most importantly in South Africa, extractive industry (Cook 
2018). Thus we have two different subjectivities, defined in part in law, that have generated very 
different outcomes as the opportunities available for strategic positioning have varied 
considerably. Chiefs who have historical claims to positions of authority, and many of whom are 
respected for their authority by the peoples who live under their leadership, are interpolated into 
new, reformed subject positions constructed in contemporary conditions, while collectivities 
defined from the ‘ground up’ remain nearly illegible outside of the CPA model.  In the following 
chapters I demonstrate how these struggles over propertied subjectivities are being re-articulated, 
recast, through human rights and strategic litigation. I illustrate how new struggles over authority 
and territory are influencing the development of new forms of property, albeit in a fragmented 
landscape of neoliberal restructuring.  
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 In the remainder of the dissertation I argue that while the Constitutional framework has 
had a significant influence on how political mobilization is organized, and how transformation, 
including land reform, has emerged as a particular site of struggle, there are many struggles that 
demonstrate the indeterminacy of legal subjects and the rights they are able to assert. For 
example, the ongoing articulation of land, culture, and customary rights by community groups 
and non-state actors is evidence of the opportunities offered by the Constitution beyond the 
legislation that has been introduced. They are testament to the role of the Constitution as a living 
document that has the potential to facilitate the realization of communal property rights beyond 
their initial legal framework. In the next chapter I focus on ‘living customary law’ as a new 
avenue for peoples to assert a collective subject position in ways not captured by the CPA Act or 
its model of communal land holding, or traditional authority. Living customary law is 
emphasized because it provides a way to interpret the values and cultural practices of rural 
peoples through a legal form that was not previously available to them.  
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5 ALEXKOR V. RICHTERSVELD: ABORIGINAL TITLE, 
CUSTOMARY LAW, AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 In 2003, the Constitutional Court of South Africa handed down a landmark land restitution 
judgment transferring land to the Richtersveld community, marking the first time that common 
law Aboriginal title was applied in an African court (Barume 2014, Chan 2004, Lehmann 2007, 
Mostert 2010). The Richtersveld decision was significant because of how it was informed by law 
from other jurisdictions; it also marked the beginning of further South African engagements with 
transnational policy and international human rights norms in land reform (the significance of 
which I return to below). The Constitution directs the courts to consider international law when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights (Section 39), an imperative that "creates a formal and permanent 
link between the rights enshrined as a product for the local struggle for democracy in South 
Africa and the constant evolution of rights in the international environment" (Klug 2010, 46). 
Although it is mandatory for the Court to “address the interpretation of rights given in 
international documents and by international fora” (Klug 2010, 79), South African courts have 
generally been hesitant in their application of international law. Kweitel explains that: 
One of the reasons for this dearth of reliance may be that reference to 
international human rights law is often deemed unnecessary, as many of the 
relevant norms have already seeped into the South African Bill of Rights. 
Indeed, international human rights law in no small measure inspired the 
drafting of the South African Constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights" 
(2013, 193). 
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This observation, made a decade after the Richtersveld decision, underscores the significance of 
the judgement, which, I argue, provided an opening to turn to Indigenous Peoples’ rights in legal 
struggles. Contrary to the finds of Kweitel above, we can identify in land rights struggles 
ongoing productive links to transnational law on indigenous rights.    
Common law Aboriginal title has become an important legal tool in the international 
Indigenous rights movement to the extent that upholding Aboriginal title relies in part on 
drawing from international norms on indigenous rights. In recent years, courts outside of the 
common law courts of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where the doctrine originated, have 
applied Aboriginal title (Knafla 2010), extending its use to jurisdictions around the world 
(McHugh 2011, Tobin 2014). Aboriginal title is part of a spectrum of Aboriginal rights, explains 
Canadian lawyer and author Jim Reynolds (2018). The potency of Aboriginal title as a challenge 
to the law introduced by a settler state stems from the fact that it is “based on the pre-existence of 
Aboriginal peoples” (Reynolds 2018, 92). In other words, it draws its force from the prior 
occupation of Aboriginal peoples and their pre-existing legal rights to land before British 
occupation, rather than from “practices integral to a distinctive culture” as a more general rights-
based framework for recognizing the human rights of Aboriginal peoples, would do (ibid).    
Some critics argue against the applicability of Aboriginal title, and Indigenous Peoples’ 
rights more broadly, in the African context because, they assert, there is no basis to categorize 
any African peoples as any more ‘indigenous’ then the majority, who have been marginalized 
and dispossessed through colonialism just as indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world have 
(Lehmann, 2004). However, as I will show, the expansive use of Aboriginal title should be 
understood in relationship to the emerging articulation of Indigenous rights, a “process in 
connection with norms and values” (Anaya 2004, 6) evolving within a larger political field of 
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indigenous identification and organization. From this perspective we can acknowledge that the 
assertion of indigenous subject positions and indigenous rights involve processes of articulation 
in which norms, values, and histories of dispossession are shared and compared, such that legal 
forms emerging from one colonial history can be used to address others.  
Aboriginal title should be studied as one strategy used by rural peoples’ advocates as they 
maneuver and assert different positions within shifting fields of power characteristic of 
neoliberal government (Hodgson 2011). Non-state actors, including national, regional, and 
international NGOs, engaging with international forums (such as the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues and the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs), play an essential 
role in indigenous mobilization in Southern Africa (Sapignoli 2018, Sylvain 2017). As 
demonstrated in this chapter, the Richtersveld decision needs to be read in the context of the 
history of indigenous peoples in Africa, and, more importantly, as an important judgement within 
the history of the crafting of the concept of indigeneity in South Africa (Sylvain 2017, 1).  
5.2 Alexkor v. Richtersveld: Aboriginal title and customary law 
The plaintiffs in the case were Nama peoples (an ethnic grouping within the Khiosan), but they 
identified as ‘Richtersvelders’ more often than as Nama (Interview #1). The Richtersveld dossier 
includes judgments in the Land Claims Court (LCC), the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), and 
the Constitutional Court. Alexkor v. Richtersveld is now part of a growing body of jurisprudence, 
law, and policy on indigenous and customary land and resource rights in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Barume, 2014). Before explaining how key findings of the judgement are re-articulated in fields 
of struggle in South Africa, the particulars of the judgement require review.  
The claimant community, who live in a semiarid and mineral rich-area of the Northern 
Cape province, made a claim for the restitution of lands they historically occupied under the 
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Restitution of Land Rights Act (hereafter the Restitution Act). At the time of the claim, the land 
was occupied by the mining company Alexkor Limited Mining Corporation (hereinafter 
Alexkor), which was granted the subject land and all mineral rights by a deed of grant by the 
National Party in 1994 prior to the election of the ANC (Richtersveld SCA 2003, para 2). The 
state was the sole shareholder of Alexkor. The Richtersveld community claimed that it had 
thereby been “dispossessed of ownership (under common law or indigenous law) or the right to 
exclusive beneficial occupation and use of the subject land including the exploitation of its 
natural resources” (Richtersveld CC 2003, para 7). It was in response to this claim that the Court 
began using the phrase ‘indigenous law ownership’ to refer to the ownership of their land under 
customary law (‘indigenous law’ and ‘customary law’ were synonymous to the court).   
Under the Restitution Act, claimants need to meet several requirements. First, if the 
claimant is not an individual, it must represent a ‘claimant community’ defined by shared rules 
of land use. Second, the claimants must have had a ‘right in land’ prior to dispossession. Under 
Section 1 of the Restitution Act, a ‘right to land’ includes a ‘customary law interest’.28  Third, 
dispossession must have happened after June 19, 1913. Fourth, the claimant community’s 
dispossession must have been due to racially discriminatory laws or practices. 
According to the first court, the LCC, the Richtersveld claimants did not meet all of the 
requirements in the Restitution Act above. While the Richtersveld community experienced some 
forms of dispossession starting in 1925 when their lands were found to be rich with minerals and 
mining interests began prospecting, the area in which they lived had been annexed by the British 
long before in 1847. The community needed to prove that their ‘right to land’ survived British 
                                                 
28 According to Section one: “any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the interest of a 
labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and 
beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in question”. 
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annexation and that their dispossession in the 1900s was due to racially discriminatory laws. The 
Richtersveld community argued that even after annexation they continued to live on their land 
according to their indigenous customary law. They referred to the doctrine of Aboriginal title in 
common law to make this argument. The LCC dismissed the claim, finding instead that their 
rights did not survive annexation and thus that their dispossession was not due to racially 
motivated laws (Richtersveld LCC, 2001).  
 The community appealed the decision to the SCA, which overturned the lower court 
opinion and found that the Richtersveld community had a customary right of ownership that 
survived annexation by the British crown. This decision was based on the finding that when the 
British Crown acquired sovereignty over the Cape Colony in 1806 the British Crown recognized 
the continued rights of the peoples who lived on the land. The Articles of Capitulation of January 
1806 provided that “All bona fide private property, whether belonging to the civil or military 
servants of the Government, to the burghers and inhabitants . . . shall remain free and untouched” 
(Richtersveld SCA 2003, para 47). In the unanimous judgement Judge Vivier concludes: “In my 
view it is clear from the Articles of Capitulation that when the British Crown acquired 
sovereignty of the Cape Colony by conquest and cession in 1806 the indigenous land rights of 
the inhabitants were recognised and respected” (Richtersveld SCA 2003, Para 48).29 Thus the 
particular history of British annexation provided historical evidence of the applicability of 
Aboriginal title in the South African context.   
                                                 
29 The finding is elaborated further: “Ordinance 50 of 1828 enacted by the Colonial Government is another 
indication that indigenous land rights were respected. Section 3 of that Ordinance provided as follows: 'And whereas 
doubts have arisen as to the competency of Hottentots and other free Persons of colour to purchase or possess Land 
in this Colony: Be it therefore enacted and declared, That all Grants, Purchases, and Transfers of Land or other 
Property whatsoever, heretofore made to, or by any Hottentot or other free Person of colour, are, and shall be, and 
the same are hereby declared to be, of full force and effect, and that it is, and shall, and may be, lawful for any 
Hottentot, or other free Person of colour, born, or having obtained Deeds of Burghership, in this Colony, to obtain 
and possess by Grant, Purchase, or other lawful means, any Land or Property therein - any Law, custom, or usage to 
the contrary notwithstanding.'” (SCA 2003, Para 50-51).  
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The SCA cited Aboriginal title jurisprudence such as Mabo v. The State of Queensland 
and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia using “elements of Aboriginal title as precedents for 
proving elements for a claim of a customary law interest” (Chan 2004, 124). The community’s 
customary right, argued the court, constituted a “customary law interest under their indigenous 
customary law entitling them to exclusive occupation and use of the subject land and that its 
interest was akin to the right of ownership held under common law”, that is, a “right in land” 
(Richtersveld SCA 2003, para 26). Oddly, while the SCA based their decision on common-law 
Aboriginal title to provide a basis for the ‘customary law interest’, it provided no explanation of 
the relationship between “customary law” and Aboriginal title, finding it ‘unnecessary’ to decide 
if the doctrine of Aboriginal title forms part of South African law.30  
Alexkor appealed the decision in the Constitutional Court, where the decision made in the 
SCA was upheld and, arguably, strengthened with respect to the application of Aboriginal title. 
The Constitutional Court argued that the community had rights to land and that these rights were 
properly determined by reference to ‘indigenous law’ (Richtersveld CC 2003, 50). Importantly, 
‘indigenous law’ meant the same thing as ‘customary law’ in the judgement, a change in 
language that arguably served to naturalize and solidify a link between ‘customary law’, which 
has a long history in South Africa (as explained in Chapter Two), and ‘indigenous law’ with its 
international human rights connotations.  
Taking inspiration from common law principles defining Aboriginal title, the 
Constitutional Court determined that the subject land was owned communally, that the 
                                                 
30 As explained in the judgement: "All the aspects of the doctrine [Aboriginal title] do not fit comfortably into our 
common law. For instance, the idea that the State or Crown possesses radical title to all land may have its origin in 
English feudal law and may be foreign to our law. In view of my conclusion that a customary law interest, for which 
the [Restitution] Act expressly provides, has been established in the present case, it is not necessary to pursue the 
matter any further and it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine forms part of our common law or 
whether our common law should be developed to recognise aboriginal rights." (SCA 2003, Para 43)   
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community had been historically defined in part by its exclusion of others, that it had exclusive 
rights to the subject land, and that its rights included prospecting, mining, and using minerals.31 
The Constitutional Court found that the right to land in question amounted to what it termed 
‘indigenous law ownership’, which is akin to common law ownership:  
While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it 
must now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its 
ultimate force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be 
determined by reference not to common law, but to the Constitution .The 
courts are obliged by section 211(3) of the Constitution to apply customary law 
when it is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that deals 
with customary law. In doing so the courts must have regard to the spirit, 
purport and object of the Bill of Rights… It is clear, therefore that the 
Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of indigenous 
law as an independent source of norms within the legal system . . . In the 
result, indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the 
amalgam of South African law (Alexkor Ltd and Another v. Richtersveld 
Community and Others (Richtersveld CC, 2003: para 51). 
 
The court explained the concept of ‘indigenous law’ by referring to its evolving nature, “. . . 
indigenous law is not a fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules. By its 
very nature, it evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life” 
(Richtersveld CC 2003, para 52). The Constitutional Court argued that legal pluralism needed to 
be taken seriously in South Africa (Richtersveld CC 2003, para 45-51). It is from these 
statements of the evolutionary and changing character of customary law, as well as its place in 
South African law, that the concept of ‘living customary law’ (which I will explore in greater 
detail in Chapter Six) was born.  
                                                 
31 Through the testimonies of expert witnesses, the SCA found that “This evidence clearly establishes that the 
Richtersveld community believed that the right to minerals belonged to them and that they acted in a manner 
consistent with such a belief. They exploited the minerals without requesting permission from anyone to do so and, 
significantly, strangers respected their rights by obtaining their permission to prospect for minerals and concluding 
mining and mineral leases with them” (SCA 2003, 87).  
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It is unclear when and who introduced the terminology of ‘living’ customary law to these 
descriptions of the evolutionary nature of customary law. In 2004, the Constitutional Court 
handed down the judgement Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelistsha and Others in which the 
Court engages directly with living customary law. For example, judge DCJ Langa writes: “The 
official rules of customary law are sometimes contrasted with what is referred to as “living 
customary law,” which is an acknowledgement of the rules that are adapted to fit in with 
changed circumstances” (Bhe 2004, para 87). What sources DCJ Langa is referring to is unclear, 
however one can reasonably speculate that it was introduced by the fourth applicant, the 
progressive human rights NGO the Women’s Legal Centre based in Cape Town. Moreover, in 
the Constitutional Court decision of Shilubana these quotations are referenced as authorities on 
living customary law (see para 44, 45, 46 in Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 
(CC)), where the evolutionary nature of customary law is re-articulated as living customary law. 
The introduction of living customary law is significant for how it is linked to Aboriginal title and 
indigenous law.  
In Alexkor v Richtersveld, the Constitutional Court transitioned from a focus on 
Aboriginal title to a focus on indigenous law, a shift interpreted differently by different authors. 
According to T.M. Chan: indigenous law ownership “is substantively identical to Aboriginal title 
as developed under comparative jurisprudence and is thus a form of Aboriginal title within South 
African law” (2004, 127). He argues that:  
It is clear that the CC meant to formulate ‘indigenous law ownership’ as a 
South African version of Aboriginal title. Along with native title, indigenous 
title, Indian title and Aboriginal title, the CC has added ‘indigenous law 
ownership’ as the South African contribution to the pantheon of names 
representing this important aboriginal right to land (Chan 2004, 128).  
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Similarly, Jarome Barume asserts that “[b]oth the indigenous law ownership and the Aboriginal 
title basically pursue the same purpose…. Both doctrines establish a right of Indigenous Peoples 
who owned the land before and at the time of annexation” (2014: 131) Hanri Mostert (2010) is 
less optimistic, arguing that the doctrine of Aboriginal title was “either ignored or even rejected 
as a means to resolve the dispute” (2010: 227). Mostert concedes, however, that the courts relied 
on comparative Aboriginal title literature to identify and substantiate the Richtersveld 
community’s right as a ‘customary law interest in land’ (ibid). I argue that this reiteration of 
Aboriginal title as indigenous law ownership in the SCA and the Constitutional Court constitutes 
a significant substantive change in the meaning and applicability of the judgment.  
The Richtersveld judgment is now cited for its contribution to the indigenous rights 
movement in South Africa and across the continent. For example, in an overview of the rise of 
Indigenous rights in Africa, Barume boldly asserts that: “[t]he Constitutional Court of South 
Africa made in fact a landmark decision that will, for a long time to come, have a major impact 
on the legal protection of indigenous’ peoples’ rights to lands” (2014: 181). Despite its high 
profile, there have been no other judicial cases in South Africa involving self-identified 
indigenous communities that have relied on the precedent set in Alexkor v Richtersveld.32 In 
response to this curious fact, some have questioned its real force and implications in the African 
context. Following a brief analysis of the Richtersveld judgment, one prominent scholar of 
Aboriginal title explains: 
. . .despite the immense publicity the case received and though seeming to have 
arrived in South Africa, the doctrine did not take seed . . . The line of 
jurisprudential development that has ensued has concerned the status of 
                                                 
32 This is likely due to the fact that few Khoisan peoples would have been displaced prior to 1913, which remains 
the cut-off date for land restitution claims and are thus still excluded from even filing a claim. There are also likely 
very few who had a comparable experience to the Richtersveld community in the sense that they remained on their 
land and continued to practice their custom and traditions after annexation by the British.   
132 
 
customary law at large and in wider contexts rather than the proprietary 
paradigm of Aboriginal title (McHugh 2011: 200-201). 
 
Others have argued that the use of Aboriginal title in Richtersveld was ‘simply symbolic’ 
because a legislative land restitution program already exists to return land to those previously 
dispossessed and thus the application of Aboriginal title was not needed (Knafla 2010, 25; see 
also Fairweather 2006, 116). Such a dismissive reaction I would suggest, reveals too limited an 
approach to the influence of the Richtersveld judgment and the significance of its recognition of 
indigenous (and customary) law for broader movements to protect the rights of dispossessed 
communities. For example, the judgement did not make a distinction between ‘customary’ and 
‘indigenous’, which has implications for how the judgement is used to mobilize the concept of 
living customary law. 
 The Richtersveld judgement also advances Indigenous Peoples’ customary law rights 
beyond the framework developing in common law jurisdictions elsewhere. Jeremie Gilbert 
explains that the recognition of possession and customary law as a source of land rights in the 
case goes beyond its recognition in common law countries such as Australia and Canada where 
Aboriginal title is subordinated to the power of the state to extinguish it (2017, 671, see also 
Reynolds 2018, 94). Instead, the court “adopted a less State-centric approach to indigenous 
peoples' land rights, emphasizing the power of customary laws” (Gilbert 2017, 671). Thus 
Richtersveld draws from Aboriginal title to contribute to the recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ 
customary laws (however, as explained in the next chapter, the outcome of this recognition is not 
necessarily determined by the expansive spirit of Richtersveld).   
The significance of the Richtersveld decision is illustrated by the fact that it is cited 
repeatedly in key judgments on the development of living customary law and its application in 
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the communal areas of the former bantustans (reserves) in South Africa.33 These cases reference 
the now famous quotation from Richtersveld to affirm customary law as an integral part of South 
African law and an independent source of norms; they repeat the commitment to respecting legal 
pluralism in the South African legal system.34 The references to ‘living customary law’ in this 
jurisprudence is now interpreted by South African legal scholars as a representation of 
‘transformative constitutionalism’ in the area of rural land rights (Claassens and Budlender 
2013). However, the effect of the Richtersveld judgement is not exhausted by these judgments, 
as contemporary articulations of Aboriginal title in the politics of indigeneity will illustrate. As I 
explain below, Aboriginal title and Indigenous rights represent human rights norms that develop 
in both political contexts and international arenas. They have been interpreted and elaborated in 
transnational spheres of deliberation and translated into local contexts as they are rendered in 
‘the vernacular’ (Merry 2009, Goodale 2007, Ibhawoh 2016). 
5.3 Richtersveld in the context of the South African politics of indigeneity   
The Ricthersveld decision, which effectively transferred land and mineral rights back to the 
Nama community, marked a key moment in the emergence and articulation of indigeneity in 
Southern Africa. It is through Alexkor v Richtersveld that we can identify the first influence of 
international Indigenous Peoples’ rights as opening up new possibilities for the articulation of 
‘social tenure’ as a legible property form in South Africa, although it would take at least another 
decade and a half for its ramifications to be widely understood. Its impact is only slowly being 
realized. In the remainder of this chapter I describe the political context in which Richtersveld 
                                                 
33 See Bhe and Others v. Magistrate, Khayelistsha and Others, 2004; Cala Reserve v. Premier of the Eastern Cape, 
2015; Shilubana and Others v. Nwamitwa, 2008; for an analysis of Bhe and Shilubana, see Claassens, 2011. 
34 Bhe and Others v. Magistrate, Khayelistsha and Others, 2004: para 43; Cala Reserve v. Premier of the Eastern 
Cape, 2015: para 31; Shilubana and Others v. Nwamitwa, 2008: para 43. 
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was handed down and describe key developments since this landmark decision (for a longer 
history of indigenous rights in South Africa see the introductory chapter).  
It is important to note that land reform is only one area of indigenous rights struggle. The 
NGO Natural Justice produced a report on national laws and policies that “support or undermine 
indigenous peoples and local communities” in South Africa and enumerates and explains law 
and policy related to marine resources, conserved territories, protected areas, natural resources 
and the environment, traditional knowledge, intangible heritage and culture, natural resource 
exploration and extraction, and infrastructure development (Natural Justice 2014). Critical 
scholarship and research on Khoisan indigenous rights in South Africa focuses on topics such as 
language revitalization (Brown and Deumert 2017), intellectual property and the protection of 
traditional knowledge (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2011) and geographical indications in the 
case of Rooibos tea (Ives 2014, Coombe, Ives and Huizenga 2014). The intersection between 
land reform and indigenous rights is the specific focus of this chapter. 
A defining feature of the Richtersveld judgement was the fact that to a significant degree 
it relied on the international human rights of Indigenous Peoples.35 This is an important 
development in a context where the idea of being ‘indigenous’ is considered either redundant 
(because it applies to all black Africans) or to promote ethnic essentialism and ‘special rights’ 
(Kuper 2003). The 1996 Constitution makes no specific reference to Indigenous Peoples and 
there is evidence to suggest that South African governments have historically been 
uncomfortable with the idea of Indigenous rights. The Bill of Rights has not led to a “robust, 
respected and resilient regulatory framework” (Humby et al. 2014, 21) for the protection of the 
                                                 
35 Richtersveld can be read alongside the significant judgement by the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights in Endorois, which also relied significantly on emerging collective rights norms and jurisprudence by 
national and regional systems and international institutions and networks (Ndahinda 2016). Centre for Minority 
Rights Development & Others v Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009). 
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rights of indigenous communities. The Khoisan, who historically comprise five groupings, the 
San, Griqua, Nama, Koranna, and the Cape Khoi, however, self-identify as indigenous and are 
widely considered by many academics and civil society to be the Indigenous Peoples of South 
and Southern Africa. The Khiosan are also referred to as the First Peoples of South Africa by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, who in 2005 demanded that the South African 
government take swift action to uphold their rights as Indigenous Peoples (Stavenhagen, 2005).  
Some Khoisan groups argue that they have been marginalized in land reform; the 
Restitution Act, for example, stipulates that only those peoples who were dispossessed after 1913 
(the date of the Native Land Rights Act) are entitled to restitution. Many Khoisan were 
dispossessed long before 1913 and therefore argue that their historical dispossession is not being 
addressed. The 1913 cut-off date was chosen as a pragmatic compromise to two other dates that 
were being considered – 1652 and 1948. Indeed, it appears to have been chosen as a way to 
avoid competing claims between groups of black and Khoisan South Africans (PLAAS 2016, 7). 
The Department of Land Affairs White Paper on Land Reform indicates that there has been some 
acknowledgement of the restrictions imposed by the 1913 cut-off date, affirming that claimants 
who were dispossessed of their land prior to 1913 “will be accorded priority status in the land 
reform programme”, and that “the Commission is empowered to make recommendations to the 
Minister on alternative remedies for such claimants” (DLA 1997, 78). However, there is no 
evidence that this has happened. In recent public hearings Khoisan-identified groups have argued 
that the Minister of Rural Development and Land Affairs should be able to consider pre-1913 
land claims, and that claims dating back to the 1800’s should be included in land restitution 
(Northern Cape Hearings, 21 September 2016). Not all Khoisan peoples were dispossessed prior 
to 1913, however, and some have secured land restitution. The Khomani San, for instance, were 
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successful in a landmark land restitution claim which extended from the Kalahari Dessert to the 
Kalagadi Transfrontier Park (Ellis 2010, Huizenga 2014).  
The state has ignored Indigenous Peoples’ demands for statutory recognition. South 
Africa adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
in 2007 but the country is lagging significantly in the implementation of its provisions (Sapignoli 
and Hitchcock 2013, 363). There are no specific programs designed for Indigenous Peoples in 
South Africa and the Khoisan continue to be identified as ‘coloured’ or ‘other’ in the South 
African census. There is a national Khoisan Council created by the state to advocate for the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples in the country and advise the government, but it has no legislative 
power (Sapignoli and Hitchcock 2013, 359).  
Despite the reluctance to recognize Indigenous Peoples’ land rights in South Africa, 
regional movements demonstrate that indigeneity has emerged as a form of political mobilization 
across the continent. Since the Richtersveld decision there has been a marked increase in 
mobilizations to recognize and protect indigenous land tenure in South Africa. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, for example, has played an important role in 
advocating for Indigenous Peoples’ rights in Africa generally. The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights recognizes three categories of rights: civil and political, social and 
economic, and peoples’ rights. The African Charter is unique for its protection of peoples’ rights. 
Peoples’ rights refer to the collective rights and include the rights to self-determination (art. 20), 
the right to sovereignty over natural resources (art. 21), right to development (art. 22). People’s 
rights, however, are not often linked to distinct self-identified collectivities and remain vaguely 
understood.  
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The landmark Endorois decision36 of the African Commission against the Government of 
Kenya, linked Endorois peoples’ rights to their recognition as an indigenous people. The African 
Commission found specifically that the “Endorois are a “people”, a status that entitles them to 
benefit from provisions of the African Charter that protect collective rights” (Endorois 2011, 
para 75) and recognized their rights to property, culture, development, free disposal of resources 
and religion. However, by defining the Endorois as ‘indigenous’, rather than a more broadly 
defined ‘customary community’ that refers to rural peoples whose customary rights have been 
historically marginalized, the Commission may have too narrowly circumscribed collective 
rights.37 ‘Customary communities’ refer to “communities who regulate their lives, and in 
particular their tenure rights, in terms of customary law” (Wicomb and Smith 2011, 423). 
‘Customary communities’, argue Wicomb and Smith, ought to be recognized as ‘peoples’ so that 
collective rights are not limited to a more narrowly interpreted group of indigenous peoples. 
Despite the usefulness of the protections offered by the African Commission for indigenous 
peoples in South Africa, very few peoples actually engage with the African commission as a 
venue for rights mobilization (Sing’Oei 2012), testifying to a continuing difficulty of making an 
indigenous identity legible in the African context.    
 To this end, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights published a report 
on Indigenous Peoples in Africa, wherein they defined ‘indigenous’ in the African context by 
way of reference to a 2007 Report by the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs:  
                                                 
36 Centre for Minority Rights Development & Others v Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009) (Endorois case). 
37 South African lawyers Wilmein Wicomb and Henk Smith argue that rather than referring to African jurisprudence 
on the rights of customary communities, the African Commission emphasized their rights in line with the 
international indigenous rights: “While the Endorois community based their claim to aboriginal title on judgments 
that mostly protected communities not necessarily identiﬁed as ‘indigenous’, the African Commission was at pains 
to formulate its entire analysis of the merits in terms of the rights of indigenous (or ‘tribal’) peoples. This may be the 
most disheartening aspect of the decision as it could be interpreted to narrow the protection of customary tenure 
rights to a handful of groups in Africa recognised as ‘indigenous’ or ‘tribal’… leaving half of the continent out to 
dry” (Wicomb and Smith 2011, 438). 
138 
 
The overall characteristics of groups identifying themselves as Indigenous 
Peoples are that their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the 
dominant society, and that their cultures are under threat, in some cases to the 
point of extinction. A key characteristic for most of them is that the survival of 
their particular way of life depends on access and rights to their traditional 
lands and the natural resources thereon (IWGIA 2007, 10).   
 
The realization of these characteristics in practice has led to a wide and inconsistent application 
of the term indigenous. 
A general recognition of the importance of indigenous rights, and the particular role of 
land for the protection of indigenous people’s cultural practices, is identified in regional policy 
frameworks however often in vague terms. For example, the Pan-African Land Policy Initiative 
was established in March 2006 by the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa, and the African Development Bank to develop guidelines on land policy development 
in Africa. In 2010 the Initiative published the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in 
Africa, where it is explained that “there are a range of indigenous principles and emerging 
innovative local practices that can inform sound national land policy development and 
implementation” (African Union et al. 2010, 23). The Framework encourages countries to 
“acknowledge the legitimacy of indigenous land rights” and “recognize the role of local and 
community-based land administration/management institutions and structures, alongside those of 
the state” (African Union et al. 2010, 14). Similarly, the South African Human Rights 
Commission, which restricts their definition of indigenous peoples to the Khoisan, explains the 
significance of cultural rights to the Khoisan and their right to self-determination, specifically the 
importance of development that is consistent with their own cultural values, customs, and 
worldviews (SAHRC 2016, 30). However, as a review by Natural Justice (Humby et al. 2014) 
shows, South African legislation adopting the term ‘indigenous’ peoples does not clearly define 
the Khoisan as indigenous peoples. The ‘Protection, Promotion, Development and Management 
139 
 
of Indigenous Knowledge Bill’ is a clear example in this regard. While originally titled the 
‘Traditional Knowledge Bill’, the title was changed to refer to ‘indigenous knowledge’, with no 
explanation about whether the shift from ‘traditional knowledge’ to ‘indigenous’ knowledge 
marked a shift in focus.  
Acknowledgement of Khoisan activism has also been inconsistent among civil society 
actors. While some specific NGOs focus exclusively on Khoisan human rights and engage with 
the international movement of Indigenous Peoples, there appears to be a reluctance to engage 
with Indigenous rights, and specifically the rights of Khoisan peoples, in those sectors of South 
African civil society focused on land and customary rights. Organizations such as the Indigenous 
Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC), which has an office in Cape Town, focus 
their advocacy in South Africa on the rights of Khoisan,38 while NGOs such as the Association 
for Rural Advancement and research centres such as the Land and Accountability Research 
Centre and the Institution of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) produce no research 
that focuses on the rights of Khoisan peoples, despite their deep archives of research and 
reporting on rural land rights. Some actors recognize that the term ‘indigenous’ may be limiting 
rather than broadly inclusive and expansive for rural peoples when advocating for the rights of 
rural peoples. A report published by the Natural Justice includes ‘customary communities’ for 
the purpose of assessing the laws and policies in South Africa that impact indigenous or local 
communities (Humby et al. 2014).39  
                                                 
38 The IPACC has its headquarters in Cape Town; however, it works in 22 countries across the continent with a 
variety of indigenous groups.  
39 It is important to note that in some forums Natural Justice has advocated for a clear definition of indigenous 
peoples in reference only to the Khoi and San peoples, arguing that the vague definition of ‘indigenous community’ 
would lead to the further marginalization of Khoi and San communities (IKSB submission, 2015). This indicates a 
lack of consistency in the organization’s focus and understanding of indigenous peoples’ rights.  
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In direct response to international, regional, and local pressure to recognize indigenous 
rights, the South African state now acknowledges the distinct history of marginalization that 
Khoisan peoples have experienced and has responded to their advocacy by recognizing their 
language, land, and cultural rights, but only negligibly. One example is the 2015 introduction of 
the Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill (TKLB) which recognizes Khoisan leaders within 
the wider ambit of recognizing Traditional Leaders more generally. However, the TKLB also 
refuses Khoisan recognition as Indigenous Peoples, insisting that  "[t]he provisions of this Act 
relating to the recognition of a traditional or Khoi-San community or leader shall not be 
construed as bestowing upon such a community or leader any special indigenous, ﬁrst nation or 
any other similar status" (TKLB, Chapter 1, 1(para 5)), thereby rejecting the relevance of 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights in South Africa (see also Verbuyst 2016, 86).  
Anthropologist Alan Barnard’s approach to indigenous rights in Southern Africa is 
perhaps indicative of a belief prevalent in civil society: "Land rights and rights to utilise the 
resources passed down from the ancestors are human rights. If we want to call them ‘Indigenous 
rights', that is ﬁne; but let us not take these ‘Indigenous rights' too literally" (Barnard 2006, 10). 
International law scholar Karin Lehmann in 2004 expressed an attitude long common in South 
African land reform when she argues that indigenous rights are unlikely to be strategically useful 
for people claiming land because it is very difficult for people to ‘fit’ an ‘indigenous’ subject 
position in the South African context.  
The wide variation in the use of the term indigenous demonstrates that in practice the 
Khoisan are not universally recognized as indigenous peoples distinct from peoples who live by 
customary law. It is apparent that many actors do not consider the forms of colonial 
dispossession that the Khoisan experienced as distinct and therefore requiring specific 
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transitional justice measures. In recent years Khoisan activists have begun demanding that they 
be recognized as First Nations as a way to affirm that they were the first inhabitants of the area 
(SAHRC, 2018: 38).40 This is perhaps in response to the ways that the term ‘indigenous’ is being 
used by such a wide variety of people and in such a diversity of contexts.41  
5.4 Conclusion  
The Richtersveld judgement is widely acknowledge for the fact that it represents the first time 
that Aboriginal title was applied in an African court. It is no surprise that it was the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa that made this progressive judgement. To date, however, 
readings of Richtersveld have doubted its wide applicability for indigenous peoples in South 
Africa. These critiques have been far too narrowly focused. In this chapter I demonstrated that 
the Richtersveld judgement is a landmark decision for how it has served to provide a new 
understanding of customary law as equivalent to Aboriginal title and for its role in facilitating the 
broader introduction of Indigenous Peoples’ rights into South African land struggles for Khoisan 
and rural peoples more generally.  
The Richtersveld judgement must also be read within the recent history of the emergence 
of indigenous rights in South African land reform. Richtersveld not only provides an important 
historical moment within this history; it also colours the reading of this ongoing history to the 
extent that indigenous emergence in South Africa can be told as a story of the emergence of 
customary law, in all of the different ways and different environments in which it is being 
asserted. In this regard, Richtersveld opened space for the introduction of culturalized rights as a 
constitutive norm in demands for the recognition of living customary law and thus contributed to 
                                                 
40 See also the transcripts for the High Level Panel Western Cape Public Hearings.   
41 Khoisan informants that I spoke to during my research expressed concern that indigenous rights were being 
claimed widely, by non-Khoisan peoples, in South Africa. They felt that the specific experience of colonialism, 
dispossession and marginalization of Khoisan demanded recognition as indigenous peoples.   
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the development of living law. In the next chapter I turn to examine the emergence of living 
customary law as it is articulated in jurisprudence, as a central concept used by researchers to 
interpret their fieldwork, and in social mobilization. I illustrate why it is more accurate to adopt 
the concept ‘living law’ in order to account for the diverse amalgam of rights claims that are 
mobilized in a variety of different contexts and by a range of actors in struggles over rural land 
rights.      
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6 THE MAKING OF ‘LIVING CUSTOMARY LAW’ AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF ‘LIVING LAW’ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
South African land reform was defined by the Constitution to include three key areas: land 
redistribution, land restitution, and land tenure reform. While land tenure reform refers 
specifically to the protection and security of communal tenure relations in the former bantustans 
(now called communal areas), the question of land tenure, and land tenure rights, stretches across 
all three areas of land reform. Tenure, however, is difficult to define. Key legislation, such as the 
Communal Land Rights Act and the Communal Land Tenure Bill don’t provide definitions of 
‘tenure’ despite the centrality of the term. The African Union Framework and Guidelines on 
Land Policy in Africa defines land tenure as “the nature of and manner in which rights and 
interests over various categories of land are created or determined, allocated and enjoyed” (AU 
2010, xiii). The Food and Agricultural Organization also provides a definition of tenure:  
Land tenure is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among 
people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land. Land tenure is an 
institution, i.e., rules invented by societies to regulate behaviour. Rules of 
tenure define how property rights to land are to be allocated within societies. 
They define how access is granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land, as 
well as associated responsibilities and restraints. In simple terms, land tenure 
systems determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what 
conditions (FAO 2002). 
 
As South African researchers demonstrate, tenure relationships are “complex, multi-layered, and 
poorly understood” (Hornby et al. 2017, 3). Important characteristics can, however, be identified: 
these relationships are often ‘layered’ or ‘nested’ in character, meaning that tenure is mediated 
between different layers of authority and responsibility held by individuals, families, kin groups, 
and/or wider ‘communities’. Relationships are flexible and determined to be ‘socially legitimate’ 
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within shifting social and economic contexts (see Cousins 2007, Hornby et al. 2017).42 How, 
why, and in what conditions tenure relationships are deemed ‘socially legitimate’ raises 
significant questions, particularly in a context where ‘land rights’ are the subject of legal and 
institutional frameworks designed to respond to demands for transitional justice. Moreover, in 
conditions of neoliberalism, where the actors and authorities advocating for protection of land 
tenure relationships marshal authority through state and non-state institutions, the processes 
through which tenure relationships are legitimated, is particularly complex.  
The landmark Constitutional Court judgment Alexkor v Richtersveld and others (2003), 
explored in the last chapter, introduced an understanding of customary law as ‘living’. This led 
to the emergence of the legal concept ‘living customary law’ that has had reverberating effects 
on land reform in South Africa, not least for the way that it has been articulated in the 
conjuncture of transformative constitutionalism and neoliberalism to legitimate and make legible 
characteristics of tenure relations as human rights concerns. This chapter explores the conditions 
in which living customary law has emerged, with a specific focus on how different actors have 
adopted the concept as a way to interpret rural tenure relations as a human rights concern; it 
explains how living customary law has become an ethos of democratic and local rule-making 
that informs a discourse of collective land rights. Finally, I argue in this chapter that a 
                                                 
42 Researcher and community advocate Jackie Sunde provides an example of ‘layered’ tenure systems in a fishing 
community in the Eastern Cape: “In many traditional authority areas, rights are administered by a subheadman 
acting at local village level. He is, however, advised by a group of elders from the village and his authority to make 
decisions is entirely derived from this group of elders. For example, interviews with residents in Ntubeni, Dwesa-
Cwebe reveal that the Chief, known as the Nkosi, is merely informed of developments and actions and his 
permission is not specifically sought. In Kosi Bay, tenure rights have historically been derived from membership of 
a particular clan, living adjacent to the lake. This clan is part of the larger Tembe-Tsonga people, living under the 
authority of the Tembe chief. Rights to access and use the fishery resources of the lake are derived from the 
authority of the Nkosi, which is devolved to the local Induna or headman. In some instances, the administration of 
rights is located at the level of the users. For example, women harvesting mussels at Dwesa-Cwebe report that they 
have a system of rules among themselves that relate to how they conduct themselves when they go to harvest 
mussels. This layer of administration is further embedded in local institutions of tenure that exist at the village level, 
where membership derives from a combination of kinship and other social ties. The sub-headman and a group of 
household heads have authority at this level of administration”. (Sunde et al 2014, 128).   
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dichotomous view of ‘living’ vs ‘codified’ customary law fails to capture contemporary 
dynamics of rural land struggles, which are better understood as engendering conditions of living 
law.  
There are many different and conflicting understandings of custom, which have in turn 
required the articulation of a new concept. Living customary law emerged as a way to respond to 
these conflicting views. Living customary law is a concept and category that is used in three 
different ways by different groups of actors. First, it is a legal term used by the Constitutional 
Court.43 Second, it is a term used by empirical researchers to describe tenure relationships. Third, 
it is a term used by NGOs as a way to advocate for a democratic and participatory version of 
customary law that embodies Constitutional commitment to human rights. Across all three of 
these usages, living customary law is part of a strategic discourse used to legitimate entitlements 
to property for indigenous and rural peoples. As I show, to understand the political context in 
which living customary law emerges as a legal concept, a focus of research, and an aspiration in 
civil society, we need to consider how it articulates with Aboriginal title and the human rights of 
Indigenous peoples in contemporary conditions. Understanding how living customary law was 
developed in relation to Aboriginal title and indigenous rights is central to recognizing the 
emergence of living law, and the significant shift in articulations of property and subjectivity in 
struggles over land tenure in South Africa that the Richtersveld decision prompted. More 
importantly, these articulations are illustrative of an emergent living law in rural land struggles. 
This chapter demonstrates the role of living law in South African law and social mobilization 
                                                 
43 See for example, Bhe and Others v. Magistrate, Khayelistsha and Others, 2004: para 109; Shilubana and Others v. 
Nwamitwa, 2008: para 43, 44. In further affirmation of the use of living customary law in the Constitutional Court, 
Judge Gutta J. writes: “The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised that the law which is recognised is 
living customary law, which evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life” (in Bafokeng 
Land Buyers Association and others v. The Royal Bafokeng Nation, High Court, North West Division, 2018: Para 
22). 
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and explains, first, its role in the re-negotiation of relationships between land-holding 
collectivities and traditional leaders, and second, how it signals the introduction of culturalized 
rights as a means of understanding and protecting communal tenure relations. 
My analysis of living customary law, as it originated in the Constitutional Court, used in 
jurisprudence and social mobilization, and contributes to the emergence of living law, is 
informed by an understanding of neoliberalism not as an ideology but as processes of 
governmental restructuring whereby a wide range of actors participate in decentered forms of 
governance, contributing to the intensification of “the uneven development of regulatory forms 
across places, territories, and scales” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 184). The constitution 
of new legal subjects in these conditions is a key concern. The post-apartheid South African 
context is described as “a complex terrain of struggle” wherein there are “woven the strands of 
many smaller struggles by local groupings in specific historical circumstances” (Lee 2003, 80). 
The political context in which activists are working in South Africa has been further described as 
“hybrid, provisional, and situational” (Robins 2008, 165) whereby pragmatic activists are 
“capable of switching registers, repertoires and identities depending on specific contexts, 
audiences and political objectives” (Robins 2008, 168). Through social, political and legal 
struggle we can identify the emergence of an ‘insurgent citizenship’ in South Africa (Brown 
2015, see also von Lieres 2016) as advocates and activists maneuver to leverage opportunities 
and overcome structural constraints at the intersection of regional, state, municipal and global 
institutions and local contingencies (Perelman and White 2011, 6–7).  
The conditions described in this chapter contribute to the emergence of living law, of 
which living customary law is a distinct part. Living customary law is mobilized through the 
activities of a distinct set of actors, including researchers, advocates, activist lawyers, and 
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community members, who negotiate in the context of fragmented policy regimes and variegated 
governmental rationalities. I shall describe two different ways that living customary law has been 
mobilized in conditions of living law, both of which have different effects on the constitution of 
collective subjectivities. I show how it is used in jurisprudence to challenge autocratic traditional 
leaders and demonstrate how it is used in social mobilization as a means to assert tenure 
relationships expressed in part through rights claimed in the language of culture. The examples 
used in this chapter illustrate the emergence of living law, whereby multiple human rights norms 
are vernacularized with revitalized assertions of customary law.   
6.2 Living customary law as a challenge to autocratic traditional leadership 
In Chapter Four I described how the land reform program created and relied upon two 
subjectivities asserting claims to collective title – communal property associations and traditional 
leaders. Living customary law has become the primary legal concept through which the 
relationship between traditional leaders and CPAs is challenged and reconfigured. Indeed, much 
of the case law that relies on the Richtersveld judgement deals precisely with the relationship 
between traditional leaders and communities, often represented by CPAs. 
Many of the judgments that consider living customary law as a concept through which to 
understand custom deal precisely with the question of chiefly authority, which was, ironically, 
not an area of dispute in Richtersveld. In Pilane (2013), the Constitutional Court had to decide if 
a community, part of the larger Bakgatla-Ba-Kgefela traditional community recognized by the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA), could secede from the 
authority of the traditional leader Nyalala Pilane and appoint their own leader. The majority 
decision supported the rights of the community to determine their own leader in the name of 
democracy, thus clarifying the relationship between a state-recognized traditional leader and the 
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peoples who live within the territory under their jurisdiction. In Sigcau (2013), the issue hinged 
on determining what law ought to be referred to in deciding which of two contending traditional 
leaders was the legitimate one. In neither case did the Constitutional Court have to deal with any 
substantive issues relating to defining the content of customary law.44   
The judgment concerning the Royal Bafokeng (RBK) Nation (2018) in the High Court 
(North West Division) is insightful for how collective groups have referred to living customary 
law as a defence for their collective property and autonomy.45 The applicants in the case wanted 
to be autonomous from the RBK Nation. They asserted their autonomy by demonstrating that 
they were common-law owners of land and therefore did not have to submit to the whole of the 
RBK Nation. They claimed that they were owed the duty to consult on matters impacting their 
land. Judge Gutta J.wrote  
A failure to recognize the duty to consult as legally enforceable, fosters 
arbitrariness and autocracy, and undermines the participatory democracy which 
is at the heart of our Constitution and of RBN governance. While the 
institution of traditional leadership according to customary law is recognized 
under the Constitution, it is subject to the Constitution. Courts must interpret 
customary law in light of the Constitution; and if it falls short of constitutional 
requirements, then the Court has a responsibility to develop the law (RBK 
Nation 2018, para 48).  
 
The victory represented by this judgement is understood by researchers and legal critics to be 
another victory for living customary law. Again, however, the issue before the court was one of 
                                                 
44 Interestingly, the role of Richtersveld is less direct in this judgment. Rather than citing Richtersveld, the ruling 
referenced expert evidence provided by the Centre for Law and Society, which was admitted as amicus curiae 
(friend of the court). In their submission they informed the court of emerging jurisprudence on living customary law, 
starting with Richtersveld, to demonstrate that the procedures for deciding on traditional leadership are amendable to 
community decision-making, even if it goes against practice legislated in the TLGFA (Sigcau 2013, para 18).  
45 The influence of Richtersveld is clearly informative. In para 21 and 22: “[21] The Constitutional Court has 
pointed out that while customary law is to be understood on its own terms rather the through the lens of the common 
law, it is subject to the Constitution, and has to be interpreted in the light of its values. In other words, the process of 
interpretation is informed by the values and ethos of the Constitution, from which customary law draws its force. 
[22] The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised that the law which is recognised is living customary law, 
which evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life.” 
149 
 
determining relationships of authority. The case did not deal with any other issue of custom, 
however, and thus did not address community cultural rights, which makes its status as part of 
this field of law questionable. 
Another key area of litigation on living customary law focuses on determining women’s 
customary rights. For example, in Mayelene (2013), the Constitutional Court had to decide 
whether a husband needed to obtain the consent of his wife before he married another woman. 
The court thus had to determine the customary law of the Xitsonga people and the contemporary 
relevance of a historical patriarchal practice. To determine such practice the courts referred to 
traditional healers from the community, experts writing on customary law, and individuals from 
within community to determine that conventions had evolved such that a husband needed 
permission of his wife before entering another marriage. The judgement potentially contributes 
to changing patriarchal power relationships that are said to characterize many rural societies 
adhering to forms of customary law, thus demonstrating a further affirmation of customary law 
as ‘living’ in the Court (Ozoemena 2013, 153-154, see also Claassens 2015).  
While these judgements should certainly be celebrated, they have also served to solidify 
an overly narrow interpretation in conditions of living law by distinguishing between codified 
and living customary law. According to the judgements, codified customary law refers to a 
construction of colonial government to control the rural populace while living customary law 
refers to the rules and practices of peoples who access and manage land and resources 
collectively and who make changes to their customary laws in response to changing social and 
economic conditions (Claassens 2011). Legal researcher Aninka Claassens and prominent human 
rights lawyer Geoff Budlender, for example, explain how the Constitutional Court’s recognition 
of customary is distinct from the 'interpretation' of customary law in legislation (such as the 
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TLGFA). As opposed to a 'codified' customary law that legitimates traditional leaders as the 
authors of custom, the authors argue that "[t]he source of true customary law is processes, 
practices and rules on the ground, which change over time" (Claassens and Budlender 2013, 76). 
They call this ‘living customary law’. 
Many critical summaries of jurisprudence repeatedly ascribe to the notion that ‘living 
customary law’ is a way of thinking about law as sets of horizontal relationships between people, 
while ‘codified’ customary law refers to the vertical imposition of power from traditional leaders 
onto subjected peoples (Diala 2017). Within this vision the ‘chiefly’ power of traditional leaders 
is thought to be imposed through legislative fiat and hierarchical power relationships. The 
problem is that this perspective leaves intact the assumption that traditional authorities impose 
powers from the top down whereas a flexible living customary law evolves organically to meet 
the local needs of a defined community. There is  no consideration of forces that might 
contribute to the emergence or articulation of customary law nor is there any recognition of the 
multiple ways that traditional leaders assert their authority in the context of the new opportunities 
provided by the neoliberal global economy, including new forms of neoliberal governmentality 
that target cultural expressions (Comaroff and Comaroff 2018). In these conditions, for example, 
traditional leaders have been able to draw from an emergent transnational field of cultural rights 
in order to make themselves legible to the state as well as extractive industry actors (see Chapter 
Four).    
While the authority of traditional authorities may be challenged through a narrative that 
posits living customary law against codified customary law, the potential of a more 
encompassing field of living law to legitimate cultural rights of communities remains under-
explored in both jurisprudence and critical commentary. This is not atypical of law and policy 
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scholars who have a tendency to “unduly emphasize state-based frames of reference, and, in the 
process, overlook significant forces shaping new cultural rights and properties” (Coombe et al, 
forthcoming, 1). Custom, I contend, can be more descriptively understood as a culturalized 
assertion informed by transnational trends in indigenous rights and thus a key concept articulated 
within a field of living law. Below I first identify the relationship between custom and 
culturalized rights and then explain the effects of the articulation of customary and cultural rights 
through examples that demonstrate how ‘community’ is being re-asserted in the wake of 
Richtersveld, thus contributing to the emergence of the living law.  
6.3 Making living customary law legible 
The introduction of culturalized rights in rural struggles for land tenure rights represents a shift 
in how collectivities and their tenure relationships are understood. This shift needs to be placed 
in a  wider international context, wherein Indigenous Peoples’ human rights have historically 
been articulated in terms of cultural rights.46 For example, the International Labour Organization 
Convention No. 169 states that in applying its provisions “the social, cultural, religious and 
spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognized and protected” (Art. 5(a), in 
Shaheed 2011 para 42). Moreover, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) stipulates that “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions” (Art. 31). In reference to indigenous governance and law UNDRIP affirms that:  
indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain 
their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, 
traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical 
                                                 
46 International forums provide important definitions of cultural rights. The United Nations Economic and Social 
Council Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity describes culture as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, 
intellectual and emotional features of a society or a social group, [which] encompasses, in addition to art and 
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO 2001, 4). 
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systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards 
(Art. 34, in Shaheed 2011 para 43).     
 
Cultural rights are used to inform the recognition and protection of indigenous people’s laws and 
governance. In this regard, it is important to understand culture as a ‘way of life’ as it is affirmed 
in General Comment 21 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:  
The expression “cultural life” is an explicit reference to culture as a living 
process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a future. 
The concept of culture must be seen not as a series of isolated manifestations 
or hermetic compartments, but as an interactive process whereby individuals 
and communities, while preserving their specificities and purposes, give 
expression to the culture of humanity (CESCR 2009, Para 11-12). 
 
The ICESCR further explains that indigenous people’s cultural life has a communal dimension 
that is “indispensable to their existence” and makes a distinct connection between land and the 
realization of their cultural rights (CESCR 2009, para 36).  
Indigenous activists organizing for their sovereignty and self-determination through the 
United Nations leveraged cultural rights as a strategy to gain recognition outside of the 
framework of the state. International law developed as the law between states; in this system 
indigenous peoples were not recognized as sovereign peoples. This changed when, through a 
series of cases, indigenous peoples made submissions as collectivities protected under article 27 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for the protection of 
minority cultural, religious, and language rights (Koivurova 2008, 5, see also Cutler 2011). The 
Richtersveld judgement and the contemporary articulations of living customary law emerge in 
this broader context.  
The introduction of culturalized rights is significant for a number of reasons. The 
articulation of living customary law within a field of living law contributes to making land tenure 
relationships legible in ways that are not represented in existing legislation, such as the 
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Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, the Communal Property Associations (CPA) Act 28 of 
1996, and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (and others, as discussed 
in the next chapter). The drafters of land reform policy and legislation did not imagine custom 
and culture to be an important vocabulary to gain property in land reform because they imagined 
African culture and custom to be static and already fully represented by ‘chiefs’.  
The treatment of customary law in the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform, for example, 
is striking. Customary law is discussed as something separate from land reform policy generally. 
For example, “[i]t is recognised that there are many areas in which the system of customary land 
tenure is popular, functional and relatively democratic. It would be unnecessary and even 
dangerous to interfere with such functional systems, especially while there is no proven better 
alternative” (DLA 1997, 89). The Department of Land Affairs argued that human rights-based 
land reform measures were in ‘conflict’ with customary law (DLA 1997). Here again there is 
evidence of an understanding of customary law as a separate area of law conflicting with the new 
Constitutional order, rather than as an expression of Constitutionally protected cultural rights that 
can inform land reform legislation. Finally, the Commission for the Protection of Cultural, 
Religious, and Linguistic Communities,47 has no programming focused on land rights and there 
is no evidence to suggest that the Commission has ever dealt with the issue of land in any 
meaningful way.48 Living customary law however opens up the opportunity to draw on cultural 
rights to make rural peoples tenure relationships legible in new ways.  
                                                 
47 The Commission for the Protection of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities is established in line with 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution. As described in Chapter Two of this dissertation, Chapter 9 institutions are ‘State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy’. These institutions are subject only to the Constitution and the 
law and are thus independent of government. The above Commission is mandated to support cultural rights. 
48 This finding is based on a review of annual reports by the Commission for the Protection of Cultural, Religious, 
and Linguistic Communities from the years 2007-2018.  
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The absence of cultural rights in land reform policy and legislation in South Africa 
contrasts with the re-articulation of cultural rights in heritage management (Meskell 2012), the 
protection of indigenous knowledge (Comaroff & Comaroff 2009), and the rise of chiefs and 
chieftaincy (Oomen 2005, Comaroff & Comaroff 2018). The impact of the inclusion of 
Aboriginal title in Richtersveld was effectively to provide a means to bring cultural rights claims 
and arguments into the field of land reform.  
As it emerged in South Africa, living customary law was used in diverse ways by 
different people for distinctive ends. By understanding these different uses as particular 
articulations, I provide a perspective that draws out the emergence of living law as a field of 
rights mobilization and indigenous emergence, whereby indigeneity is understood as “a 
contingent, structured positioning, one that can be spoken and linked to other indigenous 
struggles only within particular geographically and historically specific conjunctures" (Yeh and 
Bryan 2015, 534, see also Radcliffe 2017). In conditions of neoliberalism, articulations of living 
customary are dispersed in different fields of action, thus they take on different forms for and by 
different actors. It is to the articulation of living customary law as a means to express the cultural 
practices of localized communities in arguing for their customary rights that I now turn.  
6.4 Re-imagining ‘community’ and legitimating tenure in transnational contexts 
To understand the localized and participatory development of customary law as an assertion of 
culturalized rights one needs to understand the links between human rights and cultural heritage 
more generally, and to acknowledge the specific links between cultural rights and cultural 
heritage, specifically. In her report to the United Nations Human Rights Council (2011), the 
independent expert in the field of cultural rights Farida Shaheed explains two key points. First, 
she asserts that the protection of cultural rights in the African context is articulated in the Charter 
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for African Cultural Renaissance (2006), which recognizes that “all cultures emanate from 
societies, communities, groups and individuals” (Shaheed 2011, Para 29) and that according to 
Article 15 of the Charter all states are called to “create an enabling environment to enhance the 
access and participation of all in culture, including marginalized and underprivileged 
communities” (in Shaheed 2011, Para 29). Second, she explains that, internationally: 
the participation of individuals and communities in cultural heritage matters is 
crucial, fully respecting the freedom of individuals to participate or not in one 
or several communities, to develop their multiple identities, to access their 
cultural heritage as well as that of others, and to contribute to the creation of 
culture, including through the contestation of dominant norms and values 
within the communities they belong to as well as those of other communities 
(Shaheed 2011, Para 10).  
 
In the South African context this affirmation challenges the suggestion that ‘culture’ belongs to 
the distinct domain of traditional leaders and positions culture in local struggles whereby peoples 
express political agency by defining their cultural identities and practices in their relationships 
with others. 
The concept of community as a collective entity defined by shared rules of access and 
membership was significantly expanded in Richtersveld through ‘indigenous law ownership’ 
(Richtersveld CC 2003, Para 81). As Hanri Mostert explains: “the judiciary entertained evidence 
about the shared culture, language, religion, social and political structures, customs and lifestyle 
that proved the existence of customary rules relating to land use, to find that the community 
could have a sense of legitimate access to the land, to the exclusion of others”.49 Moreover, 
                                                 
49 In the SCA Judgement, for example: “The Richtersveld people shared the same culture, including the same 
language, religion, social and political structures, customs and lifestyle derived from their Khoi-Nama forefathers. 
One of the components of the culture of the Richtersveld people was the customary rules relating to their entitlement 
to and use and occupation of this land. The primary rule was that the land belonged to the Richtersveld community 
as a whole and that all its people were entitled to the reasonable occupation and use of all land held in common by 
them and its resources. All members of the community had a sense of legitimate access to the land to the exclusion 
of all other people. Non-members had no such rights and had to obtain permission to use the land for which they 
sometimes had to pay” (SCA 2003, Para 18).  
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Mostert highlighted the “subtle link that was drawn, in the course of the proceedings, between 
the ‘indigeneity’ of communities and the land rights accruing to them [which] was informed 
largely by comparative law on Aboriginal title” (Mostet 2010, 229). This goes far beyond the 
stipulations in section one of The Restitution Act which states blandly that communities are 
defined by shared rules of land use.  
  New ways of addressing community subjects as property holders are emerging via 
culturalized customary law. How claimant communities, including customary and indigenous 
communities, identify themselves has been influenced by the Richtersveld judgment through the 
recognition of ‘indigenous law’. For example, according to the Land Restitution Act, initially all 
members of claimant communities had to be recorded in a membership list, but this stipulation 
changed by virtue of judgements in the Land Claims Court in the Kranspoort case (LCC26/98) 
and by the Constitutional Court in Richtersveld (CCT19/03). These judgements determined that  
A community is a dynamic and ever-changing entity, and while some members 
will leave, others will join. Moreover, this process of renewal is not dictated by 
lineage alone but also by other forms of association related to culture, location, 
and livelihoods. For this reason, in the case of community claims, 
determination of lineage between claimants and those originally dispossessed 
is futile. (Sjaastad, Derman and Manenzhe 2013, 419).  
 
These changes have had significant impact on how communities are recorded for the purpose of 
transferring land. By using Richtersveld to elaborate on communal ownership, communities 
make themselves legible as distinct self-determining entities. State attempts to construct 
communities as legal entities, such as CPAs, are being challenged by rural peoples asserting 
community self-identity and cultural distinction at the intersection of Indigenous rights and 
customary law. These claims are in part legitimated by the precedent set in the Richtersveld 
judgment.  
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Living customary law provides a legal vehicle to interpret and reconfigure relationships 
between culture, rights, and property; it is an essential ingredient in living law within the broader 
political economies within which it is being asserted. To see some of the possibilities of living 
customary law in land reform, and to understand its contribution to a broader context of living 
law, it is necessary to move beyond the courts to examine how it is taken up in specific contexts 
and struggles towards specific ends. By looking at the ways in which some communities are 
articulating living customary law as a form of culturalized right, we will get a clearer sense of the 
opportunities this concept affords for re-articulating tenure relations, including the layered and 
nested character of customary ‘social tenure’ as a subject of human rights. It is here, we will see, 
that the promise of living law is beginning to be realized for the recognition and protection of 
land tenure.  
Richtersveld articulated key issues in the determination of landed property rights that 
became components of living customary law. The Court held that “[t]he content of the land 
rights held by the Community must be determined by reference to the history and the usages of 
the community ” (Richtersveld CC 2003, 60).50 Empirical research on the concept of living 
customary law now  informs understandings of tenure relationships that are in line with the 
Richtersveld judgement. In 2011, for example, the Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian 
Studies (PLAAS) at the University of Western Cape in South Africa published a research report 
on 'living customary law' in Msinga. The report was based on a three-year action research project 
(beginning June 2007) focused on the Mchunu and Mthembu tribal areas in KwaZulu-Natal. 
                                                 
50 Moreover “we are of the view that the real character of the title that the Richtersveld Community possessed in the 
subject land was a right of communal ownership under indigenous law. The content of that right included the right 
to exclusive occupation and use of the subject land by members of the Community. The Community had the right to 
use its water, to use its land for grazing and hunting and to exploit its natural resources, above and beneath the 
surface. It follows therefore that prior to annexation the Richtersveld Community had a right of ownership in the 
subject land under indigenous law” (Richtersveld 2003, 62).   
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While the report was published by PLAAS online as part of their open-access research series, the 
research was carried out by staff from the Mdukutshani Rural Development Programme during a 
period in which the 2004 Communal Land Rights Act was being challenged on the grounds that it 
misrepresented the nested forms of rural social authority  to reinforce a system of chiefly power. 
The research sought a deeper understanding of customary law to be used to inform legislative 
development. 
The researchers argue that living customary law is best understood as having a nested 
character. To describe land tenure as having a ‘nested character’ is to show that use and access to 
land is negotiated through multiple authorities, institutions and collectivities which have varying 
degrees of legitimacy in decision-making. In the Msinga research these collective actors include 
izigodi (wards), imihlati (neighbourhoods) and imizi (homesteads), all of which define local 
boundaries at different scales (Cousins et al. 2011, 85, see also Cousins 2007, Claassens 2008). 
The authors explain that, “communal land tenure regimes in rural South Africa are best 
understood as systems of living law, which have the potential to adapt and evolve over time and 
are sometimes deliberately and consciously adjusted to meet changing circumstances” (Cousins 
et al 2011, 83).51 The challenge for researchers and advocates in contemporary South Africa, 
then, is establishing whose voices are heard in defining the content of living law, and in 
supporting institutions to hold those in power in check: "A key objective of policy and law 
should therefore be to establish and support land tenure institutions and decision-making 
                                                 
51 The authors make a deliberate shift from ‘living customary law’ to ‘living law’, arguing that “[t]he term 
‘customary’ is a misnomer, since this seems to imply that the system is handed down relatively unchanged from the 
past, and that its content is derived primarily from a discrete and unique set of cultural norms and values” (Cousins 
et al, 2011, 83). The move from ‘living customary law’ to ‘living law’ is premised however on a (colonial) 
conception of custom and culture that I challenge in this dissertation. Therefore, my use of the phrase ‘living 
customary law’ is closely affiliated with the author’s description of living law. Custom, for example, continues to be 
articulated within the field of living law.      
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processes which are legitimate, open to popular participation, and accountable to rights holders" 
(Cousins et al 2011, 84).  
The recognition of tenure relationships as part of a wider set of cultural relations is 
clearly emergent in recent activism for land and resource rights. Furthermore, it is in this activity, 
described below, that we can identify the role of transnational norms in defining tenure 
relationships. In a presentation and educational flier produced by four organizations advocating 
for the customary fishing rights of a community in the Western Cape province, for instance, we 
can begin to see the articulation of a broader understanding of customary law rights 
(Environmental Evaluation Unit et al. 2012). Organizations working with community leaders 
have begun a process of supporting the community in articulating their community rights, 
documenting their histories of living in the area, describing how their social and cultural lives are 
intertwined with the river and coastal resources, and recording their local ecological knowledge 
(Environmental Evaluation Unit et al. 2012). Here we see customary law being understood as a 
cultural practice embedded within an indigenous cosmovision, a perspective that is echoed 
through other community presentations (Waldeck and Smith 2011) and community-based 
proposals for tenure governance (Sunde et al. 2014). The introduction of ‘indigenous customary 
law’ as an independent body of law has provided a means for the introduction of a legal 
understanding of customary law not only as shared rules (which has previously defined 
community membership) but as a way of life and tenure governance. 
The significance of these commitments was highlighted at a litigation workshop on 
customary law and land tenure held in Johannesburg, where the importance of pan-African 
guidelines, such as the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, the African Union 
Commission, is clearly stated in their discussion of Richtersveld and customary law in the 
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postcolonial era (LRC 2011). A consortium of South African community organizations 
representing movements of small-scale farmers, fishers, forestry workers and rural workers 
developed a ‘Plan to Act!’ at a national workshop meeting help in Cape Town, 7–11 June 2015. 
The meeting was held to discuss new national and international guidelines on tenure security, 
including the Voluntary International Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT). In their published 
declaration, they state:  
We, women and men who are the historical users and caretakers of the 
Commons, have a particular relationship with the land, forests, oceans and 
waters of our territories upon which we depend for our lives and livelihoods. 
Through our interaction with the Commons we have developed our diverse 
cultures, knowledge and tenure systems. We have fed ourselves and our 
communities and continue to do so as well as to provide food and nourishment 
for the communities around us (Masifundise 2015). 
 
The Plan to Act! engages with transnational norms to link their identities and their particular 
relationship with the land, which is mediated by diverse cultural systems.  
Transnational engagements between small-scale fishing activists and international 
activists and policy makers were fundamental to the creation of a policy for small-scale fisheries 
in South Africa: representatives from Masifundise, for example, were instrumental in discussions 
and negotiations within the FAO to develop the VGGT as well as the Small Scale Fisheries 
Guidelines (Interview #4). Throughout negotiations over the text of the policy, small-scale 
fishers “referred to customary practices in demanding recognition of their rights and have taken 
inspiration from international policy instruments in articulating their vision for a new system of 
fisheries governance” (Sunde et al. 2014, 121). The policy brings a distinctly transnational 
character to these movements and challenges dichotomous constructions of ‘global’ and ‘local’ 
scales in organizing. Community organizations fighting for land and resource rights are engaging 
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with international policy regimes and asserting their tenure practices within emergent 
transnational discourses of indigenous and community land rights to practice their own forms of 
land tenure governance as an expression of their cultural rights.  
Beginning with the use of Aboriginal title, Richtersveld signaled and legitimated a 
broader trend among activists and community organizations to approach the rights of indigenous 
and customary communities through regional and international guidelines on land tenure rights. 
In this activity, we can identify approaches to living law emergent in ‘translocal assemblages’, 
which “are not simply a spatial category, output, or resultant formation, but signify doing, 
performance and events” (McFarlane 2009, 562). These are articulations of neoliberalism(s), 
which “are more than curious local manifestations of global norms, but sets of theories and 
practices about the world that are fundamentally the products of local history and experience” 
(Goldstein 2012, 305).  The living law refers to the relationships that exist between people and 
the land in terms of cultural or spiritual connections, as well as the diverse uses of land in 
making and sustaining social ties between families for example (Fay 2015), or as sites of 
important social re-distribution (Ferguson 2013). In other words, the living law of land tenure 
affirms that rural and Indigenous Peoples own and manage land in a wide variety of ways and 
through a variety of relationships not captured in existing legislation.  
By articulating their own situated identity in relation to international policy 
developments, these community organizations participate in an emergent transnational dialogue 
calling for the protection of indigenous and community land rights. In summary, the Richtersveld 
decision and the ensuing assertion of living customary law has opened the door to a broader set 
of normative and discursive claims to property that are being articulated in civil society, in 
activism around litigation, and in publications on the importance of living customary law as a 
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means towards recognizing ‘social tenures’ in land reform; Richtersveld has contributed to an 
emergent amalgam of living law whereby rural peoples are making claims to their land.   
The analysis provided in this chapter has implications for how the link between law and 
legibility is understood. The introduction of culturalized claims to rights introduces new 
opportunities, as well as requirements, for peoples asserting land tenure rights to make their 
claims legible. Yet the politics of making legible cannot be imagined as being mobilized by any 
unified motivation – as either motivated by ‘high modernity’ or ‘the will to improve’ (as Scott 
1998 and Li 2005 argue, respectively). Rather, as I identified in this chapter, living customary 
law is articulated as an issue of cultural rights in different ways by an activist Constitutional 
Court as well as by activists themselves, and through their work custom is made legible in 
different ways and for the purposes of advancing new understandings of custom. For example, 
some activist/researchers argue that living customary law must be understood in contrast to 
codified customary law, however the reality of any such dichotomous relationship is not 
illustrated empirically. This is in part the product of conditions of neoliberalism and legal 
pluralism in South Africa.  
In Alexkor v Richtersveld the Constitutional Court asserted the need to ‘take legal 
pluralism seriously’ in democratic South Africa. ‘Taking legal pluralism seriously’ requires 
paying attention to the generative spaces that are opened up by the recognition of multiple legal 
orders. Political Scientist Peter Houtzager and Law professor Lucie White, in their conclusion to 
a collaborative volume on socio-economic rights advocacy in Africa, find that African advocates 
creatively engage with normative pluralism and “welcome the generative tension that it brings to 
their work” (2011: 175). From this perspective pluralism is not an end but a context in which 
struggles are waged, where norms are worked with and against. Rather than see it as a colonial 
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construction, Houtzager and White approach legal pluralism as producing ‘generative spaces’ 
which may arise when groups place the triggering ‘event’ in a ‘justice’ frame and  enter into 
redistributive contestation, deliberative engagement and institutional experimentation so as to 
imagine and even try out previously unimaginable win-win [economic and social rights] delivery 
strategies” (Houtzager and White 2011, 183-184). Living law, in conditions of neoliberalism and 
(arguably) augmented legal pluralism, offers new opportunities for articulation with cultural 
rights in the pragmatic and strategic advocacy of peoples in their struggle for securing tenure.  
6.5 Conclusion: The emergence of living law in struggles for rural land rights 
Living customary law has emerged in contrast with codified customary law and in the process 
has created a new dichotomous understanding of custom that may itself be unhelpful for 
recognizing its diverse uses and may in fact ‘entrench’ a simplistic idea of custom void of 
struggle or conflict. While the concept of living customary law easily matches the ethos of 
democratic constitutionalism, there is a risk that this understanding is being sedimented as a 
particular form of ‘custom’ that relies on platitudes about democracy rather than a deep and 
critical engagement with the diverse forms of struggle and the shifting relations between 
property, subjectivity and territory in contemporary rural South Africa. Contemporary conditions 
of rights-based legal struggles over land are better understood as engendering the living law of 
rural land tenure, whereby claims to land are localized however fundamentally informed by 
transnational conditions of interlegality.  
The promise of living law is realized through jurisprudence and the advocacy through 
which rights to land are mobilized. The Richtersveld decision and its ongoing influence 
demonstrates how indigenous legal traditions, supported by Aboriginal title as it has been 
developed in common law, continue to push the presumed boundaries of law, identity, and 
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subjectivity that might confine indigenous and rural peoples living in customary legal situations. 
Rather than being representations of static ‘traditions’, indigenous identities are better 
understood as articulations of “how people interpret their histories and desired futures in contexts 
in which they encounter new values” (Coombe 2017, 380, see also Speed 2008, Altamirano-
Jiménez 2013). Collective subjectivities are made legible in land reform legislation as traditional 
leaders and as communities’ express cultural attachments to land, and such subjectivities are 
made anew through the articulation of customary law, indigeneity and cultural rights, 
contributing to what is best understood as the living law of rural land tenure. 
 In the next chapter I focus on an area of struggle where communal land rights are 
articulated outside of the land reform program and community rights are asserted in the context 
of conflicts with extractive industry. I focus in particular on how mining governance regimes 
come into conflict with land reform objectives, and how, in these sites of struggle peoples use 
emergent transnational norms to articulate indigenous and customary land rights in an emergent 
field of living law. I show how advocates and peoples living in collective tenure relations thereby 
leverage multiple norms to make legible their localized practices of government to make new 
demands on the state and legislature in order to influence both land reform and mining reform 
legislation. I demonstrate the links between property, territory and authority revealed in this 
context, and argue that a deeper critical engagement with each is needed in order to transcend 
apartheid territorial authorities vested in the garb of tradition.   
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7 GOVERNING TERRITORY IN CONDITIONS OF LEGAL 
PLURALISM: LIVING CUSTOMARY LAW AND FREE, PRIOR 
AND INFORMED CONSENT (FPIC) IN XOLOBENI, SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The work of rural peoples, their advocates, and the courts have contributed to the emergence of 
the living law of land tenure. Such living law must be understood through the transregional and 
transnational conditions by which it is legitimated. The living law of rural land struggles open a 
space of opportunity for land claimants to draw on culturalized rights and discourses to contest 
post-apartheid collectivities that were born out of the land reform program. In the conjuncture of 
indigenous rights, Aboriginal title, and revitalized assertions of custom, a new form of 
governmentality is emergent whereby advocates and communities draw on transnational norms 
of community consent to turn practices of government back on the state and make demands for 
land rights. One area where this form of governmentality is mobilized is in the context of mining 
governance reform. Here the living law of rural land is identified through, in part, the range of 
rights and norms, and their local and transnational links, asserted by peoples against both mining 
companies and the state. While the struggles identified here are unique, they would not have 
been realized in the same way had it not been for the gains made in the Richtersveld decision and 
the new politics that this opened up.  
 What gives this struggle characteristics of governmentality, rather than being a mere 
reaction against dispossession, is the extent to which it  relies on transnational norms requiring  
community consent that derive from global environmental policy, the international indigenous 
rights movement and the field of corporate social responsibility which has responded to both. 
Existing scholarship explains how the mining industry participates in shaping the meaning, 
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practice and experience of the ‘local community’ by illustrating the "contingent intersections 
among CSR [corporate social responsibility], neoliberalisation, community, and capital" (Mayes 
et al. 2014, 410). Here, however, I am interested in understanding how one community draws 
from within a field of governmental power to hold state actors accountable. Nikolas Rose et al 
(2006) explain that governmental thought and technique is “contingent and invented (and thus 
always mutable)”. Moreover,  
Government is not assumed to be a by-product or necessary effect of immanent 
social or economic forces or structures. Rather, it is seen as an attempt by those 
confronting certain social conditions to make sense of their environment, to 
imagine ways of improving the state of affairs, and to devise ways of achieving 
these ends. Human powers of creativity are centered rather than marginalized, 
even though such creation takes place within certain styles of thought and must 
perforce make use of available resources, techniques, and so on (Rose et al. 
2006, 99). 
 
I will demonstrate that the community subjects who are the actors in this chapter participate in 
specific power relations and in the process reproduce and transform them (Brockling et al 2011, 
14).  
 One effect of the shifting forms of power and subjectivity that I have identified within the 
realm of living law are the emergence of overlapping territories (Agnew Oslender 2016, Lund 
and Boon 2010) as different collectivities make claims for recognition of their territorial 
authority and their specific role in governing land and resources. It is imperative in this context 
to “conceive of territory from the perspective of multiple overlapping power relations” 
(Haesbaert 2013, 149). The empirical challenge is to identify the practices, processes and 
institutions through which rural and indigenous peoples negotiate land rights in conditions of 
“entangled territorialities” (Dussart and Poirier 2017). To this end, the chapter focuses on the 
particular social, political and legal struggles being waged in the Umgungundlovu territory of the 
Eastern Cape in South Africa.  
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One community, the Xolobeni community, within the wider Umgungundlovu territory, is 
centrally engaged in a struggle to protect their land from proposed extractive industries. What is 
a legal struggle in courts is also a wider social and political struggle against the power and 
authority of both the state and traditional leaders, as well as against historical discourses of 
conservation and underdevelopment that have positioned these peoples as in need of 
development introduced, designed and controlled by others. The pairing of conservation and 
underdevelopment has a long history in South Africa, where, even after the end of apartheid, 
there remains an entrenched racialized ideology among state officials and conservation activists 
that poor black people are a hinderance and threat to biological diversity (for a recent summary 
of this work, see Kepe 2018). It is in these conditions that the people of Xolobeni are demanding 
the right to ‘say no’ to imposed development plans and to assert their customary and cultural 
rights as the basis of their vision for the future.   
7.2 Mining Governance Reform: FPIC and the right to ‘say no’ in context 
Post-apartheid mining governance reform in South Africa has rhetorically promoted the 
‘participation’ of communities impacted by mining operations, yet scholarly research finds 
pervasive poverty and increasing inter-communal violence in mining areas (Mnwana 2015, 
Mnwana et al 2016). There has been a marked increase in conflicts between local communities, 
traditional leaders and mining companies as people demand that they be either compensated for 
damaged environments or gain stakes in mining operations (Manson 2013, Capps and Mnwana 
2015). As I will show, these conflicts are characterized by local historical struggles over 
property, territory, and authority whereby customary laws and practices are articulated with 
national law and transnational human rights norms in dynamic conditions of legal pluralism. 
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Reading the advocacy of local communities and their struggles over property, territory 
and authority is one way to interrogate the complex field of power constituting mining 
governance reform in post-apartheid South Africa. Moreover, as geographers Scott Prudham and 
William Coleman argue, "[c]risis in property regimes highlight how a politics of place can 
challenge existing globalizing processes, build new bases for autonomy, and articulate 
alternative ways of living" (2012, 2). In this chapter I highlight two areas of struggle in mining-
community relations and their territorial dimensions: 1) strategic re-assertions of custom, 
jurisdiction and subjectivity; 2) practices of self-determined development. While these areas of 
struggle are inter-related, it is useful to separately delineate these two themes to draw out 
different aspects and dimensions of community resistance to imposed mining regimes.  
One of the ways that communities organize their resistance to imposed mining operations 
is by demanding that their consent be obtained for the operations which affect them. The right to 
consent, however, is meaningless unless it includes a right to agree, to disagree, to set terms, and, 
particularly, the right to say ‘no’ to mining operations entirely. Community-based assertions of 
the right to consent are challenging state and industry-led proposals for reform in South Africa to 
the extent that some mining operations are halted while legal battles are waged in the courts. 
How these rights are asserted, the language used and the claims made, illuminate shortfalls in 
post-apartheid mining governance reform that are not captured by broad, top-down analyses of 
these processes. Moreover, these struggles reveal the highly spatialized characteristics of mining 
governance in post-apartheid South Africa and how these territorializations are being re-
configured under conditions of neoliberal governmentality.   
Conflicts between mining companies and communities often involve contestations over 
jurisdiction and scale that draw on both ‘international’ and ‘local’ imaginaries. Geographers and 
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anthropologists have long challenged the scalar distinctions ‘local’ and ‘global’, highlighting that 
these designations are socially constructed. Perceived local struggles are often constituted 
through the transnational circulation of information, strategies, and relations of power. In 
environmental governance, for example, there has been a rise in governing structures mediating 
between the domestic and the international, while not determined by either, while transnational 
institutions and NGOs have become international ‘knowledge brokers’, seeking out ‘local’ 
knowledges for the realization of ‘global’ agendas (Martello and Jasanoff 2004). In such 
conditions constructions of the local and global depend “on the production of knowledge and its 
interaction with power” (Martello and Jasanoff 2004, 5); indicating a need to interrogate 
perceived ‘local’ accounts through a globalized perspective (ibid).  
Legally binding conventions as well as ‘soft-law’ statements (referring to non-binding 
regulatory governance instruments) are influential means through which norms on indigenous 
rights and resource governance circulate transnationally. Binding instruments include the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), ILO Convention 169 (the 
1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention), the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In addition, soft-law norms such as 
those deriving from the Food and Agricultural Organizations Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure are mobilized in rural land rights struggles. These function to 
mediate relationships between states and indigenous populations, and in effect demand that we 
interrogate the oft-presumed role of the state. Anthropologists James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta 
(2002) argue that in neoliberal political economy, state power, often expressed in modern terms 
in relations of ‘verticality’ and ‘encompassment’ is reconfigured as transnational organizations 
confound such historical metaphors of scale and jurisdiction:  
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Claims of verticality that have historically been monopolized by the state 
(claims of superior spatial scope, supremacy in a hierarchy of power, and 
greater generality of interest and moral purpose) are being challenged and 
undermined by a transnationalized “local” that fuses the grassroots and the 
global in ways that make a hash of the vertical topography of power on which 
the legitimation of nation-states has so long depended (2002, 995).  
 
State law, as I demonstrate in this chapter, is similarly being challenged by ‘local’ actors 
engaging with transnational soft-law standards and transnational legal activism. Territorial, 
regional, national, and transnational forms of law, politics and government are interwoven. This 
is not to suggest that each scale of politics does not have its own political effects, but rather to 
highlight that multiple structures and institutions interact through transnational politics. Just as 
mining governance is increasingly transnational, community resistance and organizing is 
informed by transnational human rights norms as they are articulated in the local contexts in 
which they are being mobilized (Merry 2006).    
Focusing on the transnational is important for understanding mining governance reform. 
Bonnie Campbell (2010) argues that after decades of liberalization in the African mining sector, 
functions often assumed to be the responsibility of the state have been delegated to actors in the 
private sphere, thus prompting demands for new means of extra-state or private governance. The 
transnationalization of mining governance has been articulated in part through the proliferation 
of transnational standards, including standards of corporate social responsibility. For example, 
critical development scholars Eduardo Canel et al. (2010) suggest that extractive activity has 
entered a new phase globally, in part due to the emergence of national and international 
voluntary codes of corporate conduct, corporate social responsibility and corporate community 
contracts (Canel et al. 2010, 8). The multiplication of governance regimes under neoliberal 
reforms have impacted the extractive industry in Africa. Transnational governance critics Hany 
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Besada and Philip Martin suggest that voluntary transnational initiatives might be understood as 
a new generation of mining governance in Africa (Besada and Martin 2015).  
The role of transnational law in local and national mining governance regimes is far from 
uniform; some suggest that the indeterminate effects of transnational laws indicate their lack of 
influence in challenging entrenched political economies. Kojo Busia and Charles Akong argue, 
for example, that developments in the transnational governance regime have not substantively 
challenged a structural history of expropriating capital in the form of rents from mineral 
resources that continues to characterize mining on the continent (2017, 6). Moreover, the 
aforementioned changes are arguably “limited to mechanisms and instruments” that are unevenly 
applied in dynamic and contested political and economic environments (Busia and Akong 2017, 
6). Nonetheless transnational law and activism have an effect to the extent that they contribute to 
the development of new discourses and practices in mining governance reform. Moreover, they 
coalesce with demands for the recognition of living law to provide a new terrain of political-legal 
struggle. Struggles for the right to community consent represent a site where transnational law 
has a key role in the negotiation and development of mining governance regimes.  
These insights parallel broader themes in studies of transnational law and governance.   
Neoliberal globalization demands an approach to governance that decenters the state, 
constitutional and international law, and looks instead “towards a functional characterization of 
governing activities" (von Benda-Beckman et al. 2009, 1), whereby there can be "a multiplicity 
of governance agents, who engage in new modes of exercising power, often guided and 
legitimized by 'alternative' legalities" (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009, 1-2). As I demonstrate, 
law plays an important part to the extent that it "constitutes, organizes, and legitimizes positions 
of authority of governance agents and governance activities" (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2009, 
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4). As state responsibilities are relegated to the transnational legal sphere and multilateral 
negotiations between non-state parties, a critical question emerges: how will the emergent body 
of norms be locally appropriated, and how will these norms cohere with national policy 
objectives (Campbell 2010, 210)? This question is pertinent in the context of transnational 
struggles for the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).  
The first recognized assertion of FPIC was in the International Labour Organization’s 
Convention 169.52 Today references to FPIC often UNDRIP where Article 32 requires that States 
must consult with indigenous peoples, through their own chosen institutions, in order to “obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their land or 
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization and 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources”. Advocates in South Africa first began 
discussing the applicability of FPIC in 2002 in negotiations over mining legislation, but in more 
recent years the principle has picked up new momentum in social struggles and NGO activism. 
Due to its origins in the international indigenous movement, whether FPIC applies to rural 
peoples in South Africa more generally has been questioned. Nonetheless, the use of FPIC in 
South Africa represents a step towards “reclaiming FPIC” from institutional embeddedness 
(Franco 2015). In sum, the struggle in Xolobeni, Eastern Cape, reveals how social struggles 
grounded in territorial claims to the authority of customary law are articulated through local 
histories, national law and jurisprudence, as well as FPIC and international human rights 
discourse to oppose state territorial governance legislated through the Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) .  
                                                 
52 South Africa has not ratified ILO Convention 169, however it is a signatory to the UNDRIP.  
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 A significant characteristic of the struggle in Xolobeni is that these people  are not 
‘indigenous’ in the dominant use of that term in South Africa; they are not Khoisan peoples and 
prior to this struggle did not self-identify as indigenous peoples. Yet, to some degree an 
indigenous identity has been embraced and taken hold: during a Human Rights Day event on 21 
March 2017 in the village of Sigidi (next to Xolobeni) many of the speakers referred to their 
struggle as an Indigenous Peoples’ struggle (Personal notes, 21 March 2017). During the court 
proceedings on 23 April 2018, Advocate Thembeka Ngcukaitobi (acting for the applicants) 
declared that “there is no question that the applicants are an indigenous people” to justify   
drawing upon international Indigenous Peoples’ rights and more specifically, the right to 
exercise FPIC.53 The fact that the people of Xolobeni were never dispossessed of their land 
during apartheid, have a long historical and cultural connection with their land, as well as a 
history of  continued marginalization by the state, appeared to be significant to their indigenous 
subjectivity being unchallenged.  
 In the next section of the chapter I provide an overview of the social and political context 
of mining governance reform in South Africa and describe the unique and rising power of 
traditional leaders in this context. In the third section I describe key legislative changes and the 
importance of jurisprudence on living customary law – as a key dynamic in the development of 
living law - in challenging the current legislative framework and, more specifically, the territorial 
authority of traditional leaders. In the fourth section I explain my approach to territorial 
pluralism in the context of mining governance. In sections five and six I introduce the struggles 
of the Amadiba people against a proposal for open cast mining on their land and explain the 
importance of integrating the transnational principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
                                                 
53 See hand held video recording of the proceedings, by John Clarke: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1geB7fLj74 
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and a revitalized conception of customary law to realize their substantive right to consent and to 
self-determined development. In section seven I conclude.     
7.3 Community Consent to Mining in South African Context 
Mining has long been an important resource in the South African economy. The mining industry 
provided 455,109 jobs in 2016, representing over 5% of all people formally employed nationally 
and providing annual employee earnings of R120 billion. In the same year, the mining industry 
reportedly represented 7.3% of the overall GDP of South Africa (Chamber of Mines, 2017, 15). 
While the figures are impressive, the industry has fundamentally failed to re-distribute wealth to 
historically marginalized black and indigenous peoples. This is a startling reality in the context 
of the post-apartheid promise to reform mining governance in the country. During the colonial 
and apartheid years mining capital was consolidated in the hands of the white minority. A 
reserve system was legislated demarcating 13% of the land area, called Bantustans, to the Black 
majority who made up 87% of the population, whose residents served as labour reserves for the 
extractive industry. After the first democratic elections in 1994 many believed that wealth 
produced through mineral extraction would be redistributed to serve an imagined national 
interest based on principles of democracy, equality, and human rights.  
During the transition to democracy the African National Congress (ANC) called for the 
nationalization of the mining industry and a transfer of all mineral rights to the state, a proposal 
appealing to millions of black and coloured South Africans who had so far not enjoyed the 
wealth produced by mining. However, powerful actors in the mining industry vigorously 
opposed proposals to transfer mineral rights to the state, using their private property rights and 
constitutional protection against expropriation without compensation as a key point of leverage. 
After years of negotiation with industry over legislation, starting with the Mineral Development 
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Bill, which was promulgated in the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA), the state response was a skeleton of the initial vision of redistribution. What remains 
are royalty payments to local communities, Black Economic Empowerment Schemes (BEE)54, 
mine-community partnerships, and social and labour plans as requirements for mining companies 
(Capps 2012). The 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), for example, 
indicates that its central objective “is to de-racialize business ownership completely through 
focused policies of black economic empowerment” (RDP 1994). The primary focus is to increase 
black participation in the industry by achieving 26% black ownership of mining operations. BEE 
is enforced through a list of ‘codes’ that measure company success in meeting affirmative action 
targets and by insisting that all mining companies meet legislated ownership requirements. 
Mining licences are only guaranteed security if this 26% black ownership benchmark is met and 
BEE codes are complied with (Capps 2012, 322; Tangri and Southall 2008).  
The impact of neglecting community rights has been devastating for people across the 
country. The legislated reform “above all remained a reform of mining policy  designed to 
accelerate capital accumulation in the mining industry by eliminating the barriers to 
investment… and control of mineral rights, not least by the mining houses themselves” (Capps 
2012, 316). What remains for communities are guaranteed royalty payments, but how these 
payments are to be used and managed is unclear.  
Moreover, there is a suggestion in the policy that such royalties could be converted to 
equity shares in local mining operations, but too often there have been no opportunities afforded 
for impacted communities to gain any ownership share in a particular mine. As a consequence 
                                                 
54 Black Economic Empowerment is broad-based policy objective introduced by the African National Congress. It is 
an affirmative action program developed to correct the racially skewed opportunity and wealth distribution – across 
all sectors of the economy - that was a product of colonialism and apartheid.  
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the main beneficiaries of mining reform have been well connected black elites and ‘traditional 
leaders’ who have been propped up as the de-facto representatives of rural communities and 
legitimate partners in mining, a reality that is now well detailed in case studies from across the 
country (Capps 2016, Claassens and Boyle 2015, Mnwana et al. 2016). Reform initiatives 
amount to a South African articulation of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), a global 
industry initiative oriented more towards giving gifts and reinforcing structures of patronage and 
dependency than redistributing profits or respecting the land and territorial rights of peoples 
impacted by mining (Rajak 2006). The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
describes significant poverty and socio-economic inequality in mining-affected communities, 
failed community consultation processes, as well as environmental degradation caused by 
widespread failure of mining companies to comply with environmental protection regulations or 
social and labour plans (SAHRC 2018). 
The failures of reform have recently been highlighted through public submissions to the 
High Level Panel on Assessment of Key Legislation and Acceleration of Fundamental Change in 
South Africa, a forum provided by the state to gather public input on the success and failures of 
the post-apartheid transition (HLP 2017). Public events uncovered an alarming number of stories 
from rural peoples that illustrated the extent of poverty and exclusion in mining-affected areas. 
Kgalema Motlanthe, the former South African Interim President and the chair of the forum, 
explained that the MPRDA disadvantaged communities while empowering traditional leaders to 
approve projects under the assumption that they represent everyone (Capazorio 2017). These 
testimonies are reinforced in research by Sonwabile Mnwana et al. (2016), who found that the 
new legislation has  
reproduced apartheid-style interpretation of communal property rights. Now 
chiefs (of different ranks) in these areas are empowered to become custodians 
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of communal and other natural resources. Not only does this go against many 
rural peoples' understanding of the authority of chiefs, it can also violate the 
cultural meanings attached to and connections with the land (Mnwana et al. 
2016, 13).   
 
Fundamentally the racial distribution and political economy of mining in South Africa has been 
incredibly resistant to change and rural peoples continue to bear the violence of mineral 
extraction.   
State initiatives to engage with communities have failed, often by design and often due to 
a lack of commitment by state actors to listen to community voices. Despite years of engagement 
in hearings for a proposed amendment to the MPRDA, submissions from participants remain 
largely ignored. During public consultations on the MPRDA Amendment Bill, stakeholders 
highlighted that the perspectives of communities, who have voiced their concerns about the 
legislation for years, have yet to be added to the text of the Bill. In their submissions on 28 June 
2017, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, the Legal Resources Centre, and the Land and 
Accountability Research Centre, all South African NGOs with a long history of working with 
rural communities, indicated that the issues raised in previous submissions remain absent from 
the Bill (PMG 28 June 2017). In the minutes from the meeting it is noted that the international 
NGO ActionAid was “flabbergasted that none of the contributions and inputs by civil societies 
had found their way into the Bill” (PMG, 28 June 2017). In addition to these glaring shortfalls, 
the dates and places of public hearings are routinely advertised only days before they are to take 
place. In Gauteng, for example, the residents of Blyvooruitzicht Mine Village were told about 
the hearing just two days earlier and promised transportation to the Johannesburg hearings, but 
the buses never came (Clements and Routledge 2017). Similar stories have emerged from public 
consultations regarding the Traditional Courts Bill, which supports forms of autocratic rule and 
demarcated traditional territories (Karimakwenda and Motala 2018). Public consultation, even in 
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the context of writing the legislative framework to govern mining in the country, seems more 
like a symbolic gesture here than a procedural practice mandated to contribute to the post-
apartheid legal dispensation. In any case, the MPRDA Amendment Bill was withdrawn in 
September 2018 to ‘spur investment’ in mining (Roelf 2018). The fact that it was withdrawn 
arguably further underscores the disregard for public participation in the drafting of new 
legislation.   
Political rhetoric routinely focuses on radical transformation in the mining industry. In 
June 2017 Minister of Mineral Resources Mosebenzi Zwane introduced a new Mining Charter 
with the purported purpose of transforming the mining industry. In a statement to the press in 
May 2017 Zwane declared that the Charter “is going to be one of the (most) revolutionary tools 
to be ever seen on the South African soil” (Boyle 2017). This is far from the truth in the Mining 
Charter finally introduced in September 2018. The 2018 Mining Charter states that mining 
development “requires a balance between mining and the mine community’s socio-economic 
development needs” (DMR 2018, 24). While including a need to consult with mining affected 
communities in the identification of development needs, it includes no requirement to obtain 
community consent.  
Under these conditions, communities have not stood idle. They have engaged 
strategically with reform processes and demanded that their rights be respected. Important gains 
have been made in litigation through the land restitution program. In the landmark Richtersveld 
decision the Constitutional Court recognized both the land and mineral rights of the Richtersveld 
community in the Northern Cape by upholding customary law and recognizing its evolving 
nature as peoples adapt to shifting social and economic conditions. As explained in the last 
chapter, living customary law articulates with Aboriginal title and indigenous rights to introduce 
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new norms and values into the land reform program, contributing to the ongoing emergence of 
the living law of rural land tenure. These developments set the stage for the struggle in Xolobeni.  
The ability of traditional leaders to partner with mining companies has been discretely 
introduced in legislation. The 2015 Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill, passed by 
Parliament on 26 February 2019 and sent to the President for assent, will effectively repeal the 
2003 Traditional Leadership and Governance and Framework Act, adding a new dimension to 
the power of Traditional Councils55 that had not been included in any previous legislation: the 
ability to enter into ‘partnerships’ with “any person, body or institution” (Section 24(2)(c)). This 
subtle Section marks a notable addition as no prior legislation or government funded research 
(including all six volumes of the 1999 Status Quo reports on Traditional Leadership, which are 
the most elaborate research reports on the status of traditional governance in post-apartheid 
South Africa), made any mention of the right of Traditional Leaders to enter into such 
partnerships. Furthermore, and most alarmingly, the right to enter into partnerships is not 
paralleled by any obligation to gain the consent of rural peoples whose land would be impacted, 
relying instead on the vague requirement that partnerships be subject to “prior consultation with 
the relevant community” (Section 24 (3)(c)(i)). This underscores some peoples’ belief that all 
land belongs to ‘their’ chief as a ‘customary’ right (Huizenga 2017).56 This addition adds a 
veneer of legality to the authority of Traditional Councils to partner with mining industry 
players. In the next section I explain how the authority of Traditional Councils and Traditional 
                                                 
55 As per the Traditional and Khoi San Leadership Bill Section 16, traditional councils are established by the 
traditional leader or traditional community by first, a notice in the Gazette or Provincial Gazette, and second through 
elections for 40% of the members selected to sit on the Council (for 5 years terms) and appointment of 60% of 
member in terms of the communities customs. Traditional councils are fundamentally a governing body of which the 
traditional leader, often referred to as a king or queen, is at the apex.  
56 In the White Paper on Traditional Leadership published by the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
(2000), it states that “Traditional councils may also enter into partnership and service delivery agreements with 
government, at all levels, to promote development”, however there is no mention of partnerships with non-state 
parties.  
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Leaders is being challenged through competing claims to authority, legitimacy, and territory 
made by those resisting extractive industry development in Xolobeni.  
7.4 Territory and Territorialization in Mining Governance Reform 
In South Africa, mining governance is fundamentally territorial. As I have already outlined, 
white colonizers used territorial designations as a key component of their colonial and apartheid 
strategy by restricting land ownership to the black and coloured population to the defined 
bantustans, or homelands, which accounted for 13% of the land area of the country. The 
governance of these areas was administered through traditional leaders who applied a version of 
‘customary law’ created to legitimize colonial power. Some of these leaders had legitimacy 
through African historical conventions, but their authority was further bolstered through colonial 
strategies that supported those traditional leaders most willing to serve the colonizers and their 
economic projects.   
Territorial jurisdictions and the role of traditional leaders is legislated through the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA), which sets boundaries that 
are further recognized by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). 
This legislation is interpreted in such a way that it has served to entrench geographic boundaries 
and ascribe ethnic identities (Claassens 2008, 2011). The striking irony is that this post-apartheid 
legislation directly mirrors apartheid jurisdictions and reinforces the authority of traditional 
leaders over their rural subjects. Sonwabile Mnwana and Gavin Capps argue that the effect of the 
post-apartheid legislation, such as the TKLB and MPRDA, “is that chiefs are increasingly 
controlling the interactions between mining corporations and the ‘traditional communities’ they 
formally represent… With the state’s support, traditional leaders have become powerful 
intermediaries of mining deals and mineral-led development in the former homelands” (2015, 6). 
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This approach has made consultation easier for many mining companies that negotiate with 
peoples impacted by their mining operations. Mnwana explains that while the strategy of 
supporting the power and authority of traditional leaders is vigorously resisted by communities 
across the country, the current conditions work in the favor of mining capital as companies “do 
not have to engage directly with thousands of rural residents before turning communal grazing 
and ploughing fields into massive open pits and multiple shafts: they just obtain the approval of 
the chief and the tribal council” (Mnwana 2015, 502). Civil society actors regularly argue that 
traditional leaders are again assumed to speak for rural peoples to the benefit of mining 
companies (see for example, HLP 2017, 266). 
How the interpretation of proposed legislation re-creates apartheid tribal boundaries is 
now well covered in the literature cited above. The relationship between law and territory is 
understood in this literature as determinative: the jurisdictions created through law directly 
translate to the landscape. Geographers and anthropologists use the framework of ‘territorial 
pluralism’ to examine how self-government, equitable forms of recognition, and power sharing 
arrangements are negotiated with the state (Simeon 2015, 3). They focus on the practices, 
processes and institutions through which rural and indigenous peoples negotiate land rights in 
conditions of “entangled territorialities” (Dussart and Poirier 2017) and assert “territories of 
difference” on cultural grounds (Escobar 2008). These perspectives introduce a more nuanced 
account of territorialization that illustrates practices, struggles, and institutions through which 
authority to access, use and make decisions about land and resources is negotiated. Law is 
approached not only as a means to draw boundaries, but also as a force in the constitution of 
space. As Nicholas Blomley explains, “[l]aw draws from and organizes space, and in so doing 
structures power relations in specific and highly consequential ways” (Blomley 2016, 595). As I 
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show, articulations of the right to collective consent in the context of large-scale development is 
one place to explore how spatialized and territorialized claims are being made over land to resist 
state forms of territory that favour powerful state and mining industry actors.  
7.5 Territory and Jurisdiction in the Amadiba People’s Fight Against Mining 
A struggle to cancel a mining licence granted in the Amadiba territory of the Eastern Cape 
province clearly demonstrates the territorial dimensions of mining governance and community 
resistance to exclusive forms of control over resources. Within the Amadiba territory is the 
Umgungungdlovu area that covers five different villages. These are the villages that will be 
impacted by the mining project either by forced dispossession or environmental degradation. 
Xolobeni, the community at the centre of the struggle, has been resisting attempts to mine their 
land for decades. In contempt of ongoing community protests, a mining license was granted in 
2007 to Transworld Energy and Mineral Resources (TEM), a subsidiary of the Australian owned 
Mineral Commodities Ltd. (MRC). A company set up under a black economic empowerment 
scheme called the Xolobeni Empowerment Company (XolCo) is a partner in the investment. The 
license covers an area of land 22 km long and 1.5 km wide along the Eastern Cape coastline, 
constituting 2867 hectares. The intention of TEM is open-cast mining on roughly 900 hectares of 
land within the mining area. As highlighted in court papers filed by Duduzile Baleni, “with 
stockpiles, dumps, treatment plants, pipelines, powerlines, access roads, offices, stores, vehicle 
parks, accommodation, workshops and other infrastructure taken into account, the physical area 
that will be disturbed by mining will be much greater than 900 hectares” (Founding Affidavit 
2017, para 28).  
There are no official reports from TEM that outline which homesteads will have to be 
displaced should the mining go forward, nor is there any indication of the compensation that will 
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be given to those impacted by the mining. Studies conducted by the community itself estimate 
that 70 to 75 households in the Xolobeni village, comprising more than 600 individuals who live 
within 1.5 KM of the coast, will likely be forced from their land (Founding Affidavit, para 47). 
Due to the ongoing activism of community members, as well as ongoing violence in the 
proposed mining area, culminating in the assassination of a leader in the opposition to the mine 
in March 2016, MRC divested from the project with the intention to sell its shares to Keyesha 
investments. Keyesha investments is owned by XolCo, although there is no evidence that the sale 
had taken place. On 15 September 2016 the Minister of Mineral Resources, Mosebenzi Zwane 
announced an intention to impose an 18-month moratorium on mining, and the moratorium was 
officially imposed in June 2017. In August 2018 the moratorium was extended for a two-year 
period. XolCo continues to advocate for the legitimacy of their licence to mine. Moreover, 
despite the claim that MRC has divested from the project, in their 2017 Annual Report, MRC 
Chairman Mark V. Caruso states: “Further development and divestment options are under 
consideration, noting that the project’s viability has been further enhanced by the 
commencement of the construction of the  N2 Toll highway” (MRC 2018, 8). The involvement 
of MRC in Xolobeni is likely far from over.57  
Those against the mine draw inspiration from a long history of rural resistance in the 
area. The Umgungundlovu community resisted apartheid authorities in the Mpondo Revolts in 
1960s, rising up against apartheid-era attempts to govern rural land and institute “betterment 
planning” through unaccountable chiefs. Geographers Thembela Kepe and Lungisile Ntsebeza 
                                                 
57 The N2 Toll Highway constitutes another area of significant struggle (however it remains outside the bounds of 
this chapter). It is a significant infrastructure development that has begun construction and that is planned to cut 
across much of the Amadiba territory, displace households, and significantly disrupt people’s ability to graze cattle 
and travel across the territory. The highway development is facing resistance to an extent on par with their resistance 
to the mining project. It is widely believed that the N2 highway is motivated to serve mining interests on the coast. 
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assert that the “Mpondo revolts by far represented the strongest statement by rural people against 
social, economic, and political forces that came together to deny them of their right to democracy 
and equality” (Kepe and Ntsebeza 2011, 2). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to cover this 
celebrated history but it provides a well of memory and motivation for today’s activists. 
The people of Xolobeni have long been advocating to stop mining on their land. In 2007 
they formed the ‘Amadiba Crisis Committee’ (ACC), which has become the organization 
representing the resistance in media and local protests. Their advocacy illustrates the dynamics 
of power relations in a context where the historical political economy of mining in South Africa, 
as well as transnational trends in mining governance, converge. It provides insights into what a 
rural community is up against as they struggle to have their fundamental human rights respected 
in the face of extractive industry.  
The recognition of collective rights to land in the context of mining disputes hinges in 
part on how peoples legitimate their claims to property and authority. Group claims to legitimacy 
are made by peoples within particular contexts where certain subjectivities and their 
characteristics may be recognized over others. As Lund and Boon highlight: 
[r]ecognition of property, citizenship and authority are mutually constitutive 
processes... Often, processes of recognition become focal points of contestation 
among groups in society. They become sites of resistance to the processes by 
which those wielding state policy, law, coercion and resources seek to gather 
(and sometimes, to institutionalize) power and control over resources and 
populations within their jurisdictions (Lund and Boon 2013, 2).  
 
Historical subject positions that influence the struggle in Amadiba include rural colonial 
subjectivity, indigenous subjectivity, and ‘community’ subjectivity as it has emerged through the 
land reform program. However, Amadiba peoples not only resist such generalized subjectivities, 
they re-appropriate them for their own ends.  
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In Amadiba there are particularly vocal disagreements over the authority of Chief Lunga 
Baleni which reveal ongoing contestations over jurisdiction, territory, and the right to self-
determined development. Under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act the 
governing body of the Umgungundlovu community is the Amadiba Traditional Council, and 
Chief Lunga Baleni is the chairperson of the Amadiba Traditional Council and the iNkosi 
(traditional leader) of the Umgungundlovu Traditional Community. According to ‘official’ 
records, Duduzile Baleni, while the acting iNkosana (headwoman) of the Umgungundlovu 
Traditional Community, reports to Chief Lunga Baleni, and therefore cannot act on the 
Community’s behalf.  The Australian mining company TEM, for example, claims that the only 
body that has the authority to launch an application to challenge the mining rights application is 
the wider Amadiba Traditional Council (within which the Umgungungundlovu community 
exists) and Chief Lunga Baleni, thus putting Chief Lunga Baleni in a higher status than Duduzile 
Baleni.  
However, in a press statement one of the community leaders, Nonhle Mbuthuma, states 
that “[t]he government categorizes the Umgungundlovu community as part of the Amadiba tribal 
authority or Traditional Council under chief Lunga, but the Umgungundlovu community rejects 
the leadership of chief Lunga insofar as chief Lunga supports the establishment of the titanium 
mine on the community land of the Umgungundlovu people” (Mbuthuma, 11 February 2016).58 
In an act of defiance against the authority of Lunga, Mbuthuma and members of the Amadiba 
Crisis Committee (ACC), argue that they reserve the right to choose their leader. Mbuthuma 
further argues that “the community defines itself as such [Umgungundlovu] and members share 
the same social values, similar economic interests and aspirations. We are governed by our own 
                                                 
58 The authority of Chief Lunga has also been discredited because he is a board member of XolCo, the local 
partnership corporation with stakes in the proposed mine.  
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customary law” (Mbuthuma 2016). Here, the reference to their ‘own customary law’ refers to a 
belief that the mechanisms for electing traditional leaders are not determined by state legislation 
but are be the product of community negotiation and decision-making. Determining which 
‘level’ or jurisdiction of community has the authority to define customary law is a key area of 
struggle and related conflict.  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline the history of conflict in the mining-
affected area, however conditions were volatile at the time of writing. On 22 September 2018 the 
Minister of Mineral Resources Gwede Mantashe visited Xolobeni to discuss the future of mining 
in the area. The meeting turned violent when police used teargas, stun grenades, and death 
threats against members of the ACC. Residents believe that people were brought in on buses 
from surrounding areas to express support for the mine. The ACC claimed that the meeting was 
rigged to include a speakers list of pro-mining residents; those who would be directly impacted 
and were against the mine were met with excessive police force and excluded from participating. 
Attorney Richard Spoor, who is representing the community, was arrested and charged with 
incitement to commit an offence (see Amnesty International 2018). This example demonstrates 
why the peoples resisting the mine had to affirm their identity as linked with the specific land 
and place so as to exclude others from making authoritative claims to being members and 
standing in as representatives of the ‘community’. Their legal argument responds to this 
complexity by drawing from customary, national, and international law to assert the right of 
peoples to participate in decision-making, individually, collectively, and through the leaders of 
their choice as determined by their lived practices of customary law. 
The specifics of the legal argument, outlined below, are important for understanding the 
dynamic and emergent character of indigenous and rural peoples’ rights. The case was heard in 
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the High Court of South Africa in Pretoria in April 2018. The Xolobeni community sought a 
declaratory order from the court on the status of their customary land rights in the context of 
extractive industry regulations. The claimants asserted their customary land rights as protected 
by the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA). IPILRA was introduced as a 
temporary measure to protect ‘informal’ or ‘communal’ land rights while the state produced 
permanent legislation to this effect. Due to the state’s failure to provide a legislative framework, 
IPILRA has been renewed annually since its introduction in 1997. In their court papers, and 
specifically in the Heads of Argument (Heads),  the applicants argue that IPILRA recognizes 
land rights to the extent that the land is owned both individually and collectively by the 
Umgungundlovu community (Heads, para 14), and would thus recognize  the layered and nested 
character of authority and decision-making under customary law whereby individuals, families 
and kin groups all have rights and responsibilities (see Cousins 2007).  
The applicants add content to the right to community consent by asserting South Africa’s 
obligations to uphold international laws and norms most fully articulated in standards of free, 
prior and informed consent (FPIC). Moreover, they insist that “FPIC must be obtained in a 
manner that is in accordance with the indigenous peoples' customary laws and practices of 
decision-making” (Heads, para 152), which, they contend denies the practice of majoritarian 
decision-making in favour of a consensus driven model (Heads, para 241.2). While traditional 
leadership and customary law are recognized by the South African Constitution, and further 
realized in the TLGFA, the Xolobeni community argues that other jurisdictions of customary law 
continue to be practiced despite not being ‘formally’ registered (Heads, para 254). The point that 
needs to be underscored here is that the litigation draws from emerging transnational norms on 
consent as well as adds to them in critical ways by affirming living law as the basis of historical 
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rights. They argue, for example, that customary law is a system of law that has its own values 
and norms, that it is the law that is practiced by the community, that it develops as the needs of 
the community change, and, finally, that customary law is determined in reference to the 
Constitution (Heads, para 235.1-235.4).59 By interpreting transnational norms through assertions 
of a revitalized customary law the applicants unsettle assumptions and generalizations about 
collective subjectivities. The significance of these arguments needs to be understood in the wider 
context of contested notions of ‘custom’ and ‘indigeneity’ in the South African context as 
explained in the last chapter.  
Despite its origins in the 1989 Tribal and Indigenous Peoples Convention and UNDRIP, 
regional trends in the application of FPIC reveal its recent application beyond self-identified 
indigenous groups to a wider range of collectivities. Emily Greenspan of Oxfam finds that UN 
treaties are interpreted as providing FPIC protections for rural communities who hold land 
collectively according to customary law (Greenspan 2014, 22). Significantly, the World Bank 
Environmental and Social Safeguards in August 2017 included development activities in the 
lands of “sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Local Communities” as requiring FPIC 
(2017, 107). Moreover, the South African Human Rights Commission recommends that the 
existing principles for consent in South Africa need to be harmonized with the principles of FPIC 
to uphold inclusive collective decision-making (SAHRC 2018, 66). The advocacy of the 
Amadiba community parallels these transnational developments by demanding in court that their 
right to FPIC be respected. This strategic work challenges the view that FPIC only applies to 
                                                 
59 These arguments are made in reference to Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2003 
(12) BCLR 1301 (CC), Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelistsha and Others 2004 (10) SA 580 (CC), and 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC).  
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self-identified Indigenous Peoples and further illustrates the creative and iterative development 
of legal norms towards upholding the right to say no.      
Some argue that FPIC is a form of neo-colonial governmentality that defines subjects and 
assumes their capabilities. For example, anthropologist Tania Li writes, “[b]uilding on the 
colonial legacies of governing them as collectivities, which is often enshrined in law, neoliberal 
governing treats Indigenous people as collective subjects or “communities” with a neoliberal 
twist: they are communities capable of exercising their ‘free, prior and informed consent’” (Li 
2016, 90). Li does little to acknowledge that FPIC is the product of indigenous peoples struggles 
to have customary forms of government recognized and further does not account for how FPIC 
continues to be a contested practice. While in some cases it is used as a means to govern the 
construction of community and collective agency, peoples also use it as a way to resist state 
attempts to define and determine ‘community’ boundaries. For example, unlike the smooth 
translation between FPIC and indigenous peoples assumed by Li, the application of FPIC is 
challenged in South Africa and increasingly  extended to all rural peoples who mobilize 
collectively against corporate incursions into historical territories to which they have attachments 
(Greenspan 2014; FAO 2014, SAHRC 2018). Rural peoples have been able to leverage FPIC 
because of experiences of colonialism and apartheid that legislated land dispossession and 
undermined their human and resource rights and are motivated to do so by their continued 
marginalization in law and policy today.  In South Africa the application of FPIC has been a way 
for rural communities to challenge distinctions between indigenous and rural peoples that are 
often assumed by those observing from afar and trying to determine the applicability of a 
particular law or legal category.  
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The struggles and strategies of the Amadiba community are expressed through broader 
demands for community rights. For example, the Mining and Environmental Justice Community 
Network of South Africa (MEJCON-SA) demands that FPIC is made part of the mining 
legislation, the MPRDA: “In order to transform the mining industry and promote equality, we 
submit that the MPRDA must be amended to include FPIC if any serious progress is to be made 
towards redressing past discrimination and power imbalances and to promote equality in the 
mining sector” (MEJCON-SA 20 June 2017). According to this network of communities and 
community-based organizations, FPIC demands much more than community engagement; it 
demands a complete re-arrangement of the relationships between mining companies and 
impacted communities, a relationship not defined by a top-down imposition of development 
plans, but one characterized by direct partnerships with impacted peoples. This is a challenge to 
the reality on the ground: “[i]n our experience, consultation processes are no more than box-
ticking exercises for the mining companies…  any substantive issues raised by communities do 
not have any bearing on the ultimate development programs implemented by mining companies 
and overseen by government” (MEJCON-SA 20 June 2017).  MEJCON-SA seeks to fulfill the 
intention of the legislation, which is to transform the mining sector, by giving communities a 
stake in the mine. Their approach is to reject conventional approaches to corporate social 
responsibility wherein the corporations determine the rules of engagement. They appropriate 
FPIC towards these ends.  
In the Amadiba struggle the people demand that the processes for seeking and attaining 
community consent be determined by the peoples in impacted communities in accordance with 
their own governance and decision-making practices (Founding Affidavit 2016). Their demands 
reflect assertions made in UN negotiations over FPIC. As stated in the Report of the International 
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Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent (E/C.19/2005/3), 
endorsed by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2005, the process of 
gaining consent must be directed by indigenous peoples themselves: “procedures concerning 
free, prior and informed consent should recognize indigenous customary law where it is relevant, 
and address the issue of who represents indigenous peoples” (UNESC 2005, Paragraph 15). The 
workshop participants argued that according to ILO No. 169 “the elements of good faith, 
representativity, and decision-making through indigenous peoples’ own methodologies were 
essential to free, prior and informed consent” (UNESC 2005, Paragraph 24).  Finally, it was 
concluded that “[a]s an important methodology, free, prior and informed consent is an evolving 
principle and its further development should be adaptable to different realities” (UNESC, 
Paragraph 42). Thus it becomes crucial to consider collective assertions of FPIC, to explore how 
it is used to make legible their positive engagement, political legitimacy. Their claims to FPIC, 
as a principle of customary law, are resistances against the colonial forms of power and neo-
colonial rural subject positions encouraged by the state. They articulate  an alternative vision of 
territorial jurisdiction against the history of imposed territory and the authority of state-backed 
traditional leaders that asserts a new form of self-determination.  
7.6 Practices of Self-Determined Development  
“The way I’m being involved to fight against mining is to occupy the land and use the land as 
much as possible” (Umgungundlovu villager, in Bennie 2017). 
 
State territorial jurisdictions are challenged by collective material and institutional practices that 
constitute land and resource use. Legitimating social relations of production and trade has been 
an important area of struggle for the Amadiba peoples as they resist discourses from first the 
conservation industry and second mining interests that label them as impoverished. Christian 
Lund and Catherine Boon highlight that “[c]ompetition for land may hinge on the interpretation 
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and significance of social relations that are forged around land use, or upon who has the political 
power to impose one interpretation at the expense of others” (Lund and Boon 2013, 2-3).  
The people of Amadiba resist historical and global conservation discourses that position 
them as poverty stricken and a threat to an ecologically significant area. It is widely 
acknowledged among critical scholars that the contemporary conservation industry in South 
Africa (state agents, many conservation activists who tend to be white and upper-middle class) 
has sustained an apartheid-era racial ontology that understands black rural peoples and their 
communities to be an impediment and threat to biodiversity conservation (Kepe 2018, 17). This 
wider context is relevant in the present case study, as the Umgungundlovu area is situated in 
what is known as the ‘Wild Coast’ in the Eastern Cape of South Africa. This area is known for 
its “unique flora” and “its extensive, rolling grasslands, which form as much as 80% of the 
coastal vegetation” (Kepe 2014, 2149). The region  has long been the focus of global and 
national conservationists, to the extent that it has become subject of a global conservation 
discourse: “over forty years environmental activists have used their own initiatives, global 
environmental discourses, and government legislation, as well as shortcomings of the apartheid 
and post-apartheid governments, to advocate for the conservation of sections of the Wild Coast” 
(Kepe 2014, 2144). This discursive rendering has not contributed to developing an understanding 
of the livelihood practices or resource rights of the people who live there but has rather created a 
perception of them threatening their own ‘vulnerable’ ecology through under-management and 
destructive land use practices. In this historical context state forms of power, partnered with 
mining industry proposals, appear to be the only authoritative form of territorialization. 
Community members actively contest the prevailing perception that they are poor and 
that their land is under-used. Many of the residents participate in both subsistence farming and 
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farming for market sale, and upwards of 90% of households in the proposed mining area sell 
excess produce. Their agricultural production stands out in a province where nearly 40% of 
people are found to be food insecure (Legal Resources Centre and Richard Spoor Inc. 2016, para 
21-22). In recent years, as protests against mining have intensified, villagers in one of the five 
villages in Umgungundlovu, Sigidi, decided to amplify their land-based agricultural practices as 
a means of resistance.  They have done this through two ways. First, by increasing the amount of 
land in the village that is farmed, and second by spreading the areas used for cattle grazing. As 
Andrew Bennie writes,   
In this sense, the Sigidi villagers have deployed agriculture as a tactic of 
resistance, giving literal expression to the notion that “resistance is fertile”. 
Tactics like these represent a particular form of stern defiance against the plans 
of a fledgling business class and state elite that, to them, has long severed itself 
from their humble desires: to keep their land, to decide what to do with it, to 
welcome others to appreciate it with them, and to be assisted in a forward-
looking approach that seeks to build on it rather than destroy it (Bennie 2017).  
 
Finally, the community asserts that their land is vitally important for the continued traditional 
medicine practices that are deeply connected to the land, landmarks, watercourses, the ocean, 
and burial sites that are slated to be moved if mining is to take place. Displacement would break 
links with their ancestors, links that are important for healing and could cause some to die in the 
area, according to traditional medicinal practitioners (ACC 2016). The community thus uses 
arguments characteristics of transnational biocultural rights.  
Through their resistance the peoples of Amadiba demonstrate that territories are 
physically inscribed through their cultural practices. In their work Thomas Sikor and Christian 
Lund argue that the exercise of authority often relies on territoriality. They argue that, “[b]y 
making and enforcing boundaries, by creating a turf, a quarter, a parish, a soke, a homeland etc., 
different socio-political institutions invoke a territorial dimension to their claim of authority and 
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jurisdiction” (Sikor and Lund 2009, 14). These markers create spaces that have different 
structuring effects on access and property (Sikor and Lund 2009, 14). The material aspects of 
jurisdiction have also been highlighted by legal geographer Nicholas Blomley, who finds that, in 
a much different context, hedges serve as material inscriptions on the landscape (Blomley 2007).  
Inscriptions on land need not always be material, however, to have proprietary 
consequence. In her discussion of community resource rights for aboriginal peoples in Australia, 
Johanna Gibson (2005) discusses how territory is not identified in relation to a specific place, nor 
is it understood as an object in relation to a legal subject. Rather it is understood as emerging out 
of community practice and customary laws. For example, while indigenous peoples may refer to 
natural features of the landscape to create ‘mental maps’ of a place, these natural features do not 
define a territory. Rather, territory evolves out of “the becoming of community, producing the 
site, the location, the “neighbourhood” of culture” (Gibson 2005, 234). The emergent 
territoriality relies on what geographer Robin Roth (2009) calls ‘dwelling space’, a spatiality 
distinct from ‘abstract’ space often produced through mapping technologies. Roth explains that 
abstract space produces ideas of “simple polygons” used to distinguish between forests, 
agriculture, private, communal, or one household’s plot as completely distinct from another’s. 
However, the spatiality of community territory is better thought of as a “dynamic arrangement 
produced through social relations and where each piece of land has multiple attachments to 
community and to family and to spirit" (Roth 2009, 217). In the case at hand, the material 
agricultural uses, as well as the daily relations and practices of collective government that are 
evidence of the living law, are exercises of affirming their own visions of development. The 
peoples of Xolobeni undermine historical racialized renderings of black people as threats to 
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biological diversity, and, moreover, challenge the specific discourse that positions the Amadiba 
people as impoverished and a threat to the ‘vulnerable’ ecology of the Wild Coast.  
Another way that the people of Ungungundlovu, as well as their advocates, have resisted 
narratives about their apparent underdevelopment, is by actively promoting the integrity and 
legitimacy of their local institutions and customary practices. For example, they consistently 
articulate the importance of their territory for the maintenance of networked social relations 
sustained through meetings at the sacred meeting place, or Komkhulu, and the relationship of 
these to customary law: “Our customary law builds from our dearly held meanings of our shared 
history, culture, individual and collective interests, together with our shared responsibility to 
sustain the life of our community” (Baleni 2016, para 68). Moreover, they state the importance 
of their land to their ongoing survival as a community:  
The households in the area engage in exchange relationships around food and 
food production. This sharing of resources includes the sharing of crops, sea 
harvests and animal products. The reciprocity also extends to food production 
and exchange of manure used for fertilizer, cattle used for ploughing of fields, 
and other similar activities. These inter-linkages are important for community 
cohesion and would be nearly impossible to reproduce if the community were 
to be relocated (Legal Resources Centre and Richard Spoor Inc. 2016, para 
23).  
 
The community clearly describes in their pleadings that this collective work is itself an 
expression of their customary law. These multiple community-based practices are all means to 
challenge state endorsed forms of territorialization and subjectification. Rather than succumbing 
to apartheid-era ‘traditional territories’ being re-entrenched by legislation such as the Traditional 
and Khoi-San Leadership Bill and the powerful lobbying of traditional leaders and transnational 
mining capital, they are demanding that their own practices are recognized as authoritative for 
the marking of jurisdiction.   
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Industry and state actors have tried to undermine the legitimacy of the Komkhulu as a 
decision-making authority by creating other institutional forms to ‘represent’ the community’s 
views. For example, the Xolobeni Empowerment Company (Xolco) is said to represent the 
community. However, although it was established in 2003, the community did not know about it 
until 2007. The board of directors was not elected by the community but rather appointed. The 
municipality has also attempted to create decision-making authorities to make decisions on its 
behalf. In March 2017 the leader of the ACC, Nonhle Mbuthuma, was invited to join a board of 
directors to help negotiate a deal with the mining company. She agreed to attend a meeting but 
found that she did not know any of the other participants and that none of the members were 
elected by the community to represent their views. After highlighting that this was an illegitimate 
board that had no authority to speak on behalf of the community, she left (Mbuthuma 2017). The 
actual local practices of making decisions collectively at the Komkhulu must be read against 
these efforts on behalf of the mining industry and the state as the former underscore the 
fundamental importance of historical, collective and institutional practice in challenging state 
attempts to assert authority over territory.     
In their struggle, the ACC asserts the importance of their livelihood practices and 
customary law in the context of historical marginalization, emphasizing the importance of 
keeping remedial justice central to mining governance reform in South Africa. The importance of 
supporting local community capacity to negotiate mining contracts as a remedial principle has 
been completely left out of mining governance reform, including the MPRDA. Reforms have 
instead focused on distributing wealth generated by mining through royalty payments. The 
importance of community empowerment as a remedial practice is articulated in the Xolobeni 
opposition to the granting of mining rights based on section 10 of the MPRDA:  
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The effect of mining on community land will include the loss of communal 
grazing land and access to natural resources. In respect of individual families it 
will also involve the loss of ploughing land and physical displacement. Such 
an impact is particularly intense given that the community’s current tenure 
insecurity is a direct product of colonial and apartheid degradation of the 
community’s rights and of their customary law (Legal Resources Centre and 
Richard Spoor Inc. 2016, para 83).  
 
The issue of community consent as a remedial practice in light of colonialism is left out of nearly 
all contemporary discourse and practice of community consent. 
 The livelihood practices, cultural traditions, and customary governance systems were 
recognized and affirmed when, on 22 November 2018, High Court Judge Anneli Basson ruled in 
favour of the people of Xolobeni and the wider Ugungundlovu community. Judge Basson found 
that the applicants have the right to be consulted, under the MPRDA, and to consent to 
development on their land, as required by IPILRA. The judgement highlighted that what is at 
stake is not only ‘land’ but the way of life of the Umgungundlovu community, which is realized 
through the intrinsic link between the land and communal relations between individuals, 
households (umzi), and the wider community. Moreover, Judge Basson acknowledges that the 
community’s vulnerability is due to the historical marginalization of customary law and the 
denial of the cultural and religious significance of their territory. The applicants “may not be 
deprived of their land without their consent” and the community must be allowed to make a 
decision “in terms of their own custom” before any proposed deprivation of land takes place 
(Baleni 2018, Para 83). The role of international law, including FPIC, in interpreting the rights of 
the applicants is affirmed in the High Court Judgment (Baleni 2018, Para 20, 27, 78). While this 
is certainly a victory, an appeal has already been filed. Due to the nature of the case it is 
predicted that the arguments will eventually be heard in the Constitutional Court. The outcome 
of the case will determine how this particular struggle will contribute to the development of 
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national law and policy on mining governance. Nonetheless, the political and social struggle, 
articulated in part through the Xolobeni court struggle, has had material effects to the extent that 
mining has been halted. This stop has opened a space for the declaration of alternative claims to 
community, property, territory and consent.  
7.7 Conclusion 
I have demonstrated that the right to community consent in the context of mining governance 
represents a new form of governmenality in post-apartheid land reform. Beyond resisting 
particular laws that facilitate the participation of a few in mining ownership and management, 
communities in South Africa are in a position where they must also challenge the legitimacy of 
the territorial jurisdictions in which they live as well as state authority to make decisions about 
their land. This often involves resisting imposed chiefly authority. Their elaborated claims to 
consent include descriptions of their customary processes of decision-making, challenge the 
assumed sovereignty of the state and promote alternative understandings of community-based 
territorial jurisdiction. They draw importantly from emerging norms on community consent, 
including FPIC, in this struggle to protect their land. The articulations of community consent 
constitute resistance to state territorialities. In neoliberal conditions, wherein scholars have found 
that non-state actors are playing a significant role in processes of re-territorialization elsewhere 
on the continent (Corson 2011), communities and their advocates in South Africa are similarly 
asserting alternative forms of territorial authority and legitimacy against colonial and post-
colonial state designations. In this example I have argued that livelihood practices and assertions 
of customary law in the Amadiba territory are themselves a form of re-territorialization, a re-
assertion of the legitimacy and authority of cultural practices and relations of reciprocity over the 
land.    
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Mining in South Africa exists in the context of ongoing struggles over territory, which 
involve struggles over the authority to make decisions over land and resource use. This chapter 
demonstrates that historical forms of territory, deriving from colonial jurisdictions of chiefly 
authority, are being challenged by community-based and locally-asserted practices of 
territorialization. These practices of territorialization include agricultural practices of production 
and trade, participatory deliberations that respect customary roles and responsibilities, and the 
right to determine their own customary representatives. In line with transnational trends in the 
emergence of FPIC, the community demands that they must have the right to determine the 
processes through which consent is granted, based on their customary law. The living law of 
rural tenure security is mobilized in a new form of governmentality whereby the state and 
industry actors are active players both subject to and the subject of this field of government.  
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8 CONCLUSION: THE EXPANDING TERRITORIES OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The introduction of a constitutional democracy in South Africa in 1994 is a triumph celebrated 
by human rights advocates around the world. However, while the end of racialized segregation in 
the country was applauded, the post-apartheid state inherited a landscape that bore scars from 
centuries of colonialism and apartheid that would prove to be very difficult to heal. Twenty-five 
years after the end of apartheid the histories of forced dispossession, colonial governmentalities 
and forms of territorial government are far from undone; they are, however, re-configured, but 
not by law alone. In this dissertation I argue that the racialized territorial distinctions created 
under apartheid are being reconfigured in contemporary conditions of transformative 
constitutionalism and neoliberalism. In these conditions, customary law has emerged as a central 
site of post-colonial struggle – through which I identify the articulation of indigenous rights, 
chieftaincy, human rights, and property through the courts, NGOs, and state agencies; I illustrate 
the development of living law in these dynamics. I have delineated the contours of a variegated 
landscape of neoliberal government and its effect on the constitutive relationship between space 
and law. I show that assertions of customary law are not exhausted by the Constitutional 
protection of cultural rights and the specific claims of traditional leaders. Rather than ascribing 
customary law to the ‘traditional territories’ of apartheid or the product of living localized 
practice and assertion, customary law – as a site of struggle - is better understood as productive 
of new legal geographies and collective subjectivities. The dissertation adds a critical perspective 
to literature on colonial legal geographies (Blomley 2003, Kedar, Amara, Yiftachel 2018) by 
demonstrating some of the ways that rural peoples in South Africa leverage opportunities in 
conditions of legal pluralism to expand the possibilities for justice.    
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In this concluding chapter I recap the arguments made throughout this dissertation by 
way of an analysis of two recent judgements – the Maledu Constitutional Court Judgement 
decided on 25 of October 2018, and the Baleni (Xolobeni) High Court Judgement, decided on 22 
November 2018. The judgements are placed in the contexts of the social struggles through which 
the court proceedings have emerged. Reading the judgements together demonstrates the different 
ways that customary law is taken up in court and in social movements and illustrates the ongoing 
constitutive relationship between law and space in conditions of transformative constitutionalism 
and neoliberalism. I summarize and analyze the judgements in the wider political context of 
social struggle identified in this dissertation. The summary I provide is thus much more than an 
analysis of jurisprudence, it is an explanation of emergent norms produced through the 
relationships between community members, their advocates, NGOs, traditional leaders, and 
extractive industry interests.      
8.2 History, informal land rights, and community autonomy in Maledu (2018) 
In the Constitutional Court judgement, Maledu v. Itereleng Bakgatla Minerals Resources Limited 
(2018) (Maledu), AJ Petse began with a citation that surprised many observers and 
commentators:   
The statement by Frantz Fanon in his book titled “The Wretched of the Earth” 
is, in the context of this case, apt. It neatly sums up what lies at the core of this 
application. He said that “[f]or a colonised people the most essential value, 
because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will 
bring them bread and, above all, dignity”. Thus, strip someone of their source 
of livelihood, and you strip them of their dignity too (Maledu 2018, Para 1).   
 
This reference to Franz Fanon was certainly the assertion of what can only be described as an 
activist court. More significantly, it is a statement that demands an acknowledgement of the 
relationships between livelihoods and land security and by implication, the work of cultural 
rights in land reform.  
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The judgement concerns a collectivity self-identified as the Lesetlheng community. They 
live on a farm called Wilgespruit in the North West Province. The case dealt specifically with an 
application for leave to appeal against a judgement in the High Court of South Africa, where it 
was determined that the applicants were justifiably and lawfully evicted by Itereleng Bakgatla 
Mineral Resources (Pty) Limited (IBMR) and Pilanesberg Platinum Mines (Pty) Limited (PPM) 
(the first and second respondents, respectively) who had mining rights to the land.60 The 
respondents argued that the community provided their consent to mining in a 2007 meeting, but  
the Lesetlheng community argued that they were not represented at the meeting and therefore did 
not and could not consent.  
In deciding the case, the court first had to determine the history of land alienation 
experienced by the applicants. The forebears of the applicants purchased the farm in 1919. 
However, due to conditions of institutionalized racism under colonial rule, the purchasers were 
not allowed to own the farm, so they registered the farm in the name of the Minster. Moreover, 
the deed of the farm indicated that the Minister held the farm on behalf of the wider Bakgatla-ba-
Kgafela community. The colonial government did not recognize the community as a separate and 
autonomous entity from the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela at the time of purchase. According to the 
applicants, it was accepted at the time of purchase that it was the Lesetlheng community who 
contributed to the purchase price and therefore had rights to the land exclusive of the wider 
Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community. However, the court chose not to deal with the question of 
ownership of the farm as the Lesethlheng community had recently applied for a title deed for the 
farm through the Land Titles Adjustment Act and the process to determine ownership was 
                                                 
60 The respondents are holders of the rights to mine for platinum group metals and associated minerals on the farm, 
awarded to them under section 23 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act. 
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ongoing (Maledu 2018, para 83).61 This is a significant fact of the case because it provided the 
court the opportunity to deal with the question of informal land rights as protected by the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA). The determining issue was if the "the 
applicants are without a legal remedy simply by virtue of the fact that they constitute a 
community whose tenure of the farm in issue here is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices" (Maledu 2018, para 31).62 IPILRA stipulates “no person may 
be deprived of any informal right to land without his or her consent” (IPILRA, Section 2).  
The judgement deals precisely with determining the specific history of dispossession 
experienced by the applicants and the governance relationship between rural communities and 
the traditional territory within which they reside. In Chapter Two I demonstrated the iterative 
history through which traditional leaders were made authorities within designated traditional 
territories throughout colonialism and apartheid. Important pieces of legislation during these 
periods include the 1913 Native Land Rights Act and the 1927 Native Administration Act, and the 
apartheid-era 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. This legislation was indicative of the production of a 
governmental rationality that used racial markers to determine rights and entitlements, including 
the right to own land and travel within the country. Colonization and apartheid, I argued, relied 
on the dual role of forced dispossession and racialized government.  
While the apartheid government was an extreme representation of a colonial project of 
divide and rule and the creation of a bifurcated state (between common law citizens and subjects 
of customary law), legal anthropologists have long demonstrated that customary law is better 
                                                 
61 This process has introduced its own tensions within the community, however, as peoples have been asked to 
produce records and family trees indicating who exactly were the descendants of the original purchasers. In the 
process, distinctions between the buyers and non-buyers has become a point of contention and inter-communal 
conflict (Mnwana and Capps 2015, 20).   
62 This is in reference to Section 25(6) of the Constitution: “A person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress”. 
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understood through its changing nature within fields of social action and political practice. 
Significantly, it is best understood not as a system derivative of a singular chief, but rather as 
deriving from multiple authorities within a sociohistorical context (See Moore 1986, White 
2015). In Maledu we can identify how the Constitutional Court is untangling colonial 
assumptions about traditional leadership, traditional territories, and the subjectivity of 
communities who live within their borders. Rather than dealing with the question of ‘ownership’ 
through an absolutist property lens (cf. Van der Walt 2009), the judgement focused on the basis 
of informal land rights, and more precisely on the process that needs to be followed in order to 
gain the consent of a collectivity threatened by forced dispossession (if mining were to 
commence on the land that they occupied). By addressing the question of territorial authority, the 
spatialized and territorialized landscapes of colonialism and apartheid are being unwoven 
through the social, political, and legal struggles that peoples are waging and through the resulting 
jurisprudence.  
In Chapter Three I explained that the post-apartheid state inherited not only a country 
divided between racialized territories and extreme inequalities based on racial classifications, but 
also a form of government reliant on chieftaincy. It is in this context that a model of 
constitutional democracy was introduced to facilitate structural social and economic 
transformation. The Constitution included an entrenched Bill of Rights and legislated land 
reform as a central pillar of transitional justice. Existing literature on South African 
constitutionalism optimistically forecast the significant role of  courts in fostering and achieving 
wide scale social change, but the opportunities and barriers that characterize the practice of 
adjudication, social movements and their interaction with the courts, and the politics of 
interpretation in law and litigation are now recognized as significant impediments. I conclude the 
205 
 
chapter by explaining that while the Constitution and the Constitutional Court are the institutions 
through which transformation is imagined to be facilitated, sociolegal studies scholars know that 
courts often have a limited role in achieving wide scale social change. Moreover, an approach to 
studying transformative constitutionalism must remain attuned to the dialogical relationship 
between law and social change. An alternative framework that recognizes the indeterminacy of 
legal struggle and seeks to locate creative advocacy and consider its surprising social 
consequences is more adequate for understanding struggles for landed justice and livelihood 
sustainability.  
The Maledu judgement demonstrates the extent to which social advocacy influences the 
court’s interpretation of history and legislation. The judgement was handed down in the political 
context of rising discontent among mining affected communities and increasing community 
resistance to extractive industry (SAHRC 2018). Community resistance to the Bakgatla-ba-
Kgafela chief, Nayala Pilane, has been particularly intense and resulted in village-level protests 
(Mnwana and Capps 2015). It is in these conditions that the rights of communities to have a say 
in decision-making in the context of extractive industry. AJ Petse determined that IPILRA had to 
be read in line with the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA).63 He 
ruled in response to the spirit of the Constitution, asserting the legislation at stake (IPILRA and 
MPRDA) needs to be interpreted in line with the Constitutional commitment to dealing with 
histories of racialized deprivation (Maledu 2018, Para 34). The court determined that “the 
MPRDA must be read, insofar as possible, in consonance with IPILRA… There is no conflict 
between these two statutes; each statute must be read in a manner that permits each to serve their 
                                                 
63 This judgement was handed down a month before the Xolobeni judgement and certainly had a significant role to 
play in their victory; in Xolobeni the applicants sought a declaratory order on the protection of informal land rights, 
as per IPILRA, which includes the right to consent, against the lesser right of consultation in MPRDA. Thus, in 
many ways, this judgement offered the declaration before Xolobeni was decided.   
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underlying purpose" (Maledu 2018, Para 106). The court finds in this regard that IPILRA and the 
MPRDA need to be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection of informal land rights, 
and the issue that IPILRA seeks to remedy (histories of dispossession) must be held as the 
primary concern of the court (Maledu 2018, para 63). The judgement protects the right to 
consent to mining, rather than merely consultation. To support this argument, AJ Petse draws 
from the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and from transnational and regional 
norms on free, prior and informed consent.64 After referring to how FPIC and the associated right 
to development and customary decision-making practices inform customary law in South Africa, 
AJ Petse ruled that customary law must be understood in line with “the values underpinning our 
constitutional order such as dignity, the right to participate in the cultural life of one's choice and 
equality" (Maledu 2018, para 94). In this judgement an understanding of customary law emerges 
that is informed by the local, regional and transnational struggles of rural and indigenous peoples 
and their asserted norms and standards for protecting land and livelihoods.  
As I explain in Chapter Four, two main collective subjectivities have emerged through 
the land reform program: collective property-owning subjects as communal property associations 
and traditional leaders. These subjectivities are often in conflict, to the degree that the 
Department of Land Affairs now discourages the establishment of CPAs, a policy direction that 
benefits traditional leaders. I argue that this bias, which pits traditional leaders against collective 
property holding subjectivities, can be traced back to the narrow interpretation of cultural rights 
in the context of land reform and the general lack of recognition of the relationship between land 
                                                 
64 “The amici also argued that for the consent contemplated in section 2(1) to be effectual it must be free, granted 
prior to deprivation and be informed. This, the amici argued, is in line with South Africa’s international law 
obligations. Amongst the binding international instruments applicable to determining the nature of consent is the 
African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). The African Charter does not expressly provide 
for the concept of free, prior and informed consent, but it is generally understood that this concept is inherent in 
certain guarantees such as the right to self-determination (article 20), right to development, (article 22(1)), and even 
arguably the right to information (article 9)." (Maledu 2018, 72).  
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and cultural rights. The history of cultural rights in the country is being refracted in 
contemporary conditions of neoliberalism, however, as both traditional leaders and community 
groups draw on culturalized rights in diverse struggles and through different means. In these 
conditions traditional leaders have been able to leverage cultural rights in the context of a global 
extractive industry that provides opportunities for cultural legitimation through corporate social 
responsibility initiatives. Extractive industry actors have offered fewer opportunities for smaller 
self-identified collectivities to enunciate their cultural practices, particularly when these practices 
are at odds with the interests of traditional leaders partnering in mining agreements. However, 
Maledu provides a promising example in regard to the Constitutional Court’s recognition of the 
link between land and cultural rights. While the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela has leveraged cultural 
rights in relation to both state and non-state actors in the extractive industry to legitimate their 
control of land and territory, the Constitutional Court recognizes the cultural significance of land 
for the claimants.  
In Maledu land rights are rendered not as property but as a form of historical cultural 
practice through the recognition of historical forms of collective decision-making. The 
judgement is not coloured by assertions of living customary law and/or clearly specified cultural 
rights,65 however the logic behind the decision-making represents a clear move away from 
understanding land as fundamentally a question of property to land as part of a wider cultural 
context. This is accomplished when A.J. Petse demonstrates that deprivation of land rights are 
not only about the ownership of a particular plot, but the conditions and processes through which 
                                                 
65 The Land Access Movement of South Africa (LAMOSA) and the Land and Accountability Research Centre 
(LARC) acted as amici curiae and submitted evidence of the character of customary law and decision-making to the 
court. However their submissions were restricted on the grounds that they were not allowed to submit new evidence 
nor were they allowed to submit evidence was “incontrovertible or capable of easy verification” (Maledu 2018, para 
38).  
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decisions about the land are made, as asserted through the importance of FPIC cited above. The 
territorial control of traditional leaders was fractured in this case when the Lesetlheng 
community were able to assert their rights to the land. 
In Chapter Five I explain that the Richtersveld decision introduced Aboriginal title as a 
means to recognize customary law as a form of sui generis indigenous law that is legitimated by 
the fact that it pre-dates colonization and re-articulated in the language of human rights. The 
judgement is significant for what it has enabled: the entry of more diverse forms of rights claims 
– in the form of indigenous rights and culturalized claims to land and territory – into legal, 
political and social struggles for land security. To this end, Richtersveld represents a pivotal 
moment that allowed customary communities to re-articulate indigenous rights in their struggles 
for the recognition of customary law as a basis for land rights. Moreover, I demonstrated that 
Richtersveld needs to be read in the history and context of indigenous rights activism in South 
Africa. It provided new opportunities which peoples have leveraged to make themselves legible 
as collective subjects defined apart from traditional authorities.  
In conclusion to this analysis of Maledu, the significance of the judgement needs to be 
read in light of the complex forms of dispossession and deprivation that South Africans 
experienced under colonialism and apartheid, as well as the ethos of transformative 
constitutionalism that marked the end of apartheid rule. Finally, it needs to be read in light of the 
kinds of pressures that rural peoples face in conditions of neoliberal political economy of 
extraction and opportunities afforded under conditions of neoliberal governmentality. The 
judgement draws from international norms on community consent and re-articulates them with 
the standards set out in IPILRA; moreover, it offers its own interpretation of the relevance of 
international norms in the local context. Its significance is illustrated through a summary reading 
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of the history of colonialism and apartheid, the advent of Constitutional democracy, the 
relationship between the development of a land reform program and neoliberalism. It is this 
judgement that paved the way for the High Court Judgement in the Xolobeni struggle. 
8.3 Living customary law and culturalized rights in Baleni (2018) 
The High Court Judgement Baleni and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others 2018 
on the rights of the Xolobeni community was a landmark case for its recognition of informal land 
rights and the collective right to community consent in the context of extractive industry. By 
determining that both IPILRA and the MPRDA need to be read in tandem, Maledu set the stage 
for the Baleni judgement. Significantly, the decision illustrates the living history of customary 
law in the country, beginning with Richtersveld. 
The history of resistance to dispossession and imposed development in the region and the 
way that the community asserted their customary practices through litigation is a unique aspect 
of Baleni. As described in Chapter Five, the Richtersveld judgement introduced the idea that 
customary law is ‘living’, meaning that it changes in response to shifting political, economic and 
social conditions as people govern their own lives. Following the Richtersveld judgement, critics 
and the courts began using the term ‘living customary law’ as a way to make land tenure 
relations legible as culturalized rights. There are, however, many different kinds of living 
customary law that are constructed by many different actors in different situated contexts.  
In Chapter Six I caution against what I identify as a tendency to generalize about the 
character of living customary law in critical scholarship. I use a number of empirical examples to 
demonstrate that living customary law should be approached as a culturalized assertion of 
custom that has affiliations with a global trend in asserting cultural rights. The articulation 
between customary law and international Indigenous Peoples’ rights by communities and 
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advocates, for example, demonstrates the nuances of custom and the extent to which it represents 
a way of life, form of governance, and claim to territory. Moreover, the variation in uses of 
living customary law indicate that a dichotomous view of living customary law vs codified 
customary law is not accurate in contemporary conditions of neoliberalism whereby forms of 
government are dispersed through assemblages of actors. In these conditions, the state is not the 
only means through which collective claims to land rights are made nor is it the only audience 
for community resistance as peoples engage with regional and transnational actors, as well as 
transnational norms, in order to legitimate and make legible their claims. In this conjuncture of 
revitalized customary law and rights-based assertion we can identify the generative force of 
living law.   
In Chapter Seven I focus on the Xolobeni struggle and illustrate how the trends that I 
have identified in the previous chapters coalesce in a particular case study and have the effect of 
contributing to new forms of territorial assertion that challenge legislated traditional territories. 
The effects of this convergence on land rights are pronounced in the context of mining 
governance. The case demonstrates how culturalized rights are being articulated with custom and 
indigenous rights in novel ways, and, importantly, how such assertions draw on and in turn 
influence transnational norms, particularly free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). In Xolobeni 
we can identify the inter-related ways that the applicants – members of the Xolobeni community 
– identify themselves as an autonomous collectivity defined by their historical, cultural and 
spiritual connection to land, their local governance practices, and their agricultural production 
and trade. The case study exemplifies many of the dynamics that I have explained throughout the 
dissertation – transformative constitutionalism, neoliberal governmentality, and emergent 
indigenous rights – and their effect on forms of re-territorialization. The case (including the 
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judgement and community struggle) is used to illustrate how we can begin to identify and 
conceptualize new forms of territorialization in land reform through collective expressions of 
customary land governance and rural land-based practices.  
8.4 Territories of culturalized rights 
The case studies and examples used throughout this dissertation represent the emergence of 
“property on the margins” as peoples challenge a centralist and hierarchical model of property 
rights (van der Walt 2009). It is here that we can identify how post-apartheid legal regimes are 
challenged and reconfigured and new forms of collective subjectivities are emergent. The range 
of rights made legible through the articulation of customary law and indigenous rights as forms 
of culturalized rights include far more than property in land, however, and the case studies in this 
dissertation encourage further explorations. For example, areas where resource rights are a 
means by which land as territory is claimed include small-scale fishing rights (Sowman and 
Sunde 2018, Sunde 2014), intellectual property and rooibos tea in the form of a geographical 
indication (Coombe, Ives and Huizenga 2014, Ives 2014), indigenous knowledge (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2011, Suchanandan 2018)66, conservation (Kepe 2018), and cultural heritage (Meskell 
2012). In these areas of struggle culturalized rights are asserted to express how land is central to 
livelihoods and identities. These areas of struggle likely push the boundaries of a hierarchical 
property paradigm and a liberal conception of bounded units of land with clearly identified 
owners by promoting an ethic and philosophy of stewardship over environmental resources 
(Bavikatte 2014). Moreover, they challenge the scalar distinctions embedded in interpretations of 
                                                 
66 In recent years the South African government has opened Indigenous Knowledge Documentation Centres to assist 
in the documentation, protection, and management of indigenous knowledge. At the time of writing (April 2019), 
the Protection, Promotion, Development and Management of Indigenous Knowledge Systems bill had been 
approved by Parliament to be signed into law by the President. See also the South African submission to the 
International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where state representatives promote what they 
call an ‘ambition program’ for the protection of indigenous knowledge in South Africa (2015, Para 162). 
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‘local’ struggles over land by demonstrating the multi-scalar and multi-sectoral nature of 
contemporary struggles over land in conditions of neoliberalism.  
 An emergence of transnational rural and Indigenous Peoples’ rights are identified by 
lawyer and researcher Sanjay Kabir Bavikatte (2014). Bavikatte focuses on stewardship as a 
defining characteristic of emergent rights in the context of living law. He identifies the 
emergence of what he calls biocultural rights through the convergence of three social movements 
– the post-development movement, the commons movement, and the movement of the rights of 
indigenous, tribal and traditional communities. Biocultural, he explains, denotes “a way of life 
that emerges from a holistic dynamic between Nature and culture” (Bavikatte 2014, 2). His 
definition of biocultural rights parallels the explanations of living law and ubuntu above to the 
degree that they focus on establishing and maintaining relationships:  
Biocultural rights therefore denote all the rights required to secure the 
stewardship role of communities over their lands and waters. This role 
represents a way of life where the identity of a community, its culture, 
spirituality, systems of governance, and traditional occupations are inseparable 
from its lands and waters. The relationship of the community to its territory is 
akin to a fiduciary duty of care and protection, rather than an exercise of 
dominion (Bavikatte 2014, 16-17).  
 
Biocultural rights are emerging through the collective work of international actors, including 
local community organizations advocating for their stewardship rights, civil society 
organizations, environmental lawyers, and others, as well as international treaties (including 
most importantly the Convention on Biological Diversity) and the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.67  
                                                 
67 “The discourse on biocultural rights is spilling over from the CBD to other UN and international fora and other 
environmental conventions such as the World Intellectual Property Organization Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (WIPO-IGC), the Commission on 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA), the UN Convention on Combating Desertification 
(UNCCD), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)” (Bavikatte 2014, 19-20). 
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The multi-scalar conditions and characteristics of land-based struggle are briefly elaborated 
here in relation to the South African concept of uBuntu and the global emergence of biocultural 
rights. The emergence of stewardship rights closely resembles the South African ethic of uBuntu. 
uBuntu refers to an aspiration, a process of being-together, that is fulfilled not by achieving an 
end goal, but by the progression inherent in working towards that goal (Cornell 2014: 76). 
Political philosopher Drucilla Cornell explains its relevance in post-apartheid South 
Africa: “uBuntu underscores an activist ethic of virtue and responsibility, in which who and how 
we are as human beings is not only relational but also turns us back to how we can try to create 
an ethical relationship that was rendered impossible by the brutality of colonialism and 
apartheid” (Cornell 2014: 67).  The arguments that I make in this dissertation add a critical lens 
to the role and influence of uBuntu and biocultural rights in South Africa, where the emergence 
of living law and its culturalized assertions are articulated in response to histories of 
colonization, historical forms of dispossession and property, and the promise of human rights in 
the context of transformative constitutionalism.  
8.5 Conclusion: The generative force of living law 
In order to properly understand the dynamics of contemporary struggles over land in South 
Africa, advocates and researchers need to account for the constitutive effects of constitutionalism 
and neoliberalism, and the diverse actors and relations through which they leverage authority and 
legitimacy. Variegated neoliberalism produces multiple governmentalities that provide 
opportunities for peoples to assert legitimacy and re-create their subjectivity in the process. For 
example, peoples draw from the Constitution, regional and transnational norms on land tenure 
rights to re-make customary law as a form of culturalized right to communicate and protect land-
based traditions and livelihoods, local governance practices, and ways of life. Through 
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transnationalized struggles constituted by custom and culturalized rights, peoples express a 
contemporary claim to alternative legalities to challenge historically sedimented colonial 
governmentalites to assert their rights to land.  
The constitutive relationship between law, space and territory is a defining feature of 
rural struggles for land rights. While some critics describe how colonial legal geographies are 
‘entrenched’ or neoliberal governmentalities determine the emergence of particular 
subjectivities, my research demonstrates the indeterminate nature of legalized rural struggle. 
Moreover,  this dissertation illustrates some of the ways that legalities are contributing to re-
territorializations in the country and insists upon  an engagement with the territorialization of 
property which we should recognize as “a continuing project, dependent on the continued 
alignment (and periodic uncoupling) of multiple resources and ways of seeing and doing” 
(Blomley, 2015, 600). Localized struggles for culturalized rights over territory provoke new 
forms of legal pluralism and invigorate the constitutive relationship between law and space (von 
Benda Beckman et al 2014, Griffiths 2013, Coombe 2016, 2017). The articulation of living 
customary law, indigenous rights and Aboriginal title has provided new opportunities for land 
claimants to draw on culturalized rights and discourses to contest post-apartheid collective 
subjectivities that were born out of the land reform program and in effect produce new legal 
geographies of property and human rights. Transformative constitutionalism paired with 
neoliberalism have produced the conditions for the birth and generative force of living law in 
rural struggles for land tenure.   
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